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INJURY DETERMINATIONS IN ANTIDUMPING
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
EDWIN A. VERMULST*

Maybe it is getting into the hands now of men who do have ideas, and
these ideas may be protectionist. If such is the case what they can do
with that dumping law will make the escape clause look like small
potatoes. They can, if they wish, raise the effective tariff barriers
more than all the negotiations in Geneva will be able to achieve in the
other direction.
Jacob Viner'
INTRODUCTION

Dumping is traditionally defined as price discrimination between
national markets.2 Although this definition theoretically encompasses
both the situation in which the dumping producer sells at a lower price
in his home market than abroad and also the situation in which he
sells at a lower price abroad than in his home market, from the beginning it has been accepted that only the latter gives rise to problems in
the importing country, and only under certain circumstances. A corollary to this point of view is that protective action against dumping
should be admissible only if such dumping causes injury in the import* Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels; S.J.D. 1986, LL.M 1984 University of Michigan Law

School; J.D. University of Utrecht Law School. The author would like to thank Professor
John H. Jackson and Jacques Bourgeois for their helpful comments.
1. R. DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER, 61 (1980).
2. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 3 (1980); DALE, supre note 1; SEAVEY,
DUMPING SINCE THE WAR 2 (1970); VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
3 (1923, 1966).
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ing country. We will see that this conclusion was drawn almost from
the start of the enactment of the first national antidumping laws.
The ways in which dumping was defined and the degree of injury
required for imposition of duties, however, differed substantially
among the countries that enacted the laws. This divergence, and the
growing realization that antidumping laws had the potential of becoming significant barriers to international trade, created international interest in the problem as early as the 1920's. This was a mere twenty
years after entry into force of the first antidumping laws. It was not
until after the second world war, however, that binding international
rules were developed within the framework of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade [GATT].' It is significant that the international
rules were concerned more with the trade-distorting effect of antidumping action than with the effect of dumping itself, and that this
one-sided concern has persisted ever since that time. Over the years,
existing rules have been refined and additional rules developed. Generally speaking, the common denominator of these rules is that they all
limit the freedom of the importing country to take protective action.
Antidumping law can be divided into two parts, namely procedural
and substantive. Procedural antidumping law answers questions such
as: What institutions administer the law? What determinations are
made in the course of an antidumping proceeding? What sorts of investigation techniques do the authorities employ? Are administrative
decisions subject to administrative and judicial review? and more generally, What is the degree of discretion the authorities have in the adby the
ministration of the law? These questions have been answered
4
author elsewhere and the answers will not be reviewed here.
Substantive antidumping law falls apart into two fields: first the
determination that products are dumped, that is sold at less-than-fairvalue, and, second, the determination that the products have caused
material injury to the domestic industry of the like product.
This article is exclusively devoted to a comparative analysis of injury determinations in United States and European Community antidumping law and practice from January 1, 1980 to approximately October 15, 1984. At the former date the 1979 Antidumping Code entered
into force8 for the governments which had accepted or acceded to it by
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The current

version of the GATT is contained in IV

GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter BISD].

4.

See E. VERMULST,

5.
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(1987).
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on the Tar-
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that date. Acceptance by both the United States and the European
Community led the two systems to bring their national laws into conformity with the international rules for the first time in history.6
The detailed character of the 1979 Code provisions, the international obligation on both systems to implement the provisions into domestic law, and the fact that both faithfully did, or at least tried to
harmonize the two systems,7 would seem to warrant the conclusion
that the two national antidumping laws and practices have converged,
since 1980. Prior to the 1979 Code, the differences between United
States and European Community antidumping law were most apparent
in the field of injury.8 Therefore, it is in this field that convergence,
when compared to pre-1980 practice, would be most striking.
This article will show, however, that the convergence has been less
than one would expect on the basis of the above observations. Three
reasons for this can be given: First, the 1979 Code leaves major loopholes; second, new and unexpected problems have arisen since 1979,
and, finally, the two systems have fundamentally different approaches
towards dumping. In the United States injurious dumping is considered to be an unfair trade practice, which should be counter-actionable
per se. The European Community, on the other hand, views antidumping action as a matter of its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and,
at least theoretically, is willing to take the broader interests of that
policy into account in its decision whether or not to impose antidumping duties.
The United States seems most stubborn in going its own way to
the extent that the 1979 Code permits such an individual path. This
conclusion is evidenced by a report of the Senate Finance Committee
on the 1979 Trade Agreements Act [TAA].' In this report on an Act,
iffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650 [hereinafter 1979 Code].
6. Article VI of the GATT did not bind the United States on the basis of the grandfather right clause in the Protocol of Provisional Application Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts.
5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.TS. 187. The 1967 Antidumping Code, see infra note 64,
was accepted by the United States Executive, but was not implemented into domestic
law because of Congressional resistance. Both aspects will be discussed more extensively,
infra. Cf. Jackson, United States-EEC Trade Relations: ConstitutionalProblems of Economic Interdependence, 16 COMMON MET. L. REv. 470-71 (1979).
7. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE. TRADE AGREEMENT ACT OF 1979, S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 37-39, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 423-24 [here-

inafter

SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].

8. Thus, in a broad sense, encompassing like product, industry, materiality and
causation.
9. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at various
sections of 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter TAA]. The TAA, at section 106 of title 1, repealed the
Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 US.C. J§ 160-171 (1986). The TAA, in section 101, replaced the Antidumping Act of 1921 by adding an antidumping and countervailing title
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which implemented the results of the Tokyo round into domestic law,
the Committee stated that "[tihis bill is drafted with the intent to permit United States practice to be consistent with the obligations of the
1
agreements as the United States understands those obligations."
The European Economic Community, on the other hand, is more willing to take the practices of its trading partners into account. This conclusion is supported by the language of the Preamble of the European
Economic Community Council Regulation 2176/84 which states:
"Whereas in applying these (Code) rules it is essential, in order to
maintain the balance of rights and obligations which these agreements
sought to establish, that the community take account of their interpretation by the Community's major trading partners, as reflected in legislation or established practice."" Thus far, the strongest indication of
this 'open' attitude has been in the Allied case,12 in which the European Court of Justice granted judicial review to foreign exporters involved in antidumping investigations."'" In that case, it seemed to be a
major consideration for the Court that European exporters had a similar right under the TAA. In this article, we will find similar, but more
implicit, adoptions of American practice by the European Community's authorities.
Economists and lawyers increasingly argue that the antidumping
laws should be revised to bring them more into accordance with principles of economic and antitrust theory."' This criticism, however, assumes that antidumping laws should be economically fair. Although
this assumption is valid from a "welfare economics" point of view, it
tends to forget that the current antidumping laws might be the least of
possible evils from a political point of view. As long as the notion of
dumping as an unfair trade practice prevails, a more limited application of antidumping laws, based on economic theory, does not seem
to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1986). The new title to
the Tariff Act of 1930 is contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1671-77g. (1986).
10. SENATE FINANCE CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 36 (emphasis added).
11. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84, 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 201) 1 (1984)
[hereinafter the Regulation].
12. Allied Corp. et al v. Commission of the European Communities, 1984 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1005.
13. Id. at 1029.
14. See, e.g., Barcelo, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, 1 MICH. YB.
INT'L LEGAL STUDIES 53 (1979) DALE, supra note 1; Ehrenhart, What the Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act Can, Will, Should
Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361 (1979); Ordovqr, Sykes, Willig, Unfair International Trade Practices, 15 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L & Pol. 323 (1983);
Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The International Antidumping
Code, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 491 (1972).
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politically feasible.
In the injury field, economic criticism centers around the question
of: Injury to what? Is it injury to competition (the antitrust theory
point of view) or injury to competitors (current antidumping laws)?
Although this article will pay occasional attention to this question, its
general scope is limited to a description of contemporary American and
European law and practice and to a comparison of the two systems
with each other, and with the GATT/Code rules.
One of the purposes of this study is to find out whether one of the
two trade blocs applied the law in a more protectionist manner than
the other. For example, the United States pre-1979 Code "injury" standard and the Congressional admonition that the new "material injury"
standard should be interpreted in the same way as the injury standard
had been applied before, might be viewed as an important indicator
that, at least in this field, American law is more protectionist than its
European counterpart. It will be demonstrated, however, that this is
not necessarily the case. More generally, the infinite range of different
fact patterns makes the drawing of such conclusions extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Nevertheless, examples are found, in both systems, of application
of certain standards which facilitate findings of injury, and, thus, are
more protectionist than other standards that could have been adopted.
Conclusions will have to be limited to each particular standard, however, because the differences in the standards make a quantification of
the degree of protectionism which they confer, impossible.
Logically speaking, the investigation into whether the dumping
causes injury to the domestic industry of the like product in the importing country is comprised of four sub-investigations. They are: (1)
the definition of the like product, (2) the definition of the affected domestic industry, (3) the materiality of the injury, and (4) the causal
link between the dumped imports and the injury. This division has
been followed in the analysis, though it will become apparent that
strict separation is not always possible. Part I gives a brief overview of
the history of antidumping, both on the national and on the international level. Parts II, III, IV and V are concerned with the four subinvestigations identified above. Part VI concludes the analysis with a
summary of conclusions and recommendations.
The main sources of research have been the antidumping laws of
the United States and the European Community, their legislative histories, articles in legal periodicals, and, most importantly, determinations by the International Trade Commission [ITC] and the Commission and Council of the European Communities. Substantial gaps in
the former three sources have been filled up by these decisions.

N.Y.L. ScH. J.
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THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK

A. National Prehistory.
Excluding the United States Wilson Bill of 1894,'5 the first countries to enact antidumping laws were Canada (1904), New Zealand
(1905), Australia (1906), and the Union of South Africa (1914)." Section 801 of the American Revenue Act of 1916'7 mandated imposition
of fines against foreign producers if it could be proved that those producers sold their products at lower prices in the United States than in
their domestic market and had the intent to destroy or injure a United
States industry or restrain its development." Section 801 was, therefore, limited to predatory dumping. The common characteristic of
these laws was that none of them required actual or potential injury
before action could be taken.
In 1921, four countries enacted antidumping legislation. Three of
these countries more or less made injury a prerequisite for imposition
of duties as well. The British "Safeguarding of Industries Act" provided that employment in a United Kingdom Industry had to be or
had to be likely to be seriously affected by foreign sold articles below
the cost of production.' The Australian "Industries Preservation Act"
required that detriment might result to an Australian industry by reason of dumped imports.20 The New Zealand antidumping law subjected
three kinds of imports to duties. Only for the third kind, applicable to
imports to which the Minister of Customs had decided that special
concessions were to be granted, was an injury to a New Zealand or
other British industry required. It should be noted that there was no
requirement that the merchandise had to be produced in New Zealand."' Because this part of the law applied to what we now call subsidization (at the time it was called "bounty dumping"), it is not treated
here as injurious dumping. The fourth country was the United States.
As originally presented in the House of Representatives, the
American Antidumping Act of 1921"' did not contain an injury standard. An injury standard was included in a Senate proposal and was
15. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 403 (1969).
16. VINER, supra note 2, at 192, 204, 206, 209 and 210.
17. Revenue Act of 1916 § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
18. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 403.
19. VINER, supra note 2, at 219.
20. VINER, supra note 2, at 227-28.
21. VINER, supra note 2, at 232.
22. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) repealed by the TAA,
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
See generally supra note 9.
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eventually adopted by the House of Representatives.2 3 According to
Jacob Viner, the law was a "model of draftsmanship 2' 4 and superior to
the Canadian law, among others, because
[Tihe limitation of antidumping duties to a product which injures or is likely to injure an American industry leaves it open
to a wise customs administration to refrain from interference
with all dumping whose benefit to the American consumer is
not clearly offset in part at least by an injury, actual or prospective, to American Industry.2 5
On the international level, the League of Nations got interested in
dumping in the 1920's.26 In a "Memorandum on Dumping" written for
the League in 1926, Viner, often called the intellectual founder of contemporary antidumping law, remarked that dumping duties should be
applied only to goods of a kind which were produced on a substantial
scale in the importing country, unless there was evidence that the
dumped imports were responsible for the lack of development of a domestic industry. Furthermore, he advised that the application of the
duties should be contingent upon the existence of a distinct probability
that the continuance of dumping would result in substantial injury to
domestic industries.2 7 Viner also expressed doubts as to the feasibility
of international controls on dumping, 28 and history seems to have
proved him right: international organizations have focused their attention on control of antidumping.
In 1946, the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) instituted a preparatory committee to prepare an agenda
for a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 29 During
the first session of the committee in London, the United States submitted a "Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization
of the United Nations." Article 11 of the Charter dealt with antidumping duties. The Charter provided that "as a general rule" each party
would undertake not to impose antidumping duties unless it determined first "that the dumping . . . (would be) such as to injure or
threaten to injure a domestic industry, or . . . (would be) such as to
23.

H. R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979). See VINER, supra note 2, at

260.
24. VINER, supra note 2, at 262.
25. Id. at 263.
26. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 403.
27. VINER, Memorandum on Dumping, 36
28. VINER, supra note 2, at 368-69.

29.

SEAVEY,

supra note 2, at 16-17.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

O.J. 1 (1926).
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30
prevent the establishment of a domestic industry."
The preparatory committee, in turn established a drafting committee which met at Lake Success in New York and tightened the
phrase "like or similar product" to "like product" and added "material" to "injury." 1 As far as injury was concerned, the terminology remained the same in a subsequent Geneva Draft, which became Article
2
34 of the Havana Charter and Article VI of the GATT." It is doubtful
that the drafters, or anybody at the time, realized the future importance of addition of the word "material." Brown, for example, in
describing the antidumping and the countervailing duty provisions of
the Havana Charter, manages to use "material,"33 "serious," and "substantial" as synonyms in less than fifteen lines.
The General Agreement came into force on January 1, 1948 on the
basis of the Protocol of Provisional Application. Because Article VI is
placed in the second part of the Agreement, contracting parties only
committed themselves to apply the Article to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation. The Protocol, therefore, obviously
favored parties who already had antidumping legislation in force by
that date, and as a result were not bound by possibly more stringent
Article VI provisions."

B.

Article VI of the GATT5

Article VI provides in relevant part:
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which
products of one country are introduced into the commerce of
another country at less than the normal value of the products,
is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to
an established industry in the territory of a contracting party
or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.
For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered
as being introduced into the commerce of an importing country
if the price of the product exported from one country to an30. Id. at 17-18.
31. Id. at 18.
32. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 257 (1950);
SEAVEY, supra note 2, at 20. N.B,-The original Article VI of the GATT was later replaced by Article 34 of the Havana Charter, see JACKSON, supra note 15, at 405; BROWN,
supra at 513.
33. BROWN, supra note 32, at 214.
34. Barcelo, Artidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade: The United States and the
InternationalAntidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 525 (1972).
35. GATT, supra note 3, art VI.
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other is (a) less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, (b) in the absence of
such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or,
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of
origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit
6(a) No contracting party shall levy any antidumping or
countervailing duty on the importation of any product of the
territory of another contracting party unless it determines that
. , is such as to cause or threaten
the effect of the dumping
material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such
as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic
industry. ....
.

.6

Article VI has been termed "something of an anomaly. ' 3 7 Essentially
an exception to the most-favored-nation clause of article I," the conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to invoke the article are so
stringent that they de facto impose positive obligations upon GATT
contracting parties. 3' Four conditions for imposition of antidumping
duties are found in Article VI1' (1) The injury must involve a domestic
industry, (2) there must be a similarity of the products, (3) the domestic industry must suffer a material injury, and (4) the injury must be
an effect of the dumping. Yet, unfortunately, none of the four criteria
are defined.
It should be noted that the second criterion does not strictly follow from the wording of Article VI. Article VI uses the term "like
product" with regard to the comparison between the exported product
and the "like product" destined for consumption in the home market
product then has to cause material injury to a
of the exporter. This
4
domestic industry. '
A discrepancy exists between the English and the French text in
that the former uses the term "the like product"' and the latter "un
produit similaire," a difference presumably unintended. The term "like
36. Id.
37. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 411.
38. SEAVEv, supra note 2, at 24.
39. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 411.
40. See generally DALE, supra note 1, at 79.
41. See infra part I, § C.
42.

Emphasis added.
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4
product" emerges in several other articles of the General Agreement,"
but is nowhere defined. Indeed, a definition in one article would probably be of little value for interpretation of the same term in another
article as the preparatory statements of several delegates make it clear
that the term was not intended to have a universal meaning." Nevertheless, a comparison of similar, but not identical, terms in other articles of the General Agreement might serve to indirectly define the
term.
In Article XIX of the GATT, for example, the term "like or directly competitive" is used and seems to be "clearly intended to be
broader than merely . . . 'like products.'-"5 It has been argued that
this interpretation is in conformity with the purpose of Article XIX,
because the broader "similarity" test of that article allows competing
products, which can cause injury, to be brought within Article XIX's
scope." One might counter this argument on the ground that, in
dumping cases, competing products can cause injury just as easily; and,
furthermore, that antidumping measures are imposed against "unfair"
imports, whereas safeguard measures are taken against legitimate imports. It would therefore be logical to make the requirements for the
taking of measures against unfair imports lower than those for acting
47
against fair imports.
Despite this logic, the intention of the contracting parties clearly
was to limit action against dumped imports to situations in which the
injured domestic industry produced the like product and to exclude
protection of a domestic industry that produced merely competitive
48
products.

C.

The GATT Secretariat Study

As a consequence of a proposal by Norway, a country which until
the mid-fifties had never made use of its antidumping law,5" the GATT
43. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 259 n.1.
44. Id. at 260.
45. Id. at 262.
46. Id. at 260.
47. Compare, for example, "material injury" with "serious injury."
48. A narrow definition, however, is a two-edged sword. Although limitation to the
like product industry excludes protection of the industry producing competitive, but not
like, products, the like product industry at the same time facilitates injury findings because the like product industry will usually be smaller than the industry producing competitive products, which might include like products.
49. Secretariat, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties: A comparative study of
existing legislation and application,at 5, GATT supra note 3, art. VI (July 1958) [hereinafter Secretariat Studyl.
50. Id.
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secretariat from 1955 through 1957 conducted a study of those national
1
antidumping laws that were actually used.
Apart from these studies by country, a general section of the study
was devoted to the problems arising from the application of antidumping and countervailing duties. The sections give a fascinating insight
into the first years of interpretation of Article VI. With the exception
of Sweden none of the eight countries investigated used the term "material injury." 2 Furthermore, the term "industry" created some difficulty. Did it have to include the whole national industry or only a part
of it? Most countries considered only the effect which the imports had
on the relevant branch of the industry. Indeed, as the report noted, "a
case where the importation of a product would create a danger for the
whole national industry is difficult to imagine.""8
The report is more interesting in what it does not say, than in
what it does say. For example, there seems to be no prerequisite that
the injured industry of the importing country has to produce a like
product, an interpretation in itself reconcilable with Article VI." The
relevant branch of the industry is obviously the branch affected by the
imports. Nevertheless, four countries required that the dumped product had to be of a class or kind of merchandise made in the importing
country.15 It does not necessarily follow, however, that that class or
kind of merchandise has to be injured by the imports.
D.

The Report of the Group of Experts8

The 1958 report showed that there were clearly differing interpretations between the GATT signatories with respect to the key terms of
Article VI. During the thirteenth session, the Norwegian and Swedish
delegations proposed the establishment of a group of governmental experts in order to exchange information with regard to certain technical
requirements of their respective legislations, such as the definition of
like product and the use of the injury concept in relation to the term
industry. 2 With regard to the "like product" issue, the Group agreed
51. It is noteworthy that of the twenty contracting parties with antidumping laws in
force, only the following eight countries actually had used their laws until then: Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, Sweden and the
United States. See Secretariat Study, supra note 50.
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id.
54. See infra part I, § B.
55. Secretariat Study, supra note 50, at 55, 69, 78, 93.
56. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties: Report of Group of Experts, GATT
(L978), BISD (8th Supp.) 145 (1959) [hereinafter 1959 Report].
57. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties: Report of Group of Experts, GATT

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
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that the term should be interpreted to mean a product which is identical in physical characteristics subject to, however, such variations in
the presentation which are necessary to adapt the product to special
conditions in the market of the importing country; that is, to accommodate different tastes or to meet specific legal or statutory requirements." This approach would be in conformity with the preparatory
works which, at the time, suggested that the term "like product" in
Article VI should mean "same product.""
As to the term "industry," the Group agreed that, as a guiding
principle, judgments of material injury should be related to total national output of the like commodity concerned or a significant part
thereof.60 This seems to be the first time that the term "like" is mentioned in relation to "industry" but the Group does not connect it with
the term "like product," thereby leaving it open if the term "like commodity" has the same meaning or, perhaps, a broader meaning.
With regard to the injury concept, the experts stressed that action
should only be taken "when material injury, i.e. substantialinjury, is
caused or threatens to be caused"" and that no precise definitions or
set of rules could be given."2
One commentator has concluded that the reports only made a
"modest contribution" to the solution of the problems of Article VI
because it did not give the experts the authority to issue authoritative
interpretations. 63 In the author's opinion, this conclusion understates
the importance of the report. It should be noted that a group of governmental experts was involved, and certainly in those instances in
which the group agreed on certain interpretations, it would be hard for
one of the countries involved to subsequently deviate from the implicit
consensus.
(L908), BISD (8th Supp.) 1 (1958). (November 11, 1958).
58. 1959 Report, supra note 56, at 12. Note that this article still addresses the comparison, not injury.
59. Id., cf. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 414.
60. 1959 Report, supra note 56, at 10.
61. Emphasis added. A 1966 Report of the International Chamber of Commerce
stated that material injury meant a "substantial reduction in the returns obtained by the
domestic industry" while an OECD report, published in the same year, found that the
Group of Experts' definition was too strict, because it unduly limited the number of
cases of injurious dumping.
62. 1959 Report, supra note 56, at 10.
63. K. DAm, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 173 (1970).
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E.

The Antidumping Code of 196764

When the Kennedy Round negotiations started in 1963, there was
a growing realization of the protectionist impact that nontariff barriers
had on trade, and the contracting parties agreed that these should be
dealt with in the negotiations." One of the non tariff barriers that received the greatest international attention was that barrier arising
from national administration of antidumping laws. Antidumping laws
can be non tariff barriers both through their substantive and their procedural provisions." Although the emphasis differed with each country, national dumping laws often constituted major non tariff barriers
in both respects because (1) the substantive terms of Article VI were so
opaque, (2) nothing at all regarding antidumping procedures was included in the Article, and (3) many countries' dumping legislation antedated GATT's (and consequently those countries were not bound by
the substantive GATT provisions). Canada, for example, was mainly
protectionist on the substantive side, because it did not apply an injury
standard. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, was chiefly protectionist in procedural respects because of the "Star Chamber" nature of
its application of the law.67
In 1963, there was a favorable climate for negotiating due to the
following reasons." First, the country most complained of was the
United States.6 ' Second, the United States in turn was angry with Canada's lack of an injury requirement and with the large administrative
70
discretion, and resulting uncertainty, of European antidumping laws.
Finally, the European Community was in the process of setting up antidumping legislation of its own. 7
Within the GATT Committee on Non-tariff Barriers, a Special
Group on Antidumping Practices was set up, which consisted only of
Canada, the European Community, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain and the United States." After initially focusing on
64. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 [hereinafter 1967 Code].
65.

CURTIS & VASTINE, THE KENNEDY ROUND AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRADE

202 (1971); J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 86 (1971).
66. Barcelo, supra note 34, at 520-24 (comparing the difference between procedural
and substantive protectionism).
67. Id. at 525 (using the term "Star Chamber" nature).
68. Barcelo, supra note 34, at 526.
69. The main criticism, directed at the United States was its practice of withholding
appraisement until the final determination.
70. EVANS, supra note 65, at 110.
71. K. DAM, supra note 63, at 174.
72. CURTIS & VASTINE, supra note 65, at 207.
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criticism of the law and practice of the United States, the Group eventually took up the United States proposal of an international antidumping code.7 3 On June 30, 1967, Great Britain, Canada and the
United States signed the International Antidumping Code [1967 Code]
officially named "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT,''7" and by July 1, 1968, the date that the Agreement came into
force, seventeen countries had signed the document. The 1967 Code
tried to curb the protectionist potential, both procedural and substantive, of antidumping laws by imposing detailed requirements on national procedures and by elaborating on, and occasionally defining,
substantive provisions of Article VI. With respect to the defining of
substantive terms the emphasis was on the injury provisions."5
Through all this, it has to be noted that it was the intention of the
drafters that the 1967 Code would be an elaboration of, and not an
7
amendment to, Article VI. 1
Although the 1967 Code did not amend Article VI, it nevertheless
changed the legal consequences of that Article for those countries that
already had antidumping laws prior to their signature of the GATT,
and, therefore, had grandfather rights. 77 Article 14 of the 1967 Code
provided that each signatory"8 should take all necessary steps to bring
its national legislation into conformity with the requirements of the
1967 Code. Because the 1967 Code implemented Article VI of the
GATT, a convincing argument can be made that those countries that
signed the 1967 Code placed Article VI into full effect. 79 On the institutional level, the 1967 Code established a Committee on Antidumping
Practices to provide a forum for consultation."
Ostensibly influenced by the report of the Group of Experts, Article 2 (b) of the 1967 Code provided, with regard to the like product,
that:
Throughout this Code the term "like product" Vproduit similaire") shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration or in the absence of such a product, another product
73. Id.
74. Id. at 208.
75. Barcelo, supra note 34, at 527.
76. Rehm, Developments in the Law and Institutions of InternationalEconomic Relations: The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 403, 430 (1968).
77. See infra part I, § A.
78. 1967 Code, supra note 64, art. 13.
79. Dam expresses this idea in a slightly different way- "The Code, insofar as it incorporates the provisions of Article VI..." DAM, supra note 63, at 175.
80. 1967 Code, supra note 64, art. 17.
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which, although not alike in all respects, had characteristics
closely resembling those of the product under consideration
81

thus favoring a strict "like product" limitation. Although the definition
of "like product" was placed in Article 2, thereby creating the impression that the definition applies to the dumping determination, the
phrase "throughout this Code," and the comparison between the product as exported and the product as sold in the home or third markets,
made it clear that the Article 2 definition of like product was also relevant to the defining limitation of the industry concerned.
Domestic industry was defined as "the domestic producers as a
whole of the like products or those of them whose collective output of
the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products." ' Two exceptions to this definition were
made. First, if producers were also importers of the dumped merchandise, they could be excluded. Second, under exceptional circumstances,
a regional industry could be found (a) if the regional producers sold all
or almost all of their production in the regional market and (b) if the
market was not supplied by outside sources. Such a regional industry
could only be considered injured if there was injury to all or almost all
of the total regional production."'
Limiting the domestic industry to producing a "like product," as
defined above, does not make sense from an antitrust perspective. Indeed, antitrust economists focus on substitutability of goods in both
consumption and production as the basis for including or excluding
products in the definition of the product market." If, for example, a
small reduction in the price of coffee leads to sharply decreasing sales
81.
Id. at 25. (Emphasis added).
82. Id. art. 4(a), at 27.
83. For a different interpretation of an injury to a regional industry, see SEAVEY,
supra note 2, at 114.
84. 1967 Code, supra note 64, art. 4(a)(ii). The text of article 4(a) (ii) states:
In exceptional circumstances a country may, for the production in question,
be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each
market regarded as a separate industry, if, because of transport costs, all the
producers within such a market sell all or almost all of their production of the
product in question in that market, and none, or almost none, of the product in
question produced elsewhere in the country is sold in that market or if there
exist special regional marketing conditions (for example, traditional patterns of
distribution or customer tastes) which result in an equal degree of isolation of
the producers in such a market from the rest of the industry, provided, however,
that injury may be found in such circumstances only if there is injury to all or
almost all of the total production of the product in the market as defined.
See also Barcelo, supra note 34, at 528; DALE, supra note 1, at 79.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 7

of tea, and coffee producers can easily switch to producing tea, tea and
coffee are, depending on the size of the reduction and the increase,
substitutable on competitive products, and, therefore, part of the same
product market. The limitation in the Code to physically identical
products seems to be protectionist because it may result in overstating
the injurious impact of the dumped goods by inordinately narrowing
the product market.8 5 On the other hand, it might be less protectionist
than a test based on competitiveness because it excludes situations in
which physically identical products are not injured, but substitute
products are." In its definition of the regional market the Code seems
to apply a standard more in conformity to antitrust concepts in that it
allows the possibility of finding a regional market.8 7 The essence of the
regional market definition is the degree of market isolation, as evidenced by transportation costs, traditional patterns of distribution, or
consumer tastes. Furthermore, there has to be an injury to production
and not to producers.
The text of the regional market exception was the result of a compromise between the United States, which favored segmentation, Canada, which was strongly opposed (probably because its sales to the
United States traditionally are regionally concentrated), s s and the European Community, which wanted a restricted exception.
The 1967 Code does not define "material injury," but requires a
consideration of all factors relevant to determining the state of the industry in question. 8 ' Analysis of these factors leaves one with the impression that the 1967 Code is more concerned with injury to competitors than with injury to competition.' Factors such as market share,
profits, employment, and utilization of capacity strongly indicate a "diversion of business" test.' 1 On the other hand, the mentioning of re85. Barcelo, supra note 34, at 528.
86. DALE, supra note 1, at 79; Lorenzen, Technical Analysis of the Antidumping
Agreement and the Trade Agreements Act, 11 LAW & POLY IN INT'L Bus. 1424 (1979).
87. DALE, supra note 1, at 80.
88. Id.
89. 1967 Code, supra note 64, art. 3(b). The text of article 3(b) states:
The valuation of injury-that is the evaluation of the effects of the dumped
imports on the industry in question-shall be based on examination of all factors having a bearing on the state of the industry in question, such as: development and prospects with regard to turnover, market share, profits, prices (level
of undercutting), export performance, employment, volume of dumped and other
imports, utilization of capacity of domestic industry, and productivity; and restrictive business practices. No one or several of these factors can necessarily
give decisive guidance.
90. Id. Barcelo, supra note 34, makes the distinction; see also DALE, supra note 1, at

56.
91.

DALE,

supra note 1, at 78.
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strictive business practices and the price difference between the price
of the dumped goods and the price of the goods as sold in the home
market hints at a "danger to competition" standard.9
One should note that the 1967 Code defines the valuation of injury
as "the evaluation of the effects of the dumped imports on the
industry. '
Threat of injury has to be based on facts, and not on allegation,
conjecture or remote possibility.' 4 If dumping does not currently cause
injury but might do so in the future, the required change in circumstances had to obviously be foreseen and the injury had to be imminent; for example, a likelihood of a substantial increase of imports.
If the ground for the petition for relief is the retardation of the
establishment of an industry, there has to be proof that such an industry is indeed in the process of being established. Such proof might be
that the plans for the new industry have reached such an advanced
stage that a factory is being constructed, or that machinery has been
ordered.95
Injury and the reasons why injury occurred are two concepts that
cannot be strictly separated. The factors mentioned in respect to the
valuation of injury will at least partly also indicate whether the injury
is caused by the dumped imports, or by other factors. These factors
include: the value and prices of nondumped imports, the lessening of
demand, and changed consumer tastes. 96 If, for example, the volume of
dumped imports is negligible, it seems clear that whatever injury has
occurred is not due to the imports. Likewise, dumped imports which
are higher-priced than identical domestic products can hardly be said
to cause injury.
As far as the strength of the causal link is concerned, the 1967
Code stipulates that the dumped imports demonstrably have to be the
principal cause of material injury, and that the administering authorities shall weigh, on the one hand, the effects of the d=unping, and, on
the other hand, all other factors which, taken together, may cause injury.9 7 Although the 1967 Code does not use the word "outweigh," the
combination of "principal cause" and the "weighing" language seem to
indicate that dumping should be a more important cause of injury than
the aggregate of all other factors which cause injury." There was no
92.
93.

Barcelo, supra note 34, at 528; DALE, supra note 1, at 78.
1967 Code, supra note 64, art. 3(b)(emphasis added).

94. Id. art.
95. Id. art.
96. Id. art.
97. Id. art.

3(e).
3(a).
3(c).
3(c).

98. J.F. BESELER,

DIE ABWEtJR VON DUMPING UND SUBVENTIONEN DURCH DIE EUROPAIS-
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consensus, however, on this point. The United States delegation, for
example, interpreted the language to mean that dumping must be a
more important cause than any other substantial cause. 9 The United
States Tariff Commission (now International Trade Commission), on
the other hand, was of the opinion that the standard could mean two
things. First, the aggregate effect of all injurious factors is material injury and dumping is the principal factor, or, alternatively dumped imports are individually the cause of material injury and such injury is
greater than the injury caused by all other factors.' 0
During the negotiations, the United States and Japan advocated an
alignment defense '01 based on the so-called "competitive price" theory
102 and, on the meeting-competition defense, the Robinson-Patman
Act.' 0 3 The argument goes that, if a foreign producer dumps his products in another market at prices which do not undercut the prices of
domestic producers or, in other words, merely aligns his prices to those
a practice, though
of his competitors in the importing country, such
10 4
constituting dumping, should not be actionable.
Advocates of the alignment defense argue that:0 " 1)-alignment is a
common business practice; 2)-a meeting-competition defense is in conformity with national price discrimination laws; 3)-imports priced at
the prevailing market price do not cause injury; and 4)-in the case of
increasing market shares of low-priced, nondumped imports, it does
not make sense to forbid other importers to align their prices to those
of their competitors, even by engaging in dumping. It might even prevent monopolization of the market by the producers who do not dump.
The last argument has been opposed by Kohn:
It would seem that the German producer should be able to
compete with his American competitor, but that an American
statute should not allow him to dump to meet other foreign
competition, since the purpose of dumping legislation is to protect domestic producers from competition which is unfair as to
CHEN GEMEINSCHAFPrEN, 97
99. SEAVEY, supra note

(1980).
2, at 109.
100. Report of the U.S. Tariff Commission to the Senate Finance Committee on S.
Con. Res. 38, A ConcurrentResolution Regarding the InternationalAntidumping Code,
90th Cong. 2d Sess., 12, 13 (1968).
101. SEAVEY, supra note 2, at 110.

102. Kohn, The Antidumping Act: Its Administration and Place in American Trade
Policy, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 407, 411 (1962).
103.
104.
105.

Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
SEAVEY, supra note 2, at 110.
SEAVEY, supra note 2, at 110.
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them - no more protection than this, but also no less." 6
Kohn's argument, however, does not consider the pro-competitive effects that an alignment defense in such a situation might have, for example by preventing monopolization of the market by producers of
"fair" low-priced imports.
Opponents of the defense rebut these arguments as follows.'
First, it is very difficult to find out whether the importer had aligned
his prices to the domestic price level or the domestic producer had aligned his prices to the level of the imports. This argument does not
seem particularly strong because a history of domestic prices in previous years would indicate cause and effect. Second, an aligned price is
competitive, and might, ceteris paribus, lead to an increased market
share of foreign producers. Third, an explicit alignment defense is superfluous, because it is automatically provided for by the injury and
the causation requirement. If the foreign producer merely aligns his
prices and does not increase his market share or decrease the domestic
producer's market share, either no injury will occur or the injury will
not be caused by the dumped imports.
Because of European opposition, an express alignment defense was
not included. The fact that one of the factors to be taken into account
in evaluating injury is the extent to which the export price is higher or
lower than the prevailing home market price in the importing country,
might be seen as a compromise.0 8 On the institutional level, the 1967
Code established a Committee on Antidumping Practices for the purpose of affording signatories the opportunity to consult on matters relating to the administration of antidumping systems in the participating countries. From July, 1968 to June, 1979, the Committee issued
eleven reports.' 09 The reports are generally very vague, and details of
determinations regarding alleged violations are seldom given. Most
complaints in the Committee have centered on determinations of injury, ° and the country most often under attack has been the United
States."' This is understandable because the United States was the
106. Kohn, supra note 102, at 413. (Emphasis added).
107. SEAVEY, supra note 2, at 110.
108. Id. The alignment defense is also known as technical dumping. See S. REP. No.
1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1974).
109. See BISD, supra note 3, Supp. No. 17, at 43 (1970); Supp. No. 18, at 42 (1971);
Supp. No. 18, at 45 (1972); Supp. No. 19, at 15 (1972); Supp. No. 20, at 43 (1973); Supp.
No. 21, at 30 (1974); Supp. No. 22, at 21 (1975); Supp. No. 23, at 13 (1976); Supp. No. 24,
at 17 (1977); Supp. No. 25, at 17 (1978).
110. LLOYD, ANTIDUMPING ACTIONS AND THE GATT SYSTEM 19 (1977).
111. See, e.g., L/3521, BISD 18th Supp. 47; L/3748, BISD 19th Supp. 16; L/3794,
BISD 20th Supp. 44; L/4241, BISD 22d Supp. 25.
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only signatory to the 1967 Code that did not implement it into domestic law, a fact which has been called "one of the great fiascos of United
States trade policy. 11 The main inconsistencies were in the fields of
industry, injury and causation, as was well recognized by the United
States Tariff Commission."'
F.

The Tokyo Round Antidumping Code

During the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(MTN), non tariff barriers again were an important issue. Three factors encouraged the participants to revise the 1967 Code. The first factor 1 4 was the negotiation of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT (Subsidies
Code). 115 Because there are many common characteristics to antidumping and countervailing duty law, especially in the procedural field and
in the determination of injury, 1 it was decided that the 1967 Code
should be revised to conform to the provisions of the Subsidies Code.
The second factor 1 7 was the growing irritation in the European Community with the ways in which the United States Tariff Commission
interpreted the "causation" and "industry" requirements of the 1921
Act oblivious to the 1967 Code standards.1 18 Finally, the European
Community realized that certain requirements of the 1967 Code, notably the causation standard, might have been a little too stringent and
left too little room for administrative discretion.1 19
The result was a new "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the GATT, 1'1x 0 which differed from the 1967 Code primarily in the
field of causation, but also slightly changed the language concerning
material injury and the definition of the regional industry. The net re112. Jackson, United States-EEC Trade Relations: ConstitutionalProblems of Economic Interdependence, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 453, 470 (1979).
113. Long, United States Law and the InternationalAnti-Dumping Code, 3 INT'L
LAW. 464, 486 (1968).
114. This factor is stressed by DALE, supra note 1, at 73.
115. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature April 12, 1979, 31
U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in, Agreements Reached in the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 257
(1979) [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
116. But see Easton & Perry, The Causation of Material Injury: Changes in the
Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Investigations of the InternationalTrade Commission, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 35 (1983).
117. See BESELER, supra note 98, at 23.
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id. at 23.
120. 1979 Code, supra note 5.
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sult seems to be a more protectionist approach to antidumping measures, in that an injury determination is easier to make. Although the
definition of "like product" is identical to the definition in the old 1967
Code, the definition of "industry" changed in two important ways.
First, the possibility of excluding producers, who are at the same time
importers of the dumped merchandise, gave way to the broader possibility of excluding any producers who were "related" to exporters or
importers of the dumped goods or who were themselves such importers. The word "related" is vague and a group of experts was established in May, 1980 within the Committee on Antidumping Practices
to study the problems involving a definition.12 The group borrowed
122
some of the language of Article 15 of the Customs Valuation Code
and came up with the following definition:
[P]roducers shall be deemed to be related to the exporters or
importers only if (a) one of them directly or indirectly controls
the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person; provided that there are grounds
for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is
such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently
2
from non-related producers.
"Control" is to be considered in a pragmatic way. If a company is legally or operationally in a position to influence the behavior of another
company, the former controls the latter. 2 " This definition was subsequently adopted by the Committee in October, 1981.
The second major way the definition of "industry" changed was
that the meaning of "regional industry"' 125 was clarified. This change
was probably at the insistence of the United States. Although the basic
distinguishing aspect of a "regional industry" remained the degree of
isolation of such an industry, there were two new requirements;
namely: that producers sell all, or almost all, of their production of the
product in the regional market and the demand in that market is not
to any substantial degree supplied by outside domestic producers.
These two added requirements seem less stringent than the parallel
provisions in the old Code. The reasons for isolation do not matter
anymore, and the phrase "not to any substantial degree" permits more
outside supply than the phrase "none or almost none" in the old Code.
121. BISD, supra note 3, Supp. No. 27, at 33.
122. BISD, supra note 3, Supp. No. 26, at 116.
123. BISD, supra note 3, Supp. No. 27, at 33.
124. BISD, supra note 3, Supp. No. 27, at 34.
125. R. de C. Grey, Injury, Damage, Disruption,UNCTAD INJURY PAPERS 9. (1983).
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And although the 1979 Code adds the extra requirement that, in order
to find injury in a regional market, there must be a concentration of
the dumped imports in that region, the 1967 requirement that there
must be injury to all or almost all of the regional production is replaced by the condition that there must be injury to the producers of
all or almost all of the regional production. The change is important
because it might signify a new injury-to-competitors-approach, as opposed to the former injury-to-competition-approach in the 1967
26
Code.1
Once again, the term "material injury" is not defined, but the indicia of material injury seems to be more logical and less haphazard than
those in the old Code. The 1979 Code states that the administering
authorities shall consider:
(a) the volume of the dumped imports [has there been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or
relative to production or consumption?]; (b) the effect of the
dumped imports on domestic prices [have the imports significantly undercut domestic prices or otherwise significantly depressed prices or prevented price increases which otherwise
would have occurred?]; (c) the consequent impact on the domestic producers, to be measured, inter alia, by an evaluation
of all relevant economic factors which influence the state of the
industry concerned such as actual and potential decline in output, sales, profits, productivity, return on investments and utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; and actual
or potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth and the ability to raise capital or
2
investments.' 1
It is obvious that examination of these three factors will at the
same time largely indicate whether any injury is a result of the
dumped imports. Assume, for example, that all the elements mentioned under the third factor indicate material injury, but that the volume of the dumped imports decreased or remained stable and that
such imports did not have any discernible effect on domestic prices. In
this situation, it would be difficult to establish a causal link between
the dumped imports and the bad state of the industry.
The requirement that dumped imports must be the principal
cause of injury, and that the effects of the dumping must be weighed
against all the other factors possibly causing injury, is replaced by a
126. DALE, supra note 1, at 80-81.
127. 1979 Code, supra note 5, art. 3.
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much weaker condition; namely that the "dumped imports are,
through the effects of dumping, causing injury. 1 2 8 Other factors, which
at the same time are injuring the industry, such as the price and volume of nondumped imports, contraction in demand, changes in consumption patterns, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology
and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry,
must not be attributed to the injury. The footnote in the passage cited
above refers to paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3, thereby reinforcing the
above proposition that volume, price effects and the resulting impact
on the domestic industry of the dumped imports are important indicators of causation.
With regard to the enumeration of the injury-causing factors,
which should not be attributed to the dumped imports, the following
remark should be made.
Restrictive practices of domestic producers that result in stable artifically-high price levels of domestic products would probably result in
a higher margin of price undercutting than would be the case if normal
conditions of competition prevailed. Suppose, for example, that the
price of domestic widgets is $10.00 per unit, but the price would be
$8.00 if there were no restrictive practices, and that foreign producers
sell widgets for $8.00 while charging $10.00 in their home market. In
this situation, the foreign producers undercut the domestic producers
by 20%. In the normal, non-restricted, situation, however, there would
be no undercutting at all. If injury resulted, the Code seems to say that
it should not be attributed to the dumped imports. This approach is
sound from an antitrust, injury-to-competition point of view, but is unlike the injury-to-competition approach of the rest of the Code.
One could theoretically argue that a foreign producer who dumps
his merchandise all over the world would affect the export-oriented
American producers, and, consequently, cause injury. Nevertheless, the
Code prohibits attributing such injury to dumping.
II. THE LiKE PRODUCT
A.

Introduction

As has been seen in Part I, the determination of what products
constitute like products plays a role in both the dumping investigation
and in the injury investigation. In the former, the exported product has
to be like the product sold by the exporting producer in the home market. In the latter, the exported product should be like the product sold
128.

1979 Code, supra note 5, art. 3.
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by domestic producers in the country of importation. In the following
discussion we are exclusively concerned with the second type.
The determination of what domestic product is like the dumped
product is one of the most important issues in the injury investigation.129 To use the words of former ITC Vice-Chairman Michael J.
Calhoun:
To me, identification and analysis of what domestic product is
like the imported article in characteristics and uses, or, in the
absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with
the imported article is one of the critical questions before us in
any Title VII investigation. It is based upon our identification
of the like product that we define the industry. Our definition
of the industry, in turn, establishes the pool of domestic pro130
ducers whose health we are to assess.
We have seen that the term "like product" has been defined in GATT
as "a product which is identical, alike in all respects to the product
under consideration, or, in the absence of such a product, another
product, which, although not alike in all respects, (hasl characteristics
closely resembling those of the product under consideration." Two conclusions can be drawn from this formulation. In the first place, the correct test to apply when comparing products for "likeness" is whether
the products are physically identical.1 3 1 While physically identical
products will normally compete with each other in the market, mere
commercial competitiveness is not sufficient to make two physically
83
distinct products alike for the purposes of determining injury.1
The
1967 and 1979 Antidumping Codes, in other words, reject a test based
on commercial interchangeability. A second consequence of the definition is that, at a minimum, the domestic product has to have characteristics closely resembling those of the imported product. If such a
product cannot be found, a negative determination has to follow, even
129.

Victor, Injury Determinations by the InternationalTrade Commission in An-

tidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, in THE
1979, FOUR YEARS LATER 126 (1983).

TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF

130. Truck-Trailer-Axle-and Brake Assemblies, and Parts, Thereof from Hungary,
USITC Pub. 1135, Inv. No. 731-TA-38 (Preliminary) (1981). Additional views of Vice
Chairman Michael J. Calhoun, id. at 11.
131. BESELER, supra note 98, at 63 and 104; Briet, Antidumping in de EEC De
Kinderschoenen Ontgroeid?, 30 SEW 145, 150 (1982); Davey, An Analysis of European
Communities Legislation and Practice Relating to Antidumping and Countervailing

Duties, in

ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOhIIC COMMUNITY

(B.

Hawk ed. 1983).
132. Compare GATT, supra note 3, art. XIX. Article XIX uses the term "like or
directly competitive." Id.
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when an industry is clearly injured. The wording of the definition of
like product allows the possibility that there does not necessarily have
to be a like domestic product.
This rather narrow definition of like product can be advantageous
to domestic producers in some instances and disadvantageous in
others. It limits, for example, the scope of the relevant industry, and,
therefore, it will make it easier to find if an injury has actually occurred. The definition offers no protection, however, to producers of
merely competitive, but not physically identical, products and therefore rejects an antitrust approach.
The following sections of this chapter will explore how American
and European laws have defined "like product" and how the institutions concerned have de facto applied the concept.
B.
1.

The United States

In General

The TAA 8 s defines like product as "a product which is like, or in
the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with the
article subject to an investigation under this title."1 34 The term, therefore, has the same meaning for the purposes of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. Consequently, although examples in this
article will most often be in the dumping field, occasionally references
8
will be made to countervailing duty cases, as indeed the ITC does. 3
Two remarks in a Senate Finance Committee Report on the Trade
Agreements Act refer to this issue:
The requirement that a product be "like" the imported article
should not be interpreted in such a narrow fashion as to permit
minor differences in physical characteristics or uses to lead to
the conclusion that the product and article are not "like" each
other, nor should the definition of "like" product be interpreted in such a fashion as to prevent consideration of an industry adversely affected by the imports under investigation.'
Under its description of current (now old) law, the Senate Finance
Committee furthermore recognized:
133. TAA, supra note 9, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Truck-Trailer-Axle- and Brake Assemblies, and Parts Thereof from
Hungary, USITC Pub. 1135, Inv. No. 731-TA-38 (Preliminary) (1981). Additional views
of Vice-Chairmen Calhoun, supra note 130.

136.

SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT,

supra note 7, at 90-91.
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[Tihe ITC has generally considered as relevant industries those
composed of domestic producer facilities engaged in the production of articles like the imported articles, although it has
considered domestic producer facilities engaged in the production of articles which, although not like the imports concerned,
are nevertheless competitive with those imports in U.S.
markets."' 7
The report, by not explicitly approving the ITC decisions regarding the
definition in the 1979 Code, and by not giving any reasons for the
United States deviation from the definition of the 1979 Code, creates
the impression that the practice of the United States was intended to
be in conformity with the Code. The different and obviously broader
United States formulation and the accompanying Senate Finance
Committee language refute this impression. When taken together the
statutory definition and the legislative history leads to the following
conclusions. First, for a domestic product to be found "like" the imported product, it has to be basically, though not perfectly, identical in
characteristics and uses. Second, in defining "like product" as being
"like or similar","5 Congress must have intended to give the term a
broader meaning than that provided for by the Codes.' Third, by using the construction "characteristics and uses" -at least some physical
identity seems necessary. Less physical equality, however, could obviously be compensated for by more commercial interchangeability.
Fourth, the word "most" in the definition suggests that a "like product" should always be found. 14 0 Adoption of this conclusion would
"change inquiry from whether an appropriate industry exists to which
industry should be investigated" 4 1 with only the causation requirement operating as a limit. Fifth, the phrase "or in the absence of like"
indicates that a product should either be found "like" or "similar." If,
for example, American producers produce red wrapping paper, and
Australian producers dump red and green wrapping paper, only the red
Australian paper could be considered like.
The most important conclusion from a practical point of view is
that Congress clearly intended that a test based on competitiveness be
used to determine the similar product. 1 2 Although more appropriate
137. Id.
138. TAA, supra note 9, 19 U.S.C. 1677 (10) (emphasis added).
139. Langer, The Concepts of Like Product and Domestic Industry Under the
United States Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 17 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 495,
500-01 (1983).
140. BRYAN, supra note 2, at 60.
141. Id. at 60.
142. E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATIONS § 11.43, at 267 (1982).
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from an antitrust point of view, this test violates the 1979 Code.
Analysis of ITC decisions reveals that the Commission has generally followed the legislative history "14 and, indeed, frequently quotes it.
The preliminary negative ITC injury determination in Portable Electric Nibblers from Switzerland1 4 4 seems typical: "The concept of likeness does not require exact identity, but it does require that the goods
be substantially the same in uses or characteristics. A useful working
definition might be that which is found in Webster's 'something similar

or of the same kind.'

"145

The cited passage shows the looseness with which the ITC handles
the issue. The outcome of the case gives a good example of a situation
in which adoption of a broad like product definition disadvantages the
domestic producers. The ITC majority, consisting of Commissioners
Alberger, Moore and Stern, based their negative determination on a
United States Industry encompassing all sizes of nibblers, while Commissioners Calhoun and Bedell found the industry limited to fourteen
to eighteen gauge nibblers, and decided in the affirmative.
A somewhat doubtful motivation for the like product definition is
found in the preliminary negative determination in Snow-grooming vehicles from the Federal Republic of Germany,1"6 in which the ITC,
after having differentiated between "super" snow-grooming vehicles
and transport/utility vehicles, due to different characteristics and uses,
excluded snow-grooming parts, because focus on the vehicles themselves gave "petitioners the best possible case."
The ad-hoc character of like product definitions is stressed by Alberger and Stern in a footnote in the Hungarian Truck Trailer-axleand-Brake Assemblies case.14 7 In that case they stated that "[ilt is
most difficult to establish a detailed, objective, a priori standard for
"like product" which can be valid for all fact situations; a case-by-case
approach is thus indispensable." ' " In the same footnote, the two commissioners reject an equation of "like" with "virtually identical" by
saying "[t]he notion of virtually identical is narrower than, but comprehended within, the term "like product." They emphasize that
"[tihe terms "like" and "similar" have found wide applicability in
143. Victor, supra note 129, at 127.
144. Portable Electric Nibblers from Switzerland, USITC Pub. 1108, Inv. No. 731TA-35 (Preliminary) (1980).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Snow-grooming Vehicles, Parts Thereof, and Accessories Thereof from the Federal Republic of Germany, USITC Pub. 1117, Inv. No. 731-TA-36 (Preliminary) (1980).
147. Truck-Trailer-axle-and-Brake Assemblies, and Parts Thereof from Hungary,
USITC Pub. 1135, Inv. No. 731-TA-38 (Preliminary) (1981).
148. Id. at 5, note 1.
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United States trade laws without any distinction between them." 49 By
then adding that "had we not been able to find a domestic product like
the imported one in this case, section 771(10) [of the TAA] would have
required the ITC to examine the domestic product most similar to the
imported one,"150 the commissioners seem to contradict themselves.
The structure of the decision, however, makes it clear what the commissioners mean: they intend to apply the same standards for the determination of "like" and "similar," notably when the products under
consideration are substantially the same in characteristics and uses.
In the author's opinion, this interpretation rests on a wrong reading of the statutory language. "Like" is obviously intended to be
stricter than "most similar." The only way this strictness can be expressed is in the degree of identicality. As Commissioner Calhoun correctly observes in his additional views in the same case, "[flor me, the
standard for finding a product to be like, continues to be that the
products are virtually identical in characteristics and uses for all practical purposes in the market place.''.
Furthermore, use of the same standard harbors the danger of insufficient maintenance of the difference between "like"and "similar"
and consequent aggregation of the two, a danger that has indeed materialized in some ITC determinations. Thus, in the PlasticAnimal Tags
from New Zealand investigation, " the ITC compared imported twopiece tags with both one- and two-piece domestic tags, thereby aggregating like (two-piece) and similar (one-piece) products. Likewise, in
the 1980 review of the Polish Golf Carts case, 53 the ITC aggregated
domestically produced electric and gas golf carts and compared both to
the imported electric golf carts. These decisions seem in contravention
of the statute and are furthermore unnecessary. The same result could
be reached by declaring the differences between the two domestic
products as minor and considering both products as "like" the imported product. ' " This aggregation, however, seems to have occurred
only incidentally and, normally, the ITC appropriately differentiates
between the two domestic products.'15
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 12 (Additional views of Vice Chairman Michael J. Calhoun).
152. Plastic Animal Identification Tags from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 1094, Inv.
No. 303-TA-14 (Final) (1980).
153. Electric Golf Cars from Poland, USITC Pub. 1069, Inv. No. AA1921-147A,
(1980).
154. Langer, supra note 139, at 504.
155. Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, USITC Pub. 1080, Inv. No. 731TA-25 (Preliminary) (1980).
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The same cannot be said of the use of different standards for the
terms "like" and "similar." The correct standard, supported by statutory language and the legislative history, consists of a three-prong test.
First, in order for products to be considered "like," they have to be
physically identical. Physically identical products will obviously compete in the same market and research into substitutability in the market place is, therefore, superfluous. Second, minor differences in physical characteristics can be compensated by a high degree of
substitutability. Products with slightly different physical characteristics can still be considered "like" products if they are commercially
competitive. Finally, a lesser degree of physical identicality and competitiveness is required for a "most similar" finding. Indeed, the literal
meaning suggests that the product which is "most similar" to the imported product should always be found."' Suppose that Israel exports
oranges to the United States and that the United States does not produce any fruits at all, but that the avocado producers lodge a dumping
complaint. The language of the statute then seems to command the
ITC to treat the avocado industry as the relevant industry, provided
that there is no other, more appropriate industry. This could lead to
rather absurd situations. The ITC, however, has not been willing to go
that far, and, at least in one case, has terminated the proceeding on the
ground that no domestic industry existed that could be injured. That
case concerned European exports of certain cheeses, Fiore, Pecorino,
(made exclusively from sheep's milk) and feta (made from goats' and
sheep's milk). The producers from the United States claiming injury
made their cheese from cows' milk. 57 The ITC concluded that the Fiore and Pecorino cheeses were different from, and did not compete
with, the United States cheeses. Consequently, there was no domestic
like or similar product. In all other cases, however, the ITC has found a
domestic product like or most similar to the imported product.
A somewhat strange case is Sodium Nitrate from Chile. " Chilean
exporters produced both natural industrial grade sodium nitrate and
agricultural grade sodium nitrate, while the United States producers
only produced synthetic sodium nitrate. The ITC determined that the
industrial grade imports were like the domestic synthetic grade nitrate
and that the agricultural grade imports were most similar to the domestic synthetic grade, because both products had the same chemical
156. BRYAN, supro note 2, at 60.
157. Certain Nonquota Cheese from Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,
USITC Pub. 1079, Inv. No. 701-TA-52-60 (1980).
158. Sodium Nitrate from Chile, USITC Pub. 1357, Inv. No. 731-TA-91 (Final)
(1983).
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composition and were interchangeable."' The ITC then concluded that
there was one like product, namely, synthetic sodium nitrate.6 0 In the
subsequent investigation of causation, however, the ITC determined
that no injury was caused by the agricultural grade imports because
they only minimally competed with the domestic products. 6 ' Although
it is unusual that two imported products are compared to one domestic
product and that one of them is considered like, and the other most
similar, this in itself is not a violation of the 1979 Code. The case notably has to be distinguished from the Animal Tags case. 6 ' In the
Animal Tags case, there were two domestic products, whereas here
there are two imported products. And as the "like, or in the absence of
like, most similar" language relates to the domestic product, the provision obviously does not extend to the situation of two imported products. The ITC, however, made a mistake in considering the domestic
product most similar to the agricultural grade imports. Commercial interchangeability assumes, of course, that not only are the products the63
oretically substitutable, but also that they are in fact substituted.
Absent such a finding, there is simply no "most similar" product.
Analysis of the cases from 19910 to 1994 indicates that the factoTs

most often used by the ITC in determining the like product are: (1)
characteristics such as quality, quantity, chemical composition, taste
and appearance, 6 4 (2) use in the markets, (3) the production process,
and (4) the production stage.
A finding that products have different characteristics' " or are
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 5, 6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Plastic Animal Tags from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 1094, Inv. No. 303-TA-14

163. Cf. Langer, supra note 139, at 505, who assumes the same, basing his assumption on the Shewmaker test. We think that the Shewmaker test is of limited value for
purposes of Title VII determinations because it relates to section 201 and 406
investigations.
164. Id. at 503.
165. Chemical composition: Menthol from Japan and the People's Republic of China,
USITC Pub. 1087, Inv. No. 731-TA-27-28 (Preliminary) (1980); Unrefined Montan Wax
from German Democratic Reptiblic, USITC Pub. 1180, Inv. No. 731-TA-30 (Final)
(1981); Sodium Nitrate from Chile, USITC Pub. 1357, Inv. No. 731-TA-91 (Final) (1983);
Cyanuric Acid and Its Chlorinated Derivatives from Japan, USITC Pub. 1407, Inv. No.
731-TA-136 (Preliminary) (1983); Certain Spindle-Belting from the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland, USITC No. 1429, Inv. No. 731-TA-141-142-144
(Preliminary) (1983); Barium Chloride and Barium Carbonate (Precipitated) from the
People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1458, Inv. No. 731-TA-149d50 (Preliminary)
(1983).
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used for different purposes 1" and, therefore, are not commercially interchangeable, usually precludes a like product finding. The emphasis
is normally on substitutability. The production process and the production stage generally play merely supportive roles.
Thus, in Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France67 sodium
metasilicate penthydrate was excluded from the market (although it
had the same sodium metasilicate basis as anhydrous sodium metasilicate) because it was manufactured by different processes and provided
different properties for the users. Likewise, in Sorbitol from France,'8
the ITC initially treated liquid and crystalline sorbitol as one like
product but later changed its mind and treated them as two like products. Despite an identical chemical formula, liquid and crystalline sorbitol were considered to be two different products because they were
produced through separate and distinct processes and sold in different
markets for different uses.
The ITC approach was endorsed by the Court of International
166. Substitutability: Unrefined Montan Wax from the German Democratic Republic, USITC Pub. 1180, Inv. No. 731-TA-30 (Final) (1981); Precipitated Barium Carbonate
from the Federal Republic of Germany, USITC Pub. 1154, Inv. No. 731-TA-31 (Final)
(1981); Truck-Trailer-Axle- and Brake Assemblies and Parts Thereof from Hungary,
USITC Pub. 1135, Inv. No. 731-TA-38 (Preliminary) (1981); Bicycles from Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 1417, Inv. No. 731-TA-111 (Final) (1983) (in which the ITC stated on page
six that distribution channels or marketing techniques did not matter and that variations in style, size, weight, color, features, accessories, quality and the production process
did not provide a sufficient basis to find more than one product because those variations
did not create a problem other than a bicycle nor did they change the basic use. The ITC
here seems to adopt a "common meaning" rule); Carton-closing Staples and Nonautomatic Carton-closing Machines from Sweden, USITC Pub. 1455, Inv. No. 731-TA-116,
117 (Final) (1983); Fall Harvested Round White Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub.
1463, Inv. No. 731-TA-124 (Final) (1983) (in which the price differentials between long
white, round red, russet and round white potatoes were found to clearly illustrate that
consumers consistently placed different values on the various end uses and that the distinct characteristics allowed for little substitution); Color Television Receivers from the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1514, Inv. No. 731-TA-134, 135 (Final)
(1984) (in which the ITC stated that "different physical attributes do not delineate distinct products as physical differences in size or styling do not lead to a basic difference in
the use of the product" which is the reception of a broadcast signal and the reproduction
of it in video and audio form, compare the Bicycles from Taiwan case); Acrylic Sheet
from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1424, Inv. No. 731-TA-139 (Preliminary) (1983) (in which the
ITC on page six concluded that there was one like product, acrylic sheet, despite differences in physical characteristics and different production processes); Choline Chloride
from Canada and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1473, Inv. No. 731-TA-155, 156
(Preliminary) (1983); Certain Cell-site Radio Apparatus and Subassemblies Thereof
from Japan, USITC Pub. 1488, Inv. No. 731-TA-163 (Preliminary) (1984).
167. Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, USITC Pub. 1080 Inv. No. 731TA-25 (Preliminary) (1980).
168. Sorbitol from France, USITC Pub. 1441, Inv. No. 731-TA-44 (Final) (1983).
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Trade (CIT) in Roquette Freres v. United States.'69 This case illustrates the importance of the like product determination. The original
finding of one like product led to imposition of antidumping duties on
both crystalline and liquid sorbitol imports. Differentiation between
the two led to an affirmative injury finding for crystalline sorbitol and
a negative injury determination for liquid sorbitol. The latter product
was therefore excluded from the antidumping order.7 0
Although Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate and Sorbitol, the cases
discussed above, considered the whole production process, the ITC will
occasionally look at the production stage of the product. Thus, in Fireplace Mesh Panels from Taiwan,7 1 the ITC excluded fireplace mesh

rolls, because they were merely at a preliminary stage in the production of panels and still required a significant amount of labor in order
to be transformed into panels. In Forged UndercarriageComponents
from Italy'" a difference was found between finished and semi-finished articles despite the contentions by petitioners that both kinds
were made by the same highly integrated and interdependent industries. The petitioner also argued that the semi-finished articles had no
alternative use except to be made into a finished product. The rationale of the ITC was that there were clear differences in the areas of
processing, costs and lack of substitutability. 73 In Certain Flat-rolled
Carbon Steel Products from Brazil,17 4 the ITC separated coiled steel
from cut-to-length steel because "[w]hile the coiled products have certain characteristics and end uses with plate, they are semi-finished
materials that differ from plate in their coiled configuration and do not
169. 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 88, 583 F. Supp. 599 (1984).
170. For other cases in which the production process is mentioned, see: Unrefined
Montan Wax from German Democratic Republic, USITC Pub. 1180, Imv. No. 731-TA-30
(Final) (1981); Precipitated Barium Carbonate from the Federal Republic of Germany,
USITC Pub. 1154, Inv. No. 731-TA-31 (Final) (1981); Certain Radio-paging and Alerting
Receiving Devices from Japan, USITC Pub. 1295, Inv. No. 731-TA-102 (Preliminary)
(1982); Bicycles from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1417, Inv. No. 731-TA-111 (Final) (1983);
Acrylic Sheet from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1424, Inv. No. 731-TA-139 (Preliminary)
(1983); Barium Chloride and Barium Carbonate (precipitated) from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1458, Inv. No. 731-TA-149, 150 (Preliminary) (1983); Titanium
Sponge from Japan and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1477, Inv, No. 731-TA-161162 (Preliminary) (1984); Tubes for Tires, Other than for Bicycle Tires from Republic of
Korea, USITC Pub. 1416, Inv. No. 731-TA-137 (Preliminary) (1983).
171. Fireplace Mesh Panels from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1186, Inv. No. 731-TA-49
(Preliminary) (1981); USITC Pub. 1250, Inv. No. 731-TA-49 (Final) (1982).
172. Forged Undercarriage Components from Italy, USITC Pub. 1394, Inv. No. 731TA-133 (Preliminary) (1983).
173. Id. at 10.
174. Certain Flat-rolled Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1361, Inv.
No. 731-TA-123 (Preliminary) (1983).
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necessarily compete with plate until they are subjected to further
'1 75
processing.
At the preliminary investigation stage the information available to
the ITC is often limited and, consequently, situations may arise in
which no clear dividing lines can be drawn between different types of
products. In those cases the ITC initially adopted the "continuum"
principle.' e Under this principle, the like product may include a continuum of slightly distinguishable products which have no clear delineation.1 7 7 In Portable Electric Nibblers,1 7 for example, an ITC majority aggregated all nibblers:
The record before us reveals . . . that all nibblers are used in
cutting various types of metal sheet and that is a continuum of
sizes based on the gauge of the metal to be cut. Thus, they are
substantially the same, and there is no logic in segmenting
them into separate industries or products.17 9
Likewise a unanimous ITC in Stainless Clad Steel Plate from Japan' 80 held that:
[S]ince this is a case in which the like product candidates consist of a group of products slightly distinguishable from each
other, among which no clear dividing lines can be drawn based
on characteristics and uses, we find the like product in this
preliminary investigation is all members of the group.181
The consequence of this aggregation is that a broader like product
analysis will be applied when separate identification of products is impossible, for example, because of lack of relevant data. One commentator has concluded that application of the continuum principle is only
175. See also Hot-rolled Stainless Steel Bar, Cold-formed Stainless Steel Bar, and
Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain, USITC Pub. 1333, Inv. No. 701-TA-176-177-178
(Final) (1982); Certain Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof from Canada, USITC
Pub. 1277, Inv. No. 701-TA-182 (Preliminary) (1982); Cyanuric Acid and Its Chlorinated
Derivatives from Japan, USITC Pub. 1513, Inv. No. 731-TA-136 (Preliminary) (1984);
but see, Certain Flat-rolled Carbon Steel Products from Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, USITC Pub. 1451, Inv. No. 731-TA-146, 147 (Preliminary) (1983).
176. Langer, supra note 139, at 506.
177. Id.
178. Portable Electric Nibblers from Switzerland, USITC Pub. 1108, Inv. No. 731TA-35 (Preliminary) (1980).
179. Id.
180. Stainless Clad Steel Plate from Japan, USITC Pub. 1196, Inv. No. 731-TA-50
(Preliminary) (1981).
181. Id. See also Certain Steel Wire Nails from Japan, the Republic of Korea and
Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 1175, Inv. No. 731-TA-45-47 (Preliminary) (1981).
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possible in the preliminary investigation because in the final investigation the ITC would be obliged to apply section 771(4)(D).' 5 2The author
does not see the reason for the distinction between the two types of
investigations. In cases in which available data do not permit separate
identification, section 771(4)(D) should always be applicable, whether
in the preliminary or in the final phase. Section 771(4)(D) rather narrowly circumscribes these cases in which it can be applied, and nonapplicability of section 771(4)(D) in preliminary investigations would
circumvent the guarantees established by Congress. With the exception
of a different evidentiary standard, all other standards in the TAA
have the same meaning for both preliminary and final cases.'" 3 The
definitions contained in section 771 obviously apply to both preliminary and final decisions.'"It seems that the ITC has realized this as
well because in later cases it applied section 771(4)(D) (the products
line provision) in preliminary investigations too, and did not mention
the continuum principle at all. 185
2.

Conclusions

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion.
Commercial competitiveness is the most important factor in the determination whether a United States product is like the imported
dumped product. Minor differences in physical characteristics will not
prevent an affirmative finding if the products are commercially interchangeable. Conversely, physically identical products will occasionally
be found "unlike" if they do not compete with each other. The production process and the stage of production are relevant evidence, but will
seldom play a dispositive role. Distribution channels and working techniques are irrelevant. In some instances, the ITC seems to adopt an
"eo nomine" principle. Thus, a bicycle is a bicycle and variations in
style, size, weight, color, features, accessories, quality and the production process are irrelevant because they do not create a product other
than a bicycle. Although this emphasis on commercial competitiveness
for the purposes of defining the relevant product market is in accor182. Langer, supra note 139, at 506-07.
183. Victor, supra note 129, at 123.
184. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1230, Inv. No. 701-TA-148
(Preliminary) (1982) (Additional views of Paula Stern, at 21).
185. See Certain Steel Valves and Certain Parts Thereof from Japan, USITC Pub.
1446, Inv. No. 731-TA-145 (Preliminary) (1983); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Argentina,
Mexico, Poland, Spain, USITC Pub. 1476, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-157-160 (Preliminary)
(1984); Certain Valves, Nozzles and Connectors of Brass from Italy for Use in Fire Protection Systems, USITC Pub. 1500, Inv. No. 731-TA-165 (Preliminary) (1984).
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dance with principles of antitrust law,186 a field of which antidumping
is after all a species, it is nevertheless in violation of the 1979 Code.
The 1979 Code clearly contemplates a definition of like product in
terms of physical characteristics. 6 7
Comparison of ITC practice with the conclusions which have been
drawn in Part II section B1 regarding the requirements which statutory language and legislative history impose upon the ITC shows that
ITC practice in general has been in conformity with those conclusions.
The ITC interprets the term "like product" more broadly than the
1979 Code definition and in only one case has terminated the investigation on the basis of a "no like product" finding. The ITC considers
both characteristics and uses, but places more emphasis on the latter.
On the other hand, the ITC usually does not make a clear distinction
between like and similar and on occasion has treated several differing
products as one like product. Although this practice seems in violation
of the statutory language, the practical importance is limited because
there is no difference in the legal effects between a like and a most
similar finding.
C.

The European Community

Article 2, 12 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84,8 the basic
statutory framework for imposition of antidumping and countervailing
duties in the Community, defines like product as "a product which is
identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration,
or, in the absence of such a product, another product which has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration." 8 This definition is a literal reproduction of the 1979 Code definition. The European Commission has generally construed the phrase
narrowly, requiring there has to be a close physical relationship between the exported and the domestic product. Furthermore, domestic
producers of merely similar or substitutable merchandise are generally
not protected by the Regulation.'8 " This does not mean that the European Commission avoids looking at the uses of the products concerned,
186.

See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co,v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962);

ANTITRUST

DIVISION U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 5 (1982).
187. McGOVERN, supra note 142, § 11.42 at 265.

188. Council Regulation 1580/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM (No. L 178) (1982) amended
Council Regulation 3017/79, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 1 (1979). Council Regulation
2176/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 201) 1 (1984), repealed Council Regulation 3017/79.
189. Id.
190. BzSRLER, supra note 98, at 104: Est ist also eine enge physische Verwandtschaft
der Erzeugnisse erforderlich. Die Benachteiligung durch blosse Substitionswaren
genugt nicht. Cf. Davey, supra note 131, at 65: Briet, supra note 131, at 150.
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but rather that these uses are merely factors in an analysis. If the
products are not physically close, they will not be considered like, even
if they are commercially interchangeable. If, however, doubts exist
whether the physical similarity is sufficient, interchangeability may
turn the scale.
In Magnesite (caustic-burned) from the Peoples Republic of
China,1 9' a European importer argued that the differences in the exported products, on the one hand, and those used for the establishment of injury, on the other hand, were so great as to prevent them
from being considered like products. The European Commission then
considered the chemical composition. Despite slight differences in to
the contents of certain chemical elements, the European Commission
concluded that all the products preponderantly consisted of MgO, that
the contents of MgO in all the products lay in the same range, and that
all the products were mainly used for the same purposes, that is as an
ingredient for fertilizers and cattlefeed and in certain industries.1'" The
same conclusion, based on the same arguments, was used in Magnesite
(dead-burned) from China and North Korea.1" Likewise, in Russian
Nickel'" the European Commission considered Russian nickel and
nickel produced by French and British producers to be alike because
both types were of a purity of ninety-nine percent plus and each was
generally interchangeable in application with the other." 5
In the case Urea Ammonium Nitrate (UAN) Fertilizer from the
United States,"" exporters and importers argued that the French producers, which comprised forty-three percent of the European Community production of UAN, could not be considered injured due to a
French Ministerial decision requiring a change in the French producers' pricing policy regarding nitrogen based fertilizer. Although this decision concerned both solid and liquid UAN-based fertilizers, this fact
did not reduce the relevance of the decision because, in the opinion of
the French producers, both types were like products. The European
Commission, stated however, that in its investigation it had sought and
verified the data relating to production and sales, data which clearly
permitted separate identification of the two types of UAN. This stated
191. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 371) 21 (1982).
192. See Magnesite (dead burned) from the People's Republic of China, 27 O.J. EuR.
COMM. (No. L 66) 33 (1984). The products from Greece and the People's Republic of
China were not identical but had characteristics that closely resembled each other.
193. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 371) 25, 28 (1982).
194. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No, L 286) 26 (1983).
195. See Sodium Carbonate, 25 O.J. EuPK COMM. (No. L 283) 9 (1982);
Isopropylidenedophenol, 26 O.J. Eup COMM. (No. L 199) 4 (1983).
196. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 33) 10-11 (1983).
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motivation for the European Commission's decision is tenuous, but
creates the impression that the Commission in this case determined
the range of the like products on the basis of available data. This does
not seem to be a very strong basis for the decision. If certain products
are physically identical, they should be considered alike even though
available data might permit separate identification. As has been stated
above, however, the motivation is weak and it is therefore quite possible that the products were not physically identical. The European
Commission simply did not explicitly address the issue.
The wording of the definition of like products theoretically opens
the possibility that an investigation may be terminated on the basis of
the non-existence of a like product. Only two cases bear on this issue.
In Decabromodiphenyletherfrom the United States1 97 the European
Council of Chemical Manufacturers Federations (CEFIC) lodged a
complaint on behalf of a German company alleged to be the major European Community producer. During the investigation, it appeared
that the German producer was not in fact producing decabromodiphenylether, but rather nonabromodiphenyl, which was
claimed to be a like product. In the meantime, a French producer of
decabromodiphenylether had materialized who submitted a complimentary complaint. The European Commission then decided to continue the investigation on the basis of the second, French complaint.
The fact that the European Commission did not aggregate the two
complaints, in the author's opinion, amounted to an implicit refusal to
consider nonabromodiphenyl a like product." 8 In Outboard Motors
from Japan'99 the European Commission excluded Japanese outboard
motors above eighty-five horse power from the investigation because
there were no European producers of that type of motor, nor was there
a sufficiently convincing factual indication that such production would
soon be established.
The exclusion has been criticized by Davey on the ground that the
European Commission did not focus on "the real question of whether
Community industry could be injured by dumping a wide range of
models of a product, including models not produced by Community
industry."'' 0 This criticism seems unfounded because Davey poses the
wrong question. The determination of like product is an independent,
separate decision that has to be made on the basis of the definition in
Article 2, 12 of the Regulation. In a case such as this, it is indeed possi197.
198.
199.
200.

26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 3 (1983).
Davey, supra note 131, at 66.
26 I.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L lh2) 18-1D t1983).
Davey, supra note 131, at 66-67.
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ble that a product which is not produced in the European Community
can nevertheless cause injury, but that does not make it a like product.
The like product issue operates as a limit on the injury determination
and should not be viewed as a function of injury.
The European Commission sometimes, but less often than the
ITC, concludes that there are two like products in an investigation,
and, consequently, proceeds to consider the impact of the product 2on
0
two industries. Thus, in Glass Textile Fibres from Czechoslovakia,
the European Commission imposed a provisional duty on imported
rovings, although reaching a no injury finding with respect to mats.
Likewise, in Sodium Carbonatefrom the USSR, 20 2 the European Commission reached a no injury finding for dense sodium carbonate, although imposing a definitive duty on imports of light sodium
20
carbonate.
The above overview might create the impression that the European Commission pays extensive attention to the like product question. This impression, however, would be incorrect. In the large majority of cases the European Commission does not even discuss the issue.
It seems that, so long as none of the interested parties raises the problem, the European Commission takes it for granted that the imported
product and the domestic product are alike.

Ill. THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
A.

Introduction

The dumped imports have to cause or threaten to cause material
injury to the industry of the like product in the importing country or
materially retard the establishment of such an industry in order to
trigger the imposition of duties. The 1979 Code defines the term industry as "the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or those
of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of those products, ''E 4 and
thereby treats the scope of the industry as a function of the scope of
201. 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 160) 18, 20 (1983).
202. 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) 2-3 (1980).
203. In Fibre Building Board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the USSR, 23 O.J. Eug. COMM. (No. L 145) 40 (1980), the
Commission differentiated between hard board and insulating board. Dead-burned and
caustic-burned magnesite, respectively from the People's Republic of China and Korea,
were the subject of two different investigations and, therefore, were obviously also different products, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 371) 21, 25 (1982).
204. 1979 Code, supra note 5, Article 4.
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the like product. 0 5 The Code also mentions at least two exceptions to
this rule. The first exception involves related parties20 6 and the second
exception involves regional industry. 0 7 In the author's opinion, it is
appropriate to treat article 3,5 of the 1979 Code as a third exception. 08
Article 3,5 provides that when information identifying the domestic
production of the like product is insufficient, the effect of the dumped
imports shall be assessed by an examination of the production of the
narrowest group or range of products which includes the like product)
for which the necessary information is available (product line exception). Although this provision extends the scope of the domestic industry and although the other two exceptions narrow it down, all three
situations are deviations from the standard definition.
B.

The United States

1. The Standard Situation
Section 771(4) of the TAA defines the term industry as "the domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or those producers whose
collective output of the like product constitutes a major proportion of
the total domestic production of that product."' 09 Whereas the 1979
Code uses the plural term "like products," the TAA uses the singular
term, thereby implying that an industry can never comprise more than
one like product. Although the legislative history uses the singular and
the plural term interchangeably,2 10 ITC practice has always made the
one like product-one industry link.211 This does not prevent consideration of several industries in one investigation, 12 nor does it preclude
aggregation of several like products for purposes of the exceptions provided for in section 771(4)(D) of the TAA. The second part of the definition regarding producers of a major proportion of the output"' may
205. Cf. Victor, supra note 129, at 125.
206. 1979 Code, supra note 5, Article 4.
207. Id.
208. Note, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before
and After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076, 1098 (1981).
209. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(a) (1982).
210. SENATE FNANCE COMMI'rEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 84, 85.
211. See, e.g., Cyanuric Acid, USITC Pub. 1407, Inv. No. 731-TA-136 (Preliminary)
(1983); Certain Steel Valves, USITC Pub. 1446, Inv. No. 731-TA-145 (Preliminary)
(1983); Barium Chloride, USITC Pub. 1458, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-149-150 (Preliminary)
(1983); Carbon Steel Wire Rod, USITC Pub. 1476, Inv. No. 731-TA-157-160 (Preliminary) (1984); Valves, Nozzles and Connectors, USITC Pub. 1500, Inv. No. 731-TA-165
(Preliminary) (1984). Cf. BRYAN, supra note 2, at 59.
212. See id.
213. This second part is a major part of the definition.
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also be useful. The Senate Finance Committee Report provides that
"(w)hat constitutes a major proportion of total domestic production
will vary from case to case depending on the facts, and no standard
minimum proportion is required in each case."2" ' The House Ways and
Means Committee Report employs similar language."1 5 It has been suggested that the ITC "would not likely accept as sufficient data from
producers constituting less than fifty percent of the total production of
the like or similar product."" 6 This suggestion seems contrary to the
statutory language which uses "a major proportion"21 rather than "the
21 9
2 18
Indeed, in Swedish Carton Closing Staples,
major proportion.
Chairman Eckes noted that neither the statute nor the legislative history required that all, or even a majority, of the domestic firms join in
a petition or become interested parties.22 0
A related problem is that information supplied by domestic producers will often be incomplete in certain respects. It seems clear that
if a majority of the domestic producers answer most of the questions
with regard to their economic performance, but omit other aspects of
their performance because of, for example, accounting difficulties, such
omissions should not prevent continuation of the investigation.2 2,
In a few cases 222 there has been only one domestic producer of the
like product. In such a case, the monopolist represents 100% of the
total United States production and will constitute the domestic industry. ITC rules then prevent the disclosure of any commercial or financal data which would reveal the industry's operations. 223 Though understandable, this non-disclosure requirement is regrettable because in
such a situation there seems to be a danger of monopoly profits and
inflated domestic price levels. In other words, the extent of domestic
price undercutting by the dumped imports might have been less if
214.

SENATE FINANCE CoMMIrEE REPORT,

supra note 7, at 83.

215. Id. at 73.
216. Langer, supra note 139, at 511.
217. TAA, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (emphasis added).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Carton-closing Staples and Nonautomatic Carton-closing Staple Machines from
Sweden, USITC Pub. 1454, Inv. No. 731-TA-116 (Final) (1983).
220. Cf. H. KAY, P. PLAIA, JR., M. HERTZBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRAVE PRACTICE 18-7
(1986).
221. Langer gives the example cited in Textile And Textile Products of Cotton from
Pakistan, USITC Pub. 1086, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-62-63 (Final) (1980). In this 1980 determination, only 10% of United States production gave information with regard to their
capital expenditures. Langer, supra note 139, at 511 n.108.
222. Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan, USITC Pub. 1062, Inv. No. 731-TA12 (Final) (1980).
223. Id. at 4.
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there was domestic competition.
The definition of industry in section 771(4) of the TAA refers to
the domestic producers of the like product, and, therefore, limits the
scope of the affected industry in three ways. First, the industry is limited to producers. This excludes importers, distributors and advertisers." 4 Second, the producers have to produce in the United States. 23
This excludes industries that have their headquarters in the United
States, but manufacture the merchandise abroad. Finally, if a manufacturer produces a whole range of products, the ITC should, in principle, look at those production facilities that are used to produce the like
226
product.
Apart from the available data exception in section 771(4)(D) of the
TAA, another exception to this limitation might be justified on the basis of the special nature of the industry. The following example, de22
rived from the Senate Finance Committee Report, might clarify this. 7
Suppose that European manufacturers dump beef in the United States
market. The dumped imports might adversely affect United States
farmers by forcing them to slaughter their cows, while at the same time
the beef industry is opeyating at ful capacity with increased profits
total production
and employment. It seems that in such a situation2 2the
8
process should be included in the injury analysis.
With regard to the limitation that the producers must be domestic
producers, an interesting question arises if a substantial part of production-related activity occurs abroad. The ITC addressed this issue2 in
29
Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan.
One of the domestic manufacturers, Motorola, assembled and soldered
certain of the models under investigation in Malaysia and Korea and
incorporated components from the United States and abroad. Although the ITC admitted that these activities constituted Motorola's
most obvious production-related activities, it decided to include the respective models in the investigation because significant production-related activity, involving considerable technical expertise and capital investment, occurred in the United States both before and after foreign
assembly. The significant value that the latter activities added to the
end product was measurable because Motorola, in its Florida-based facilities, employed a substantial number of workers whose research, de224. BRYAN, supra note 2, at 61.
225. Id.
226. Cf. Langer, supra note 139, at 513.
227. SENATE FINANCE ComMrrrIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 88.
228. C(. Langer, supra note 139, at 513.
229. Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan, USITC Pub.
1410, Inv. No. 731-TA-102 (Final) (1983).
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velopment and production activities specifically related to production
of the two models under investigation.
This approach, while leading to satisfactory results in the present
case, might create difficulties in cases in which United States and foreign production-related activities are not as easily distinguishable.
2.

Regional Industries

In appropriate circumstances, the ITC can limit the geographic
market to a part of the United States if: (1) producers within the region sell all or almost all of their production in that region, and (2) the
demand in that part is not to any substantial degree supplied by domestic producers from outside the region.28 0 Whereas the 1979 Code
used the term "exceptional circumstances," the TAA uses "appropriate
circumstances," thereby suggesting at least a slightly lower standard.23,
The crux of the exception is the relative market isolation of the producers in the regional area.23 2
Once a regional industry has been found to exist, injury to such an
industry can only be found if (a) there is a concentration of dumped
imports in the regional market, and (b) if the producers of all or almost
283
all of the production within that market are materially injured. With
regard to the first condition the legislative history states that:
[T]he requisite degree of concentration will be found to exist
on at least those cases where the ratio of the . . . less-thanfair-value imports to consumption of the imports and domestically produced like product is clearly higher in the relevant regional market than in the rest of the U.S. market. 234 The second condition makes it clear that injury to a major part of the
producers is not sufficient in the case of a regional industry.
Rather, all or almost all of the regional producers must be
injured.2 5
Although not always recognized either by commentators or the commissioners of the ITC, a distinction should be drawn between the conthe conditions necditions required for finding a regional industry and
23 6
essary for finding an injury to such an industry.
230.

TAA, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(c) (1982).

231. Langer, supra note 139, at 518.
232. Barcelo, supra note 34, at 528.
233. TAA, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(c) (1982).
234. SENATE FINANCE CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 83.
235. See also Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 2 CIT 295, 301 (1981). For the citations of the other four Atlantic Sugar cases, see infra note 243.
236. BRYAN, supra note 2, at 63. See also Note, Implementing "Tokyo Round" Corn-
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The restrictions are particularly appropriate in the case of the European Community and the United States because the Treaty of
Rome2 8 7 and the United States Constitution 2 3s prevent the levying of
customs (antidumping) duties on a regional scale. In these two systems, a finding of dumping and resulting injury to a regional industry
will lead to imposition of antidumping duties on a territory-wide scale.
The regional industry issue has had a long and troublesome history in United States law.2 3' Indeed, Judge Restani of the CIT recently
remarked:
Until 1979, the confusion caused by views expressed by the
Senate Finance Committee in 1975 . ..coupled with at least
two and one-half decades of so many different views expressed
by various Commissioners . . .facilitated the support of almost any position which might have seemed appropriate in any
24 0
particular situation.
The following section of this article analyzes to what extent Commission determinations"41 and court decisions have brought more clarity to
this area of the law.
mitments, the New Injury Standard in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws,
32 STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1980). Frozen French Fried Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub.
1259, Inv. No. 731-TA-93 (Preliminary) (1982).
237. Treaty of Rome, infra note 335, art. 9. "The Community shall be based upon ...
the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries." Id.
1: "[AIII Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
throughout the United States ...." Id.
239. Wasserman, Injury from Dumping: The Problem of the "Regional Industry," 9
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 469 (1979).

240. Rhone Poulenc v. United States, 8 C.I.T. 47, 60, 592 F. Supp. 1318, 1330 (1984).
241. Sugars and Sirups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1047, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final)
(1980); Sugars and Sirups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1189, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final)
(1981); Sugars and Sirups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1243, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final)
(1982); Sodium Hydroxide in Solution (Liquid Caustic Soda) from the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1040, Inv. No. 731TA-8 (Preliminary) (1980); Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, USITC Pub.
1118, Inv. No. 731-TA-25 (Preliminary) (1980); Steel Wire Nails from the Republic of
Korea, USITC Pub. 1088, Inv. No. 731-TA-26 (Final) (1980); Asphalt Roofing Shingles
from Canada, USITC Pub. 1100, Inv. No. 731-TA-29 (Preliminary) (1981); Secondary
Aluminum Alloy in Unwrought Form from the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1143, Inv.
No. 731-TA-40 (Preliminary) (1981); Frozen French Fried Potatoes from Canada, USITC
Pub. 1259, Inv. No. 731-TA-93 (Preliminary) (1982); Portland Hydraulic Cement from
Australia and Japan, USITC Pub. 1440, Inv. No. 731-TA-108, 109 (Final) (1983); FallHarvested Round White Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1463, Inv. No. 731-TA-124
(Final) (1984).
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a. Do the regional producers sell all or almost all of their production in the region?
In Sugar and Syrups from Canada,' local sales constituted
ninety-six percent of total sales and were held to fulfill the requirement of all, or almost all, production in the region. This percentage
was upheld by the Court of International Trade in Atlantic Sugar I.2'
In Certain Steel Wire Nails from Korea"' the ITC found eighty percent sufficient. In PortlandHydraulic Cement,2 45 an average of ninetytwo percent was considered sufficient. In Canadian Fall-Harvested
Round-White Potatoes,2'6 the percentage was 84.7. On the other hand,
in Frozen French Fried Potatoes from Canada,'47 the two largest producers shipped a third of their total sales to buyers located outside the
region, and the ITC determined that this situation did not fulfill the
requirement.
b. Is the regional demand not to any substantial degree supplied by domestic producers outside the region?
After basing its original affirmative injury finding on an outside
supply of 5.5%24 the ITC subsequently realized in Sugar and Syrups
from Canada that the percentage, if calculated as a percentage of all
sales within the region, rose from twelve to to sixteen percent.2 The
242. Sugar and Sirups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1189, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final)

(1981).
243. 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 18, 23, 519 F. Supp. 916, 921 (1981). There are at least 5 Atlantic Sugar cases. For reasons of readability and clarity, the following cases are denominated as follows: Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 133 (1980); Atlantic Sugar
v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 18, 519 F. Supp. 916 (1981) [hereinafter "Atlantic
Sugar I"]; Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 295 (1981) [hereinafter "Atlantic Sugar II"]; Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 248, 553 F. Supp.
1055 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) [hereinafter "Atlantic Sugar III"]; Atlantic Sugar v. United
States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 190, 573 F. Supp. 1142 (1983), [hereinafter "Atlantic Sugar IV"].
244. Steel Wire Nails from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1088, Inv. No. 731TA-40 (Final) (1980).
245. Portland Hydraulic Cement from Australia and Japan, USITC Pub. 1440, Inv.
Nos. 731-TA-108-109 (Final) (1983).
246. Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1463, Inv. No.
731-TA-124 (Final) (1984).
247. Frozen French Fried Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1259, Inv. No. 731TA-40 (Preliminary) (1982).
248. Sugars and Syrups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1189, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final)
(1981), at 3.
249. Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 18, 21, 519 F. Supp. 916, 920
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
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ITC was of the opinion that this percentage was still not substantial,
both as a matter of law (the sales represented by the imports being
three to four times as high) and in an ordinary, arithmetical sense. The
Court of International Trade expressed doubts with regard to the correctness of the standards, but refrained from "stating the limits of the
phrase 'to any substantial degree' in this formative stage of the administration of the new law, and at this juncture of the action." 5 0 The
court remanded the case to the ITC, which held to its original determination, but gave a clearer explanation for doing so. 2 5 1 The Court of
International Trade decided that both in an empirical sense (using the
dictionary definition of "substantial" as "considerable in amount") and
in view of the particular character of the region in question, twelve
percent was not substantial. With regard to the second criterion of regional characteristics the ITC focused on the facts that producers
outside the region had significant transportation cost disadvantages;
second, the bulk of the outside supply went into the perimeter of the
region; and finally, current and historical patterns of distribution supported the analysis.
In Atlantic Sugar I1, Judge Watson disagreed with the first argument, noting that use of the word "any" rather than "a" indicated that
"[t]he statute. . . forbids any degree of supply from elsewhere beyond
'5 2
that which can be termed insubstantial under the circumstances.
He agreed, however, with the ITC that the particular character of the
region indicated a truly isolated market.
In other affirmative injury cases, the percentages were far less and
therefore did not constitute a problem. 5 3 On the other hand, in the
Sodium Hydroxide case, the ITC refused to find a regional market because the market was served to a large extent by domestic producers
whose production facilities were located primarily in Gulf Coast states.
Likewise, in Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate [ASM], the fact that two
out of three plants which supplied the Northeastern area were located
outside the regional market, and shipped significant quantities of ASM
into that market, prevented a regional market finding. An outside
250. Id.
251. Sugars and Syrups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1243, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final)
(1982).
252. Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 295, 297 (1981).
253. In Steel Wire Nails from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1088, Inv. No. 731TA-26 (Final) (1980) it was 1.5%; In Portland Hydraulic Cement from Australia and
Japan, USITC Pub. 1440, Inv. No. 731-TA-108-109 (Final) (1983) it was 5%; In FallHarvested Round White Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1463, 1Kw. No. 731-TA-124
(Final) (1984) it was 1.3%.
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thirty percent supply was held substantial in Frozen French Fries.2
In Certain Steel Wire Nails from Korea,25 5 an ITC majority construed the phrase "in appropriate circumstances" as requiring two additional factors which would warrant the treatment of regional producers as a separate industry."6 First, a particular region should account
for a significant share of domestic consumption and production and
second, the condition of producers of the like product should be worse
than that of the industry at large. The Court of International Trade in
Atlantic Sugar I ridiculed the second condition in considering it "superfluous and of questionable logical validity," because other reasons
could account for differences between the economic health of the industry in a particular region and industry elsewhere.2 5 ' The second
condition has also been criticized on the ground that it should be considered in the determination of injury, not in the determination of
whether a regional industry exists. 5" Because of Certain Steel Wire
Nails from Korea, the ITC has no longer considered these two additional requirements and seems to have found a regional industry in
each case in which the two statutory requirements were fulfilled.
It is striking that four out of the nine cases in which existence of a
regional industry was examined involved imports from Canada. The
explanation might be that a regional industry will usually exist because
the nature of the product hampers transportation over long distance if,
for example, it is highly fungible or has a low value-to-weight ratio.
This argument is buttressed by the fact that in those four cases, the
regional maket consisted of the northeastern states.
is there a
c. Once a regional industry has been found to exist,
2 59
concentration of the dumped imports in that market?
In Sugar and Syrups from Canada, ninety-four percent of Canadian imports entered the northeastern states; in Asphalt Roofing Shingles the percentage was 99.95; in Portland Hydraulic Cement ninety254. Sodium Hydroxide, in Solution (Liquid Caustic Soda), from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1040, Inv. No. 731TA-8-11 (Preliminary) (1980). Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, USITC
Pub. 1118, Inv. No. &31-TA-25 (Preliminary) (1980). Frozen French Fried Potatoes from
Canada, USITC Pub. 1259, Inv. No. 731-TA-40 (Preliminary) (1982).
255. Steel Wire Nails from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1088, Inv. No. 731TA-26 (Final) (1980).
256. Id.
257. See also Langer, supra note 139, at 519.
258. Id.

259. This article addresses the concentration of dumped imports in this section, although the subject could be treated under "injury," see infra part IV.
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nine; in Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes sixty-eight; while in
Certain Steel Wire Nails only forty-three percent of the imports entered the ten western states comprising the regional market. In the last
case the ITC relied on the legislative history 60 and considered fortythree percent to be a concentration because the western region consumed only twenty percent of the total United States consumption and
there was evidence that the forty-three percent was actually sold in the
area.
d. Are the producers of all, or almost all of the production
within the area injured?
Although the statutory language seems to direct the ITC to answer
this question in relation to each producer, the ITC in Sugar and Syr26 1
averaged the data of the seven firms within the
ups from Canada
regional market and concluded that, in the aggregate, all seven firms
had declining profits, even though the second largest producer had
made a net profit. According to the ITC, "(t)he statute is concerned
with determining whether a regional industry is being materially in'262
jured not whether particular producers are injured.
The court in Atlantic Sugar II criticized this approach and determined that the ITC must consider injury to individual firms in determining whether there is material injury to a regional industry:
The only aggregation permitted by the law is that of the production of those who have been injured individually .... It is
incorrect to nullify the profitable operation of one producer by
blending it with the loss of another and presenting
the result
263
as an "aggregate" indication of injury to both.
According to Judge Watson, the correct approach was to determine
first which producers were injured and which were not, and then determine whether the total of the injured producers constituted all, or almost all, of the total regional production.
In the third final investigation,2 6 4 the ITC followed the two-step
test, but not without expressing reservations with regard to the Court
of International Trade's methodology:
Indeed, in our view, the court's reading of section 771(4)(C)
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
(1982).

See supra text accompanying note 227.
See supra note 241.
Id.
Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 295, 300 (1981).
Sugar and Syrups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1243, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final)
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presents three serious problems. First, all of our determinations prior to the 1979 TAA relied on aggregate data. Second,
the court's analysis poses a substantial administrative burden
on the Commission and on the public. Third, it has a serious
adverse impact on the Commission's mandate to undertake an
open decisionmaking process. " "
As a result, Judge Watson in Atlantic Sugar III modified his views
somewhat by allowing an exception for cases in which numerous producers were involved. In such a case, aggregation would be permitted,
2 68
provided that methods of analysis insured an accurate finding.
The finding with regard to Revere, the second largest producer,
was held unlawful because it included information of a plant that was
located outside the region. The defense of the ITC that it had no way
to separate Revere's data2 0 was held without merit in Atlantic Sugar
IV.Y8 Because removal of Revere from the group of injured producers
reduced the level of injured production to seventy-five percent of total
production, the "all, or almost all" requirement could not be considered fulfilled. Therefore, the final injury finding was vacated. " '
The Atlantic Sugar cases are important in two respects. First,
they clarify substantive problems of antidumping provisions, and, second, these cases give a good insight into the court's in-depth probing of
the ITC's injury determinations.
In cases in which the producers in a certain region produce a major part of total United States production, an injury finding can be
based on the existence of either a regional industry or a national industry."' Because of the stringent limitations upon the regional industry
concept, it seems advisable for petitioners to demand a national industry finding. Moreover, it has been suggested that the ITC might adopt
an antitrust approach in defining the relevant geographic market. 7 1 As
of yet, neither the ITC nor the Court of International Trade have for27
mally adopted such an approach.
265. Id. at 12.
266. See supra note 239.
267. See supra note 236.
268. See supra note 243.

269. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently overturned the "Atlantic
Sugar IV" decision, Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
270.
271.

SENATE FINANCE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 83.

Wasserman, supra note 239, at 491.
272. "(The Ct. Int'l Trade] also refrains from judging whether analogies may be
drawn, as suggested by plaintiffs, between the substantiality of the lessening of competi-

tion required by S3 of the Clayton Act .. " Cf. Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 2 Ct.
Int'l Trade 18, 21, 519 F. Supp. 916, 920 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), supra note 243.
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Related Parties

When United States producers are related to the exporters or importers, or are themselves importers of the product under investigation, the ITC may exclude such producers from the domestic industry. 27 Exclusion is discretionary, but the Senate Finance Committee
Report gives as an example of a proper exclusion, a situation in which
a United States producer is related to a foreign exporter and the foreign exporter directs his exports to the United 7States so as not to compete with his related United States producer.1 '
It should be noted that the TAA provision on related parties encompasses two situations. In the first situation, a domestic producer
may be related to the foreign producer by, for example, being a subsidiary of the same parent corporation. The Senate Finance Committee
Report's hypothetical is an example of this situation. The second situation is one in which the domestic producer is also the importer. The
test in determining whether the parties are related is the degree of control one party can, or in fact does, exert over the other. This interpretation is consistent with the understanding developed among the 1979
Code signatories.275A good example of a case in which exclusion of a
producer/importer might be warranted, is given by Bryan. Because an
importer/producer is likely to refrain from selling the dumped product
in competition with his own product, the importer/producer will generally import the product for a captive market. 276 This would give him an
unfair competitive advantage both in relation to fellow-producers of
the like product, and to fellow-producers of the final product. It should
be noted, however, that Bryan's assumption does not necessarily have
to be present in all cases. In the author's opinion, it is conceivable that
a producer might import merchandise at dumped, and usually low,
prices, and, consequently, sell it at a competitive price level. Thus, the
producer/importer would benefit from the margin between the import
price and the sales price. Alternatively, he might sell it below the price
of his own product, thereby losing profits on sales of his own product,
but gaining profits, once again, from the margin.
In Color Television Receivers from the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan,27 7 petitioners asserted that certain firms, which operated in
273. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(b) (1982).
274. SENATE FINANCE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 83.
275. See also infra part I, § F. For a different "related parties" test, see BRYAN, supra
note 2, at 63.
276. Id.
277. Color Television Receivers from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, US1TC
Pub. 1514, Inv. No. 731-TA-134, 135 (Final) (1984).
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the United States but were owned by interests in Korea, Taiwan and
Japan, should be excluded from the definition of industry on the basis
of section 771(4)(B) of the 1979 TAA (the first situation).278 The ITC
adopted a three-step analysis for applying the provision." 9 First, do
the companies really qualify as domestic producers? With regard to the
first step, the ITC found that the companies did qualify as domestic
producers. The ITC based this finding on an examination of the data
on United States production activity. The data considered concerned
the amount and type of domestic-made parts, the number of employees in the United States, the amount of capital invested in the United
States, and whether the facilities in the United States merely assembled the end product, or actually engaged in processing and manufacturing. Second, is the firm related within the meaning of section
771(4)(B)? Third, are there appropriate circumstances for excluding
the company? The main concern of this third step was the possibility
of a distortion in the injury analysis. To include a protected firm would
make the industry appear healthier than it actually was. Conversely, if
exclusion would skew the ITC's analysis, it would be inappropriate to
apply the related party provision. In the case under consideration, inclusion did not distort the analysis.2 80
The second situation, in which a related party issue may exist, is a
producer who is at the same time an importer. This situation arose in
Melamine from Austria and Italy.281 There, one of the two United
States producers, American Cyanamid, was also an importer of the
dumped melamine. The other producer, MCI, suggested that the ITC
exclude American Cyanamid's production for its captive market, but
include production for the merchant market. The ITC did not explicitly address this issue. In her additional views, however, Commissioner
28
Stern noted that MCI's argument raised two very distinct questions.
The first question was whether it was appropriate to exclude American
Cyanamid from the domestic industry under section 771(4)(B) because
it both produced and imported melamine. The second question was
"whether to exclude from [ITC] calculations of the domestic industry
that portion of American Cyanamid's production which was for captive
consumption.''1s Regarding whether it was appropriate to exclude
278. Id. at 6-7.
279. Id. at 7.
280. Id. at 10. Cf. Television Receiving Sets from Japan, USITC Pub. 1153, Inv. No.
751-TA-2 (Review) (1981).
281. Melamine in Crystal Form from Austria and Italy, USITC Pub. 1065, Inv. No.
731-TA-13, 14 (Final) (1980).
282. Id. at 6, 7.
283. Id. at 11.
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American Cyanamid on the basis of the producer/importer link, Commissioner Stern determined that it was not "since American Cyanamid
is one of only two surviving domestic producers of melamine and has
significant merchant market sales. Excluding American Cyanamid
would severely distort perception of the domestic industry." ' 4 With
regard to whether American Cyanamid's production for its captive
market should be included, Commissioner Stern noted that this question in no way pertained to the fact that American Cyanamid was both
a producer and an importer. 8 5
In Snow-grooming Vehicles from West Germany,28 6 the ITC opinion merely mentioned the exclusion of one producer, Valley Engineering, without stating any reasons for doing so. Once again, Commissioner Stern's separate views are helpful. The situation was special
because Valley Engineering was the importer of the allegedly dumped
merchandise and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the dumping exporter.
Thus, Valley Engineering could be classified under both situations.
Whether Valley Engineering could qualify as an American company
was doubtful. Commissioner Stern remarked that the ITC had not had
the opportunity to verify Valley Engineering's claim that fifty percent
of the value of the machines was added in the United States. Commissioner Stern, however, found that this was not necessary. Appropriate
circumstances existed for exclusion because "[ilt would be counterproductive to include Valley Engineering in the domestic industry,
since its inclusion would decrease the impact of the alleged dumping
2 87
on the domestic industry.
In Certain Iron-metal Castings from India,2 8 8 a subsidies case,
Commissioner Stern decided to include eleven producers/importers,
who were responsible for thirty-one percent of United States capacity,
because they had made a convincing case that their sole motivation
was to remain in the market in the face of stiff competition from other
importers. Their fundamental interests, however, clearly remained in
domestic production. Thus, exclusion would have been inappropriate.
Likewise, it could be argued that producers who imported out of a desire to develop an alternative source of supply also should be included.
284. Id.
285. See also Unlasted Leather Footwear from India, USITC Pub. 1045, Inv. No.
701-TA-1 (Final) (1980).
286. Snow-Grooming Vehicles from FRG, USITC Pub. 1117, Inv. No. 731-TA-36
(Preliminary) (1984).

287. Id. at 13.
288.

45 Fed. Reg. 66,915 (1980).
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Product Lines 28 9
Section 771(4)(D) of the TAA provides that:
The effect of. . . the dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the United States production of a like product if available data permit the separate identification of production in
terms of such criteria as the production process or the producers' profits. If the domestic production of the like product has
no separate identity in terms of such criteria then the effect of
the... dumped imports shall be assessed by the examination
of the production of the narrowest group or range of products,
which includes a like product, for which the necessary information can be provided."' 0

Although the exceptions, discussed in Part III, sections B 2 and 3 of
this article, narrow the scope of the domestic industry generally, the
product lines exception expands that scope, thereby making affirmative
injury determinations more difficult. That is, the impact of the
dumped product will be more diffused if more domestic products are
considered. Another difference is that the former two exceptions relate
to the domestic industry, while the product lines exception basically
expands the industry indirectly by not limiting it to production of the
like product.
Whether the impact of the imports will be considered in relation
to the like product or in relation to the product line (the narrowest
group or range of products, including the like product) depends on the
availability of data. The provision quoted above, reflects a realization
by Congress (and the 1979 Code drafters), that the same factors of production will often be used to manufacture several similar products. 9 1
The Senate Finance Committee Report 2 "2 elaborates upon the
statutory provision in two respects. The Report extensively details the
factors which require separate data, namely: profits, productivity, employment, and cash flow. In addition, the report suggests possible reasons why separation might not be possible. For example, accounting
procedures in use, or practical problems in distinguishing or separating
the operation of product lines, may make it necessary to assess the
imported product's effect on a narrow range of domestic products.
It should be noted that the availability of data depends solely
289. The continuum principle has been discussed supra part I, § B and will not be
discussed here.
290. TAA, supra note 9, 19 U.S.C.
291. Victor, supra note 129, at 129.
292. SENATE FINANCE COMMITITE REPORT, supra note 7, at 83, 84.
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upon the domestic producers who might not be able, or might not be
willing, to supply the ITC with the relevant data. That domestic producers may not want to provide data was clearly not considered by
Congress. It has been argued that in such a case "the result might turn
on equitable considerations. 2' 93 If the domestic industry was in fact
able to provide relevant information but preferred not to (perhaps because members of the industry thought imposition of antidumping duthe disadvanties on a product-line basis might be more2 profitable),
94
taged parties should have a right of appeal.
The standard case in this respect is Babcock & Wilcox v. United
States,2" initiated by Babcock & Wilcox, a domestic producer of steel
pipes and boiler tubes, against a negative ITC preliminary determination. 296 Petitioner had originally complained of Japanese dumping of
four products: (1) welded carbon steel boiler tubes; (2) seamless carbon
steel boiler tubes; (3) seamless stainless and heat resisting steel boiler
tubes and process pipes; and (4) seamless alloy steel tubes for bearings.
Only the petitioner, however, was able to provide separate profit and
loss data for each of the four products. The ITC, on the other hand,
did not make any effort to solicit such information from the rest of the
industry. Rather, the ITC aggregated the three seamless products into
one product line, and gave a negative determination. After initially
rendering a positive determination with regard to the welded variant,
the ITC later reopened the investigation and changed its mind.
The court criticized the ITC on three points. First, it had wrongfully reopened the investigation. Second, it had adhered too strictly to
"a preference for isolation of all production factors supporting a product as predicate for ascertaining the scope of an industry. 2 97 The key
to section 771(4)(D) of the TAA was considered to be "profit accountability."'29' Third, in view of the foregoing, it should have sought profit
and loss information from other producers.29 9 Since the admonition of
the court in Babcock and Wilcox, the ITC has indeed focused on the
availability of profit and loss data. 0
293. Langer, supra note 139, at 508.
294. Id. at 509.
295. Babcock and Wilcox v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 74, 521 F. Supp. 479
(1981), vacated as moot 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 3 (1982).
296. Pipes and Tubes from Japan, USITC Pub. 1058, Inv. No. 731-TA-15 (Preliminary) (1980).
297. 521 F. Supp. at 485.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 487.
300. Compare Menthol from Japan, USITC Pub. 1058, Inv. No. 731-TA-27 (Preliminary) (1980) and Secondary Aluminum Alloy in Unwrought Form from the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1143, Inv. No. 731-TA-40 (Preliminary) (1981) with Fireplace Mesh
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Whether the ITC considers the impact of the dumped merchandise on the industry producing the like product or on the industry producing a product line, it is possible that during the investigation several like products or product lines are found. It is obvious that in such
a case there should be as many industries as there are like products or
product lines. Though an argument could be made that each antidumping investigation should be limited to consideration of one industry, we have seen that this 'ould make mattes unneessaiy impractical. However, a ITC majority in Certain Carbon Steel Products
from Certain European Countries0 1 concluded that there was one industry consisting of five product lines.8 02 Likewise, in Certain Steel
Wire Nails from Korea,s0 3 one industry was found consisting of seven
like products.
After these early cases, the ITC seems to have applied a one product line/one industry approach. Thus, in Barium Carbonate and
Strontium Carbonate from West Germany and Strontium Nitrate
from Italy,304 for example, each like product was treated as one
industry.30 5
A noteworthy case is Cyanuric Acid from Japan"O in which the
ITC, after initially determining that there were two like products and,
consequently, two domestic industries, and after analyzing material injury and causation separately for both industries, decided in the final
Panels from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1186, Inv. No. 731-TA-49 (Preliminary), (1981); Bicycle Tires and Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1258, Inv. No. 731-TA-94 (Preliminary)
(1982); Carbon Steel Wire Rod, USITC Pub. 1444, Inv. No. 731-TA-113, 114 (Preliminary) (1983); Certain Steel Valves from Japan, USITC Pub. 1446, Inv. No. 731-TA-145
(Preliminary) (1983); Carbon Steel Wire Rod, USITC Pub. 1476, Inv. No. 731-TA-160
(Preliminary) (1984); Valves, Nozzles and Connectors of Brass from Italy, USITC Pub.
1500, Inv. No. 731-TA-165 (Preliminary) (1984).
301. Certain Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 'United Kingdom, USITCI Pub.
1064, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-18-24 (Preliminary) (1980).
302. Id. The five product lines were: 1. hot-rolled sheet, 2. cold-rolled sheet, 3. galvanized sheet, 4. carbon steel plate, 5. angles, shapes and sections.
303. Certain Steel Wire Nails from Korea, USITC Pub. 1088, Inv. No. 731-TA-26
(Final) (1980).
304. Barium Carbonate and Strontium Carbonate from the Federal Republic of Germany and Strontium Nitrate from Italy, USITC Pub. 1105, Inv. No. 731-TA-31-33 (Preliminary) (1980).
305. See also Certain Steel Valves from Japan, USITC Pub. 1446, Inv. No. 731-TA145 (Preliminary) (1983) and Certain Valves, Nozzles and Connectors of Brass from Italy, USITC Pub. 1500, Inv. No. 731-TA-165 (Preliminary) (1984) in which respectively 9
and 7 like products and 9 and 7 industries were found, although the several like products
were aggregated into one product line because of lack of available data.
306. Cyanuric Acid from Japan, USITC Pub. 1407, Inv. No. 731.TA-136 (Preliminary) (1982), USITC Pub. 1407, Inv. No. 731-TA-136 (Final) (1982).
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determination that there was one product after all and that "even if we
had found that there were two or more like products, it would still be
necessary to make our assessment of the impacts of these imports on
the same basis using a product line approach. 3 0 7 Did the preliminary
data, which evidently permitted separate identification, disappear?
5.

Conclusion

The American "domestic industry" provisions closely track those
of the 1979 Code. The only deviation is treatment of the "product line"
issue as an aspect of industry rather than of injury.30' The ITC generally applies the regional industry, the related parties, and the product
line exceptions in an internationally correct and appropriate manner.
The extensive discussion and judicial review in a number of cases have,
furthermore, helped interpretation of certain vague terms and ambiguities in those exceptions. Despite the case-by-case variability, 309 the
ITC seems to be developing a certain number of rules, a development
which should be applauded.
C.

The European Community

1. The Standard Situation
In 1979, van Bael for the first time urged that the administration
310
of the dumping regulation be carried out in a transparent manner.
Although the analysis used by the European Community authorities
has become less summary since 1980 and new improvements have been
made by adoption of a more conveniently arranged case description
and motivation since the end of 1982,1' it is still very hard for the
outsider to get a good overview of the issues by analyzing the cases.
The definition of industry is the same as that of the 1979 Code
and need not be repeated here.312 Noteworthy is that the Regulation
does not devote a separate article to the definition, but treats it as an
aspect of injury. The practical importance of this seems limited. Furthermore, it is clear from statements by European Commission officials, speaking ex officio, that "a major part" need not necessarily be
307. Id.
308. 1979 Code, supra note 5, Articles 3 and 5.
309. Calhoun, Determining Injury Under United States Trade Laws, UNCTAD Injury Papers 3 (1983).
310. Van Bael, Ten Years of EEC Anti-Dumping Enforcement, 13 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 395, 408 (1979).
311. This approach was first used in Barium Chloride from China and the German
Democratic Republic, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 110) 11 (1983).
312. 1979 Code, supra note 5, Articles 4 and 5.
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more than fifty-nine percent.31s The minimum, though, seems to be
3 14

twenty-five percent.

In Cylinder Vacuum Cleaners from Czechoslovaki,"5 the main
community producer located in the Netherlands did not support the
complaint while the German producers did not considered themselves
injured. The European Commission decided, however, that the rest of
the European Community industry constituted a major part. No percentage was given. In Chinese Paracetamol,3 6 the main paracetamol
producer in Germany who had originally supported the complaint later
withdrew as a complainant but the European Commission determined
that the rest of the industry constituted a major part, again without
giving any statistics. In Monochrome Portable Television Sets from
Korea,317 a complaint was lodged by the European Association of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers. The European Commission opened
an investigation and sent questionnaires to the twenty-nine European
Community producers on whose behalf the complaint was made. Fourteen firms replied and of those, only six considered themselves injured.
Although the European Commission seemed to conclude that there was
no injury due to a lack of a causal link, it would have been more appropriate to conclude simply that a major part of the industry was not
injured.
In a number of cases the European Commission concluded that
the European Community industry consisted of a single producer. 18 In
other cases the European Commission has based injury findings on the
existence of injury to the industry of only one member state of the
European Community. Because the industry concerned in the latter
cases produced a major part of the total European Community production, use of the regional industry exception was not necessary. 1 9
A combination of the two situations occurred in the Russian
Mechanical Watches case. 3 The European Commission concentrated
on the situation of one firm, Timex, which on its own accounted for a
major part of the total European Community production, and on the
313.
314.

315.

BESELER, supra note 98, at 105.
J. CUNNANE & C. STANBIfOOK, DUMPING AND SUBSIDIES 69 (1983).
25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No, L 172) 48 (1982).
25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No, L 236) 24 (1982).

316.
317. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No, L 364) 49 (1981).
318. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No, L. 236) 23 (1982).
319. E.g., Edible and Pharmaceutical Gelatine from Sweden, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 219) 2 (1980); Louvre Doors from Malayasia and Singapore, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. C 286) 4 (1980); Mechanical Watches from the USSR, 23 O.J. BUR. COMM. (No. C
181) 3 (1980); Potato Granules from Canada, 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No, L 116) 11 (1981),
Louvre Doors from Taiwan, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 158) 5 (1981).
320. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No, L 11) 16 (1982).
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U.K. market, because exports were concentrated there and other Community producers sold only a very small part of their production in the
British market. Although the European Commission has mentioned
concentration of the dumped imports in other decisions where it based
its findings on injury to a national industry, this condition of a concentration of dumped products in a single nation does not seem to be a
necessary prerequisite.
An interesting problem arose in Stereo Cassette Tape Heads from
82 1 where the complaint was lodged by the only non-integrated
Japan,
company in the Community that produced the like product. The fact
that the European Commission investigated the case amounts to implicit exclusion of all integrated producers who produce for their own
captive market. The same "implicit exclusion" occurred in the Hermetic Compressorscase.32 2 In both cases, the integrated producers constituted a majority of all producers. 28 The rationale for this exclusion
is not clear. One reason might be that the dumped imports competed
only in the merchant market.8 24 It is also possible that the integrated
producers used the dumped imports in the production of their end
products. It has been argued that exclusion or inclusion in such a case
falls within the discretion of the European Community authorities because neither the 1979 Code nor the European Community Regulation
treat the subject.125 The author disagrees. The fact that the 1979 Code
and the Regulation require the European Commission and the European Council to investigate the impact of the dumped imports on the
Community industry of the like product means that the only justifiable
basis for exclusion is the nature of the product3 26 "La destination
march6 captif) n'est en
commerciale du produit (march6 libre ou
27
aucune maniere prise en consideration."

2.

Regional Industries
Article 4, 5 of the Regulation provides that:
In exceptional circumstances, the Community may, for the production in question, be divided into two or more competitive
markets and the producers in each market regarded as a Com-

321.
322.
323.
la CEE,
324.
325.
326.
327.

23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 69) 64 (1980).
24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113) 53 (1981).
Didier, Deaux Annees d'Application du Nouveau Reglement Antidumping de
in 21 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 44 (1982).
BESELER., supra note 98, at 105.

Id.
Cf. Didier, supra note 323, at 44.

Id.

N.Y.L.
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munity industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all
or almost all their production of the product in question in
that market, and, (b) the demand in that market is not to any
product in
substantial degree supplied by producers of 32the
8
question located elsewhere in the Community.
If those conditions are fulfilled, material injury can only be found if
there is a concentration of the dumped imports in the regional market,
and if the regional producers of all or almost all of the production are
injured.
The European Commission, however, has never relied on this provision. 2 9 An interesting reason for this apparent reluctance is advanced in a memo, offered to the European Commission by the Union
of European Community Industries, (UNICE). 38 0 European Community doctrine would abhor the cutting up of the precious common market into national markets: "(1) a doctrine communautaire a horreur
8 '
' UNICE apparently
d'un decoupement des march~s nationaux."
criticizes the reluctant attitude of the European Commission rendering
appropriate a regional market finding. First, imports are often concentrated in national markets. Second, there are still many national import quotas. Outside competition thus presses unequally on the different national markets. 3 2 It would, therefore, be appropriate to analyze
the situation of each nation individually.
In the absence of any case law, it is unclear how the European
Commission will interpret the criteria. The following is, therefore,
based on an analysis of what the various commentators have argued. A
regional market could consist of either a group of member states, one
member state, or part of a member state. "3 The necessary degree of
isolation and of concentration would make it likely that in practice
such a region could only be found in the periphery of the European
Community. 3 4 It is also probable that the European Commission
would inquire why the regional market is isolated. This inquiry would
be relevant in order to avoid conflict with the competition rules embodied in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.38 8 It has been sug328. The Regulation, supra note 11, art. 4, 5.
329. But see infra part III, § C, 1.
330. Note de IUNICE, Procedures Anti-dumping de la Communaute 4 Decembre
(1980).
331. Id. at 6.
332. Id.
333. CUNNANE & STANBROOK, supra note 314, at 71.
334. Id.
335. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 113, entered into
force Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S,11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
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gested that the regional producers would have to sell at least eighty
percent of their total production within the region in order to be protected on the basis of Article 4, 5 of the Regulation. " 6
3.

Related Parties

The same Article 4, 5 of the Regulation mentions the related parties exception.1 7 The provision is taken from the 1979 Code and need
not be repeated here. In Textured Polyester FabricsFrom the United
States," the European Commission excluded two producers stating:
"that the other two complainant producers were at the same time importers of the products in question; whereas they were therefore excluded from the examination of the injury suffered by the complainant
industry."88 9
In Caravans from Yugoslavia,'" the European Commission briefly
stated that "the Community industry in respect of which the impact of
the dumped imports must be assessed is the entire Community manufacturing industry producing rigid caravans for camping, excluding the
exporter's subsidiary in Belgium.""' 1 These flat statements lend support to the conclusion that the mere producer/importer connection, as
in the Textured Polyester Fabricscase,8 42 or the mere relationship between an exporter and a European Community producer, as in the
Caravans case, 48 are sufficient grounds for exclusion.84 ' Moreover, it is
not necessary to show that the related party, or the importer in fact,
profits from the relationship, a condition that is necessary in the
United States. The profit is obviously presumed on the basis of his
status. Such an approach, however, is unfair towards the excluded parties. It might also distort the injury analysis. As far as the related party
exception in the narrow sense is concerned, it is also in violation of the
1980 Understanding, which states in relevant part that a party shall be
deemed to be related "provided that there are grounds for believing or
suspecting that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause the
producer concerned to behave differently from unrelated producers. '
Therefore, there should be more than mere relatedness in order to in336. Id.
337. The Regulation, supra note 11, art. 4, 5.
338.

24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 133) 17 (1981).

339. Id.
340. 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 240) 14 (1983).

341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 133) 17 (1981).
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 240) 14 (1983).
Cf. BESELER, supra note 98, at 106.

345.

See infra part I, § F.
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voke the provision.
4.

46
Product Lines3

The Regulation merely provides that the impact of the dumped
imports shall be assessed in relation to the Community production of
the like product when available data permit its separate identification.
The provision thereby does not indicate what type of information has
to be available. In a number of cases, the European Commission encountered the problem of lack of available data with respect to the like
product. s4 7 Nevertheless, it did not go on to investigate the narrowest
group or range of products for which the necessary information could
be obtained, but rather investigated the condition of the producers of
the like product on the basis of the best information available. An example of the standard formula used in such situations is found in Louvre Doors from Malaysia and Singapore:
Whereas, in the absence of separate production and import
figures relating to Louvre doors alone, it is difficult to gauge
exactly the size of the Community market for such units;
whereas, nevertheless, the best information available suggests
that the total Community market has remained relatively
static from 1978 to 1980; . . .38
However, this practice of using only "the best information available" seems to be in violation of both the 1979 Code and the Regulation.
Neither statute gives the European Commission any discretion in this
respect. If available data do not permit separate identification, the European Commission must consider the information regarding the product line. The European Commission's use of the best information available gives the domestic producers an unfair advantage in that it
prevents the dilution of the relative impact of the dumped imports,
which could have occurred if a product line analysis had been used.
And, because all the available information is in the hands of exactly
the same producers, this practice of the European Commission might
take away the stimulus on their part to provide certain disadvantageous data with regard to the like product.
346. 1979 Code, supra note 5, art. 4.
347. E.g., Cylinder Vacuum Cleaners from Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and Poland, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 172) 47 (1982); Electric Multiphase Motors from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania and the Soviet Union, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 16 (1980); Louvre Doors
from Malaysia and Singapore, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 135) 34 (1981).
348. Louvre Doors from Malaysia and Singapore, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 135) 34
(1981).
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5.

Conclusions

Very little attention is paid to definition of the domestic industry
in European Commission and European Council decisions. This is regrettable because such a definition is one of the four pillars on which
each injury finding is based. This does not necessarily mean that the
European Commission does not extensively consider the issue. It
merely means that such consideration is not reflected in the decisions.
Mere constatations that the complainants constitute 'a majority,' that
certain producers are excluded, or that separate production and imports figures are not available, are hardly in conformity with the wish
of the 1979 Code signatories to provide for equitable and open procedures as the basis for a full examination of dumping cases."'
IV.

A.

MATERIAL INJURY

Introduction

One of the most difficult issues in an injury determination is the
requirement that the injury should be material. This requirement qualifies the term injury and is, therefore, concerned with the degree of
injury required to impose antidumping duties. Not only is materiality
not defined, determinations are made on an ad hoc basis. Small margins of price-undercutting may have disastrous results in some industries while having no or only de minimis influence on others. Despite
these problems, during the Tokyo Round acceptance by a.1 countries of
the material injury standard was considered to be the crux of the negotiations for a number of countries."' 0
The main controversy in this field was between the European
Community and the United States. The latter was exempted from application of a material injury standard because of existing legislation at
the moment of signing of the GATT. On the basis of the Protocol of
Provisional Application, the United States therefore had a grandfather
right.
During the Tokyo Round it was agreed that the word "material"
should not be used too conspicuosuly in order to avoid controversy in
the United States.3 61 The word was therefore relegated to a footnote,"'
349.

1979 Code, supra note 5, Preamble.

350.

AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATORAL TRADE NEGO-

TIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979). The negotiations, which
were completed with the signing of the Agreements in Geneva, were referred to as the
Tokyo Round. They were the seventh round of trade negotiations since 1948 under the
auspices of the GATT.
351. Grey, supra note 125.
352. 1979 Code, supra note 5, art. 3 n.2. The text reads:
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while the injury article confined itself to a non-exhaustive enumeration
of factors which might play a role in the determination of injury.
Despite this inconspicuous relegation, during the drafting of the
TAA it nevertheless appeared that the word material would not be
used. The European Commission noticed this and exerted heavy pressure on the United States, particularly by Ambassador Strauss.5 8 The
result was inclusion of the word in the TAA and the controversial definition of it.
Two further remarks need to be made. In the first place, here and
above the term "material" injury has been used to include three situations: (i) material injury in a narrow sense; (ii) threat of material injury; and (iii) material retardation of the establishment of an industry.
If any of these three situations occurs, material injury in the broad
sense can be found to exist.
B.

The United States

1. Prior Practice
Prior to the signing of the 1979 Code, the United States had, at
least formally, an unqualified "injury" standard. Both the Department
of the Treasury and later the Tariff Commission, however, interpreted
this standard as having a de facto material injury requirement. This
attitude was well summarized in Titanium Dioxide from France:"4
In the Congressional hearings that took place before the transfer (from the Treasury to the Tariff Commission) was made,
representatives of Treasury reported that the term "injury" as
employed in the Act, had been interpreted to mean "material
injury;" and the Tariff Commission indicated that it would
continue to follow that interpretation unless Congress decided
otherwise, which it has not done. Thus an affirmative finding
by the ITC under the antidumping Act must be based upon
material injury to a domestic industry resulting from sales at
less than fair value.855
Under this Code the term "injury" shall, unless otherwise specified, be
taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury
to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an
industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this
Article.

Id.
353. Grey, supra note 125, at 6.
354. Titanium Dioxide from France, TC Pub. No. 109, Inv. No. AA-1921-31, 28 Fed.
Reg 10467 (1983).
355. Id.
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The United States arguably relied on this previous practice when it
signed the 1967 Code, implementation of which in the law of the
United States would have established a material injury standard. This
reliance might have been a little bit misplaced in view of the fate of a
1951 administration sponsored bill which would have changed the Antidumping Act of 1921 from making it necessary to find that a domestic industry was merely injured to a finding that it was materially injured.8 6 The House Ways and Means Committee at the time explicitly
refused to adopt the material injury standard because it "might be interpreted to require proof of a greater degree of injury than is required
under the existing law."38 1 Misplaced or not, shortly after the United
States signing of the Code, the Tariff Commission altered course radi8
cally in the historic case Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland:5
The word "injury" in the Antidumping Act has been construed
by the Commission as meaning "material injury." Any injury
which is more than de minimis is material injury. When the
Congress used the word injury in the Act without qualification
of degree, the only exception that one might reasonably apply
is the old legal maxim that "the law does not concern itself
3
with trifles."
In a concurring opinion, Commissioner Clubb gave a dubious interpretation of the 1921 Act. According to Commissioner Clubb, the only reason why Congress included the injury requirement in the Act was to
relieve the Customs Bureau of the necessity of examining every importation of a product for a possible violation of the Act.360 Until 1975, the
de minimis test was upheld in a number of cases.8 6 '
The distinction between determinations made before and after
1975 is made here because of the statement in the legislative history
accompanying the TAA that the decisions of the ITC from 1975 to
1979 have, on the whole, been consistent with the material injury standards as established by the TAA. This statement seems to assume that
the ITC has been less 'protectionist' during the period from 1975 to
356. Long, supra note 115, at 473.
357. H.R. REP. No. 1089, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951).
358. USTC 214 (AA1921-50) (1967).
359. Id. at 6.
360. USTC 214, 18, 19 (AA1921-50) (1967).
361. E.g., Pig Iron from GDR, USTC 23 (AA1921-52) (1968); Potassium Chloride
from Canada, USTC (AA1921-58-60) (1969); Dried Eggs from Netherlands, USTC
(AA1921-63) (1970); Ferrite Cores from Japan, USTC 12 (AA1921-65) (1971); Clear
Sheet Glass from Japan, USTC 10 (AA1921-69-70) (1971); Clear Sheet Glass from Taiwan, USTC 7 (AA1921-76) (1971); Tempered Glass from Japan, UJSTC 8 (AA1921-77)
(1971); Elemental Sulphur from Mexico, USTC (AA1921-92) (1972).
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1979 than during the period before 1975.
This assumption is difficult to accept at least with regard to the
required degree of injury. Although it is true that from 1975 on the
ITC has more clearly articulated the standards on which it has based
its injury findings,'6 2 and that in most cases these standards are the
same as those used in the 1979 Code and the TAA, there are at least
six cases, decided between 1975 and 1979, which adopted the more
than de minimis test. " In Melamine from Japan,3" for example, the
ITC coupled the "contributory cause" standard3 6 5 with a de minimis
standard:
However, it is not necessary that importation of LTFV merchandise be a principal cause, a major cause, or a substantial
cause of injury to an industry. Even when several factors that
may cause injury, other than LTFV sales, are present, all that
is required for an affirmative determination is that the merchandise sold at LTFV contributed to more than an inconse6
quential injury.36
The 1979 House Report, however, explicitly rejected use of the term
"de minimis." In the author's opinion, there remain some doubts as to
whether the injury standard, applied by the ITC during the 1975-79
period, really was a material injury standard. Since the adoption of the
the 1979 TAA, the ITC has applied a fairly rigorous injury standard.
There can be little doubt that from 1979 on, the ITC de facto requires
injury to be material in the GATT sense.
2.

Material Injury Since 1980
a. Material injury in the narrow sense

Contrary to the 1979 Code, which does not define material injury,
the TAA defines the term as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant. ''13 7 The TAA then goes on to mention a number of factors which should be considered by the ITC in its investigations. The legislative history of the TAA provides useful information
on both points. Concerning the definition, the Senate Finance Commit362. Note, supra note 208, at 1087.
363. Railway Track Maintenance Equipment from Austria, USITC Pub. 844, Inv.
No. AA-1921-173, (1977); Silicon Metal from Canada, USITC Pub. 954, Inv. No. AA1921-192, (1979); Rayon Staple Fiber from Italy, Pub. 976, Inv. No. AA-1921-201, (1979).
364.

USTC 6 (AA1921-162) (1976).

365.

See infra Part V, § B, 1, and accompanying notes.

366.
367.

USTC 6 (AA1921-162) (1976).
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(a) (1982).
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tee Report states that:
The ITC determinations. . . from January 3, 1975 to July 2,
1979, have been, on the whole, consistent with the material injury criterion of this bill [TAA] and the Agreements. The material injury criterion of this bill should be interpreted in this
manner. This statement does not indicate approval of each affirmative or negative decision of the Commission with respect
to the injury criterion, because judgments whether the facts in
a particular case actually support a finding of injury are for the
to judicial review for subCommission to determine, subject
3 68
stantive evidence on the record.
The Report of the the House Ways and Means Committee basically
repeats this language, but added that use of the de minimis term was
specifically rejected by that Committee. Rather, it was agreed that the
"harm which is not
statute should define "material injury" to mean
'6 9
inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant.
With regard to the factors to be considered, the Senate Finance
Committee stresses that the importance of each factor depends on the
facts of the case and the nature of the industry involved:
For one industry, an apparently small volume of imports may
have a significant impact on the market; for another, the same
volume might not be significant. Similarly, for one type of
product, price may be the key factor in making a decision as to
what product to purchase and a small price differential result8 70
ing from the margin of dumping can be decisive.
The Act mentions explicitly that the following factors should be investigated: (1) the volume of the imports (market penetration); (2) the
effect of the imports on United States prices; and (3) the impact of the
imports on the domestic producers of like products.87'
In evaluating the volume of imports, the ITC considers whether
the volume of the imports, or any increase therein, either in absolute
terms or relative to production or consumption in the United States, is
significant. 7 2 This provision consists of four elements: (a) significant
volume, (b) significant absolute increase in volume, (c) significant increase, relative to production, and (d) significant increase in relation to
368. SENATE FINANCE COMMTIEmE REPORT, supra note 7, at 87.
369. Id. at 46.
370. Id. at 88. See also H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979); Calhoun,
supra note 309.
371. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(b) (1982).
372. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(i) (1982).
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consumption in the importing country. Element (b) would occur, for
example, if the volume of the imports increased from 100 to 200 widgets. With regard to element (c), a stable amount of imports may nevertheless increase in relation to the domestic production if, for example, domestic plants are closed. Element (d) is the situation in which a
stable level of imports nevertheless increase its market share, 73 for example, when more people buy the imported product because of that
product's low price." 4
It should be noted that element (a) is not mentioned in the 1979
Code. It seems to follow that the 1979 Code would not permit an injury
finding in a case in which neither an absolute nor a relative increase
occurred. The counterargument might be that the 1979 Code explicitly
states that none of the factors mentioned can necessarily give decisive
guidance.3 71 The implication is that even a decrease in the volume of
imports might result in an injury finding if such a finding was supported by other evidence. This interpretation is supported by logic as
well as the administrative practice of both the United States and the
European Community. In times of recession, for example, imports
might decline, both in absolute terms and in relative terms, and nevertheless injury might occur. The question remains, of course, whether in
such a situation the injury would have been caused by the imports.
In evaluating the effect on prices, the ITC considers whether the
imports have (1) significantly undercut domestic prices (2) otherwise
significantly depressed prices, or (3) have prevented price increases
which would have occurred otherwise.
With regard to the impact on the affected industry, the ITC has to
consider, inter alia, first, the actual and potential decline in output,
sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and
capacity utilization; second, the factors affecting domestic prices; and
third, the actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital and
377
investment.
The provisions on price effects and industry impact are taken directly from the relevant 1979 Code provisions.3 7 8 Analysis of ITC determinations between 1980 and 1984 confirms the highly factual char373.

Bellis, Injury Determinations Under EEC Import Relief Laws, in UNCTAD IN-

JURY PAPERS,

(1983).

374. Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Plate from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub.
No. 1459,7, Inv. No. 731-TA-151 (Preliminary) (1983).
375. 1979 Code, supra note 5, art. 3 n.2.
376. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(ii) (1982).
377. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(c)(iii) (1982).
378. 1979 Code, supra note 5, articles 3, (2) and 3 (3).
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acter of injury determinations and the truth of the Senate Finance
Committee Report statement that neither the presence nor the absence
of any factors are of decisive importance. Nevertheless, certain general
conclusions might be drawn:
(1)

Volume

Significant market penetration is not by itself sufficient for an affirmative injury finding. 7 9s Also, low levels of import penetration or declining levels will generally preclude an injury finding.380 However, low
levels of import penetration or declining levels may nevertheless cause
injury, if price effects and injury impact support an affirmative finding.381 Finally, the ITC generally considers whether imports have in379. SCM Corp. v. United States, 84 Cust. Ct. 227 C.R.D. 80-2 (1980), afj'd, 2 Ct.
Int'l Trade 1, 519 F. Supp. 911 (1981), reaff'd, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 7, 544 F. Supp. 194
(1982); Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan, USITC Pub. 732, Inv. No. AA1921145 (1975).
380. Rail Passenger Cars, USITC Pub. 1034, Inv. No. 731-TA-5,6 (Preliminary)
(1980) (no injury because no imports); Sodium Hydroxide, USITC Pub. 1040, Inv. No.
731-TA-8,11 (Preliminary) (1980) (total volume of imports very low, never more than
1.8% of domestic consumption.); Melamine, USITC Pub. 1065, Inv. No. 731-TA-13,14
(Final) (1980) (imports rose in 1978, decreased in 1979, in 1979 they were less than
4.05% of domestic consumption. This percentage was insignificant in light of other factors); Canned Clams from Canada, USITC Pub. 1060, Inv. No. 731-TA-17 (Preliminary)
(1980) (imports only 0.1% of domestic consumption); Secondary Allurninum Alloy from
United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1143, Inv. No. 731-TA-40 (Preliminary) (1981) (extremely
low level of import penetration, only 0.2% of domestic consumption); Chlorine from
Canada, USITC Pub. 1249, Inv. No. 731-TA-90 (Preliminary) (1982) (imports rose but
market penetration was minimal, 1.1% in 1979, 1.7% in 1981); Frozen French Fried Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1259, Inv. No. 731-TA-93 (Preliminary) (1982) (market
penetration was less than 1%); Bicycles from Tawain, USITC Pub. 1417, Inv. No. 731TA- (Final) (1993) (market share was only 4% and declining); Certain Lightweight Polyester Filament Fabric from Korea, USITC Pub. 1457, Inv. No. 731-TA-119 (Final) (1983)
(imports were never more than 5% of domestic consumption).
381. Spun Acrylic Yarn, USITC Pub. 1046, Inv. No. 731-TA-1,2 (Final) (1980); Sugar
and Syrups from Canada, USITC Pub. 1189, Inv. No. 731-TA-3 (Final) (1980) (market
share of the imports rose only from negligible to 4.46%, then declined); Portable Electric
Typewriters, USITC Pub. 1062, Inv. No. 731-TA-12 (Final) (1980) (although actual imports as a share of consumption declined in 1979, importers maintained their effective
strength in the market by selling stocks on hand); Certain Flat Rolled Carbon Steel from
Brazil, USITC Pub. 1499, Inv. No. 731-TA-123 (Final) (1984) (imports as share of domestic consumption declined from 1980 to 1982 and rose from 3 to 4.9% from Jan.
through Sept. 1983); Cyanuric Acid, USITC Pub. 1407, Inv. No. 731-TA-136 (Preliminary) (1983) (imports as a share of United States consumption decreased); Steel Valves
from Japan, USITC Pub. 1446, Inv. No. 731-TA-135 (Preliminary) (1983) (imports decreased from 4% in 1980, to 2% in 1982); Certain Carbon Steel Products, USITC Pub.
1064, Inv. No. 731-TA-18,24 (Preliminary) (1980) (imports rose in 1978, decreased in
1979 but were, nevertheless, held insignificant).
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creased absolutely or whether they have increased as a percentage of
domestic consumption or both. " "
(2)

Price Effects

Selling the imported product at a price lower than that of the domestic product is a strong indicator of both material injury and of causation.583 The ITC always examines the difference in the prices of the
domestic and imported products and will seldom reach a no injury
finding if substantial underselling occurs. Conversely, the ITC will seldom conclude that injury exists if there is no underselling or otherwise
price depressing or suppressing effects.3"Underselling will also play an
important role in price-sensitive industries. Such industries are characterized by a high cross-elasticity of demand: small changes in price will
lead to major shifts in demand. Small margins of undercutting may
therefore cause heavy injury to the domestic industry. Price-sensitivity
has been a factor in the spun acrylic yarn industry, s5s the unrefined
montan wax industry,3 86 the nitrocellulose industry,s 7 the potassium
382. Unrefined Montan Wax from East Germany, USITC Pub. 1180, Inv. No. 731TA-30 (Final) (1981); Iron Metal Castings from India, USITC Pub. 1122, Inv. No. 731TA-37 (Preliminary) (1981); Sheet Piling from Canada, USITC Pub. 1212, Inv. No. 731TA-52 (Preliminary) (1982); Carton Closing Staples from Sweden, USITC Pub. 1454,
Inv. No. 731-TA-116,117 (Preliminary) (1983); Potassium Permanganate from Spain,
USITC Pub. 1474, Inv. No. 731-TA-126 (Final) (1984) (increase in Spanish imports and
Spain's increased share of domestic consumption were coincident with domestic industry's declining profits and its decrease in market share); Tubes for Tires from Korea,
USITC Pub. 1416, Inv. No. 731-TA-137 (Preliminary) (1983) (imports rose, and as a
share of domestic consumption, quadrupled from 1980 to 1982 (10%); Barium Chloride
from China, USITC Pub. No. 1458, Inv. No. 731-TA-149,150 (Preliminary) (1983); Fresh
Cut Roses from Columbia, USITC Pub. 1450, Inv. No. 731-TA-148 (Preliminary) (1983);
Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Plate from Korea, USITC Pub. 1459, Inv. No. 731-TA-151
(Preliminary) (1983) (imports decreased, but went up as a percentage of United States
consumption); Brass Valves from Italy, USITC Pub. 1500, Inv. No. 731-TA-165 (Preliminary) (1984) (imports decreased, but went up as a percentage of United States
consumption).
383. Calhoun, supra note 309, at 18.
384. Presentation on injury determinations under the AD and CVD laws. Alberger
speaks to the Commerce Department on dumping and countervailing duties. (1982).
Strictly speaking, such a finding should be based on a "no causation" determination. The
ITC, however, seldom separates the grounds for a "no injury" finding in such a case.
385. Spun Acrylic Yarn from Japan and Italy, USITC 1046, Inv. No. 731-TA-1, 2
(Final) (1980).
386. Unrefined Montax Wax from East Germany, USITC Pub. 1180, Inv. No. 731TA-30 (Final) (1981).
387. Nitrocellulose from France, USITC Pub. 1409, Inv. No. 731-TA-96 (Final)
(1983).
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permanganate industry,38 8 and the fresh cut roses industry.
(3)

89

Impact on The Domestic Industry

The impact on a domestic industry of an allegedly dumped product is probably the most important factor in any injury analysis. An
insider's view has it that the ITC will rely heavily on two factors in
determining this effect.8 09 First, the industry must be in a distressed or
a stagnant condition. Second, heavy emphasis is placed on the determination whether low domestic price levels are a factor in the industry's
bad shape, and particularly whether the low prices are causing low
profits.
The above conclusions were individual-factor oriented. Most injury determinations, however, are based on a combination of volume
and price effects and the resulting impact on the United States
industry.
C.

Threat of Material Injury

Like the term "material injury," the term "threat of material injury" is not defined in the TAA. The 1984 Trade and Tarriff Act for
the first time provided detailed provisions which seem more of a codification of existing ITC practice, than an attempt to change it. Like the
provision on cumulation, however, it limits the discretion of the ITC
by requiring it to consider at least a number of expressly mentioned
factors. It does not seem likely that the bill will make "threat findings"
easier or harder. In that respect, it can be said to be trade-neutral.
The Senate Finance Committee Report on the TAA makes the following statement:
The ITC will consider the likelihood of actual material injury
occurring. It will consider any economic factors it deems relevant, and consider the existing and potential situation with respect to such factors. An ITC affirmative determination . . .
must be based upon information showing that the threat is real
and injury is imminent, not a mere supposition or conjecture
...
. Economic factors which may indicate that a threat of
material injury is present vary from case to case and industry
to industry. The ITC will continue to focus on the conditions
388. Potassium Permanganate from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub.
1480, Inv. No. 731-TA-125 (Final) (1984).
389. Fresh Cut Roses from Columbia, USITC Pub. 1450, Inv. No. 731-TA-148 (Preliminary) (1983).
390. Calhoun, supra note 309, at 18.
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of trade and competition and the nature of the particular industry in each case. For example, in some cases, e.g. an industry producing a product which has a relatively short market
life and significant research and development costs associated
with it, a rapid increase in market penetration can quickly result in material injury to that industry. 9 '
Although the Senate Finance Committee clarifies the circumstances in which threat might be found, it carefully abstains from giving any specific factors which the ITC is required to consider. This gap
is filled by the House Report which mentions three, though by no
means conclusive, trend factors. These three factors are: the rate of
increase of the dumped imports to the U.S. market; capacity in the
exporting country to generate exports; and the likelihood that such exports will be directed to the United States market taking into account
the availability of other export markets."'2 The language of the TAA
and its legislative history gives the impression that an affirmative injury finding should be based on either occurring injury, injury likely to
occur in the future, or material retardation. Nevertheless, thus far, all
the Commisssioners seem to have adopted the approach that preliminary findings can be based on a finding that there is a reasonable indication of injury or threat.9 '
From a logical point of view, this approach seems wrong. There is
either present injury or no present injury. Only if there is no present
injury one should start to consider what the chances are that injury
might happen in the future. In practice, however, the ITC will often
miss relevant data in the preliminary stage.39 4 In addition, if injury is
only beginning to occur, it might often be questionable whether the
injury reaches the required degree of materiality. A finding of injury or
threat provides a solution to these problems.
The ITC in its "threat" determinations routinely considers three
to four factors: (1) the rate of the increase; (2) the condition of the
domestic industry (sometimes); (3) the capacity of producers in the exporting country to generate export; and (4) the likelihood that such
factors will be directed to the United States market.3 98 5 The statute, as
391. SENATE FINANCE CoMMriTrE REPORT, supra note 7, at 88-89.
392. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 63 (1979). Cf. BRYAN, supra note 2, at
67.
393.
E.g., Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, USITC Pub. 1118,20, Inv.
No. 731-Ta-25 (1980); Truck Trailer Axle-and-Brake Assemblies, and Parts Thereof
from Hungary, USITC Pub. 1135, 1, Inv. No. 731-TA-38 (Preliminary) (1981).
394.
See additional views, Calhoun in Certain Amplifier Assemblies from Japan,
USITC Pub. 1182, Inv. No. 731-TA-48 (Preliminary) (1981).
395. 19 C.F.R. § 207.26(d) (1986).
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amended by the 1984 Act, requires the Commission to consider the following additional economic factors: (5) probability that imports will
depress or supress United States prices; (6) growing United States inventories; (7) under-utilized production capacity; (8) potential of product-shifting; and (9) other demonstrable adverse trends.
Although normal injury findings are usually completely dependent
upon information provided by the domestic industry, factors (3) and
(4) require data concerning the condition of the foreign producers.
Such information may be difficult to obtain and, consequently, findings
are sometimes based on the best, but often limited information availa8
6 the ITC based
ble. Thus, in Bicycle Tires and Tubes from Taiwan,
its preliminary finding that there was a threat of material injury on the
facts that capacity utilization of the Taiwanese industry went down
and that the United States was a major market for that industry.
These facts offered an indication of a present Taiwanese ability to increase imports to the United States by either increasing total
Taiwanese production or shifting exports. The ITC noted that:
A number of questions relating to Taiwan's potential role in
the U.S. market were unanswered here. In the final, we hope to
have more data such as the number of producers in Taiwan,
the facility of entering the Taiwan market for new firms, Taiwan's other foreign markets and import restrictions in those
97
markets.
The same lack of data posed a problem for the ITC in Greige
98
There, the ITC based
Polyester and Cotton Print Cloth from China.3
information that
general
very
on
the
its affirmative determination
China, as part of its current overall economic development
plan, is emphasizing development of export-oriented light industry as a means of earning foreign currency and has taken a
number of actions to promote the expansion of exports. Textile
products are expected to be one of the key product areas in
China's effort to achieve growth in exports. In addition, the
U.S. is a major market for textile imports from China. Furthermore, recent import volumes demonstrate China's ability to direct large volumes of printcloth to the U.S. in a short period of
396. Bicycle Tires and Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1258, Inv. No. 731-TA-94
(Preliminary) (1982).
397. Id.
398. Greig Polyester/Cotton Print Cloth from the People's Republic of China, USITC
Pub. 1289, Inv. No. 731-TA-I01 (Preliminary) (1980), USITC Pub. 1421, Inv. No. 731TA-101 (Final) (1983).
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In a footnote, the ITC paid attention to the possible effect of an existing quota agreement between the United States and China. Because
the agreement limited imports of all cotton and polyester-cotton print
cloth, the ITC concluded that it left China free to alter the distribution
of the overall quota between all-cotton and polyester-cotton print
cloth, and, consequently, did not operate as a limitation on future imports of the specific product under investigation. 0 0
The above observations indicate how difficult it is to draw the line
between "real and imminent"'0 1 threat and "mere supposition or conjecture.' 0 2 Indeed, "the concept of 'threat of material injury' arises in
an area of the law which is, needless to say, far from 'cut and dry.' "403
It is not surprising, therefore, that the correctness of ITC "threat findings" has been an issue before the Court of International Trade several
°
times.' 0
The first, and standard, case on threat was Alberta Gas Chemicals
v. United States,'0 ' which followed an affirmative threat finding by the
ITC in Methyl Alcohol from Canada.4 0 Despite the vigorous dissents
of Commissioners Alberger and Stern, a majority based its determination upon the possibility that ACGL (the Canadian producer) might, at
some future time, construct new production facilities. "If ACGL has
increased capacity and additional product availability and is able to
continue to sell at LTFV to the U.S. Market, the likelihood of increased penetration and injury to the domestic industry is apparent."' 0 7 The Court of International Trade held this analysis to be patently flawed with supposition and conjecture, particularly in view of
the following factors: (1) the exporter was producing at virtually full
capacity; (2) nearly all production was committed under contractual
399. Id.
400. For a view of the ITC on the effect of quotas on threat determinations in general, see Sugar from the European Community, USITC Pub. 1247, Inv. No. (Final)
(1982).
401. Rhone Poulenc v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 1318, 1325 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1321.
404. Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc., v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 853 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983); Republic Steel Corp., v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984); Rhone Poulenc, S.A., v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 1318 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
405. Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc., v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981).
406. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,734 (1979).
407. Id.
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agreements; (3) the exporters' other markets were expanding, and selling prices in those markets were higher than in the United States; (4)
even if the producer had diverted its entire inventory to the United
States, there could have been no significant increase in the penetration
of the United States market; and (5) even if the Canadian producer
would have started to expand its production facilities right away, production could not have commenced for a year at the earliest. The record merely showed a possibility that injury might occur at some time
in the distant future and, in view of the "real and imminent" standard,
enunciated by Congress, the record lacked substantial evidence of a
likelihood of injury.
A second case, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 08 involved a
section 751 review 9 of an antidumping order issued in 1971.410 The
difference of opinion between the ITC and the CIT centered partly on
different views regarding the function of a review procedure. The ITC
believed it had to honor the basic protective intent of the antidumping
law, that is, it had to treat the continuing validity of the existing antidumping order as a premise of the review. This point of view effectively established a presumption that injury would occur, and, therefore, placed the burden of proof on the proponents of the revocation.
The CIT rejected this purpose of a review investigation because such
an understanding would put the review investigation beyond the
41
bounds of "its neutrally stated objective. ' The court stated:
In order for the review provision to operate consistently within
the structure of this law [TAA]and in order for it to function
in harmony with one of the international agreements [1979 Antidumping Code] which the law was intended to implement,
establish the continuing need for the injury
the review must
4 12
determination.
The statutory prerequisite to administrative review, that is,
changed circumstances, if fulfilled, meant that there is some evidence
to support the view that the existing order is no longer valid. Application of this different standard led the CIT to conclude that the ITC
could not derive present Japanese intent to increase imports if the order were revoked or modified. The court held that the ITC could not
408. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 853 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983).
409. Television Receiving Sets from Japan, USITC Pub. 153, Inv. No. 751-TA-2 (Final) (1981).
410. Id.
411. Id. at 859.
412. Id. at 857 (emphasis added).

NY.L ScH. J. IN't & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 7

derive present Japanese intent to increase exports if the order were
revoked or modified from failure by the Japanese to offer evidence of
lack of intent, or solely from a disbelief in the evidence offered. "The
determination, although disarming in its candor, went beyond all the
limits of administrative fact-finding." The CIT, therefore, decided that
the ITC's conclusion that imports would increase was not supported by
evidence of production capacity alone. Though cloaked in general
terms, the court's conclusion in this case was supported by the fact
that the Japanese had tremendously increased the capacity of the Japanese production facilities in the United States. Any increase in the
level of imports would obviously have the effect of making those imports compete with the Japanese-owned televisions produced in the
United States. And, although the CIT admitted that a threat finding in
a review determination may have to be somewhat more predictive than
the threat finding in the original investigation, in the instant case, verifiable, substantiating evidence was clearly lacking. The ITC could not
"engage in . . . 'better to be safe than sorry' reasoning. "113In a third
case, Republic Steel Co. v. United States, 14 an American producer attacked, among other things, negative ITC threat determinations in
countervailing duty investigations. In those preliminary determinations, the ITC mainly relied on data regarding the volume and trend of
the imports. The CIT held that:
This information is not the logical focus of an investigation
into threat of injury. The essence of a threat lies in the ability
and incentive to act imminently. This can be investigated by
objective measurements of production capacity, available inventory, export markets and recognizable factors of economic
motivation. Most of this information is normally within the
knowledge of the [foreign] producers and it is unfair to penalize the petitioners for the absence of this information, particularly if it has been requested of foreign respondents and has
415
not been supplied.
The CIT concluded that the "low threshold" standard for preliminary
material injury investigations applied to threat of injury investigations
just as well, and maybe even more so, because information with regard
to threat will normally be more difficult to obtain than information
regarding actual injury. Therefore, "it is reasonable to predicate the
need for further investigation of a threat on the barest indications."
413.
414.
415.

Id. at 864.
Republic Steel Corp., v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
Id. at 650.
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The cases discussed above warrant two conclusions. One, threat
determinations are even more fact-determined than 'normal' injury
cases, and two, different standards apply for findings of threat in preliminary, final, and review cases. The standard for a finding of threat
in a preliminary investigation is extremely low and may be based on
the different evidentiary standards generally employed for preliminary
and final determinations. 416 Although probably in conformity with section 733(a) of the TAA,"1 it may be questioned whether this low stan-

dard is not too low when compared with the 1979 Code, which requires
a finding of dumping and sufficient evidence of injury. In administrative review cases, a threat finding may be slightly more predictive.
D. Material Retardation of the Establishment of a United States
Industry
Neither the TAA nor its legislative history provide any guidance
for interpretation of the term "material retardation of the establishment of a United States industry." There are, furthermore, relatively
few dumping and countervailing duty determinations in which material
retardation has been an issue." 8
In all the cases that do address the issue, the ITC has taken the
position that, when a domestic industry has not yet undertaken production, it must first show that it has made a substantial commitment
to commence production in order to show material retardation. In
three out of five relevant decisions, the ITC concluded that such a
commitment had not been made.4 9 In Thin Sheet Glass from Switzer416. Cf. Victor, supra note 129, at 123.
417. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a). Section 1671b(a) states in pertinant part "The Commission. . . shall make a determination, based upon the best information available to it at
the time of the determination, of whether there is a reasonable indication [of threat of
material injury to a domestic industry] . . . by reason of imports." Id.
418. Synthetic L-Methionime from Japan, USITC Pub. 1167, Inv. No. 751-TA-4 (Final) (1981); Salmon Gill Fish Netting of Manmade Fibers from Japan, USITC Pub. 1234,
Inv. No. 751-TA-5 (Final) (1983); Motorcycle Batteries from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1228,
Inv. No. 731-TA-42 (Final) (1982); Thin Sheet Glass from Switzerland, Belgium and the
Federal Republic of Germany, USITC Pub. 1376, Inv. No. 731-TA-127-129 (Preliminary)
(1983); Certain Commuter Airplanes from France and Italy, USITC Pub. 1269, Inv. No.
701-TA-174-175 (Preliminary) (1982).
419. Synthetic L-Methionime from Japan, USITC Pub. 1167, Inv. No. 751-TA-4 (Final) (1981); Salmon Gill Fish Netting of Manmade Fibers from Japan, USITC Pub. 1234,
Inv. No. 751-TA-5 (Final) (1983); Motorcycle Batteries from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1228,
Inv. No. 731-TA-42 (Final) (1982); Thin Sheet Glass from Switzerland, Belgium and the
Federal Republic of Germany, USITC Pub. 1376, Inv. No. 731-TA-127-129 (Preliminary)
(1983); Certain Commuter Airplanes from France and Italy, USITC Pub. 1269, Inv. No.
701-TA-174-175 (Preliminary) (1982).
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land, Belgium and West Germany,4 2 0 for example, this condition was
not fulfilled because the American producer had not obtained $250,000
worth of testing equipment which would have allowed it to separate
regular quality from high quality glass. Moreover, acquisition of the
equipment would not have affected the quality of the glass because,
the producer had had difficulties meeting customer specifications. Finally, the condition was not met becasue the producer had been unsuccessful in marketing high quality glass."'
These facts wrongfully mix elements showing a substantial commitment with those showing causation. Notably, the latter two facts
seem to indicate that the producer had tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to
sell his product. A more correct inquiry, therefore, would have been a
finding that there was retardation, but that the retardation was caused
by factors other than the dumped imports.
4 22
In Salmon Gill Fish Netting from Japan,
a section 751 review
or
revocation
of the outcase, the ITC concluded that modification
standing antidumping order could materially retard the establishment
of a United States industry. The producer in question had made significant investments in the development of a marketable crystal netting,
thereby substantially committing itself. Likewise, in Commuter Air2
planes from France and Italy,'4
there was evidence that the United
States producer, CAC, had obtained substantial loans and loan guarantees from private lenders, as well as federal, state and local government
agencies. Although these facts evidenced the producer's substantial
commitment, any injury he had incurred was not by reason of the
dumped imports. On the contrary, the limited nature of CAC's sales
efforts, particularly the unavailability of specification documents, had
seriously restricted its access to the market and had prevented it from
competing for sales.
E.

The European Community

1. Introduction
The findings were necessarily based in large part on the confidential information supplied to the Commission by the European industry, which the Commission was precluded from dis420. See supra, note 418.
421. Id. at 14-17.
422. Salmon Gill Fish Netting of Manmade Fibers from Japan, USITC Pub. 1234,
Inv. No. 751-TA-5 (Final) (1983).
423. Certain Commuter Airplanes from France and Italy, USITC Pub. 1269, Inv. No.
701-TA-174-175 (Preliminary) (1982).
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closing. Moreover, they were by their very nature findings that
could only be based on an assesment of complex economic
facts, not readily open to judicial review."24
This quote, taken from the opinion of Advocate General Warner in the
1979 Ballbearings cases, is still relevant because it illustrates the large
discretion of the Commission in its assessment of injury. The following
analysis is based on the often sketchy information that the Commission and the Council provide in the official Journal, and may, therefore, not always cover all aspects, covered by the Commission
internally.
2.

Material Injury in the Narrow Sense

Article 4 of the Regulation specifies that: an examination of injury
shall involve the following factors, no one or several of which can necessarily give decisive guidance:
(a) volume of the. . . dumped imports, in particular whether
there has been a significant increase, either in absolute terms
or relative to production or comsumption. (b) the prices of
dumped . . . imports, in particular whether there has been a
significant price undercutting as compared with the price of a
like product in the Community; (c) the consequent impact on
the industry concerned as indicated by actual or potential
trends in the relevant economic factors such as:
[P]roduction, utilization of capacity, stocks, -sales, market
share, prices (i.e. depression of prices or prevention of prices
which otherwise would have occurred), profits, return on investment, cash flow, employment.428
One aspect of this provision should be noted. It is noteworthy that several of the economic factors and indices mentioned in the 1979 Code
(article 3, 3), have not been explicitly incorporated into the Regulation.
For example, productivity, wages, growth, and the ability to raise capital or investment are not mentioned. This does not mean that the European Commission will never consider these factors, as the list is not
intended to be exhaustive " 6 It might indicate, however, the European
424. Opinion of Advocate-General Warner in the Japanese Balbearings, No. 113/77,
ECR 1212, 1266 (1979).
425. The Regulation, supra note 11, art. 4.
426. In Pears from Australia, 26 O.J. Eu&. COMM. (No. L 196) 24-25 (1983), the European Commission argued that the dumped imports resulted in increased payments of
production subsidies by the European Community to European Community producers
and that those increases could be viewed as injury. The decision has been criticized by
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Community's view that these factors are not among the most important indicators of injury.
Like the ITC, the European Commission makes injury determinations on an ad hoc basis which makes the formulation of general rules
difficult. Such formulation is furthermore hampered by the summary
analysis prevalent in most cases. A European Commission or European
Council determination is seldom more than three pages long and includes both fair value and injury findings. Nevertheless, the mere fact
that certain criteria are always mentioned, while others are seldom
mentioned, provides an indication of their weight.
(1)

Volume

The European Commission attaches most importance to absolute
increases and increases in the market share of the imports. Proof of
either will be a strong indicator of injury.42 7 Note, however, that it is
the increase in dumped imports that is relevant. If, for example, the
volume of imports was 100 tons in 1979 and 100 tons in 1982, an increase could still be found if the 1979 imports were sold at normal
prices and the 1982 imports at dumped prices. "28 Absolute decreases of
imports might nevertheless lead to an affirmative injury finding if the
market share of the imports increases.429
Davey, supra note 131, at 74.

427. E.g., Textured Polyester Fabrics from the United States, 24 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. L 133) 17 (1981). Malleable Case from Tube Fittings from Brazil, 24 O.J. Eu&.
COMM. (No. L 145) 29 (1981). Seamless Steel Tubes from Spain, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 145) 29 (1981). Seamless Steel Tubes from Spain, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 165) 27
(1981). Certain Car Tyres, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 113) 70 (1980). Stainless Steel Bars
from Brazil, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 18 (1980). (N.B. 3 tonnes - 1975; 1267 tonnes
-1979). Chemical Fertilizer from United States, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 212) 43
(1980). Polyester Yarn, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 231) 5 (1980). Studded Welded-link
Chain from Spain and Sweden, 23 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 231) 10 (1980). Styrene Monomer United States, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 42) 14 (1981). Mechanical Watches from
the Soviet Union, 25 O.J. Eun. COMM. (No. L 11) 14 (1982). Fluid Cracking Catalysts
from the United States, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 11) 25 (1982). Paracetamol from the
People's Republic of China, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 236) 23 (1982). Broad-flanged
Beams, from Spain, 25 O.J. Eu. COMM. (No. L 238) 32 (1982). Methylamine from German Democratic Republic and Romania, 25 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 238) 35 (1982). Magnesite from People's Republic of China, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 371) 21 (1982).
428. Cf. Vinyl Acetate Monomer, 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 129) 1 (1981).
429. Mechanical Alarm Clocks from People's Republic of China, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 158) 5 (1980). Potato Granules from Canada, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 116) 11
(1981). Motor Car Tyres from Czechoslovakia, et al., 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113) 70
(1980). Photographic Enlargers from Czechoslovakia, et al., 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
212) 32 (1982). Magnesite from People's Republic of China, 25 O.J. EuR COMM. (No. L
371) 25 (1982).
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A minimal market share (under one percent), or a minimal increase therein, will usually preclude an injury finding.430 The European
Commission generally looks at the total volume of dumped imports.
This issue will be discussed more extensively in Part V. The European
Commission sometimes takes expected imports into account. Although
this may be justifiable for 1a threat finding, this practice might distort a
4
material injury analysis.
(2)

Prices

In most of the affirmative findings made thus far, price undercutting has been ascertained. The exceptions to this rule concern two
types of cases. The variant occurred when the importers of the dumped
merchandise were unwilling to provide information regarding their resale prices. The European Commission, consequently, concluded that
the resale prices of Community producers had steadily fallen and that
there was evidence that customers had cancelled contracts with the latter to buy dumped products, thus further depressing European Community producer's prices!"s The second type of case is one in which
price undercutting is not mentioned but rather one in which the prices
of the dumped products have depressed European Community prices
430. Fibre Building Board from Czechoslovakia et al., 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 145)
39 (1980). (Bulgarian exporters excluded because their market share was never more
than 0.7%. Romanian exporters with a market share of 0.8%, however, were included).
Mounted Piezo Electric Quartz Crystals from Korea, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 162) 62
(1980). (Market share 2.47% can cause injury). Oxalic Acid from German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and People's Republic of China, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. L 148) 36 (1982). (Minimal market shares excluded). Welded Iron or Steel Tubes
from Romania, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 5 (1982). (Coated pipe excluded because
only vev sma l quntities importdj. But see It-an or Steel CoiLats for Re-rotting from
Argentina et al., 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 5 (1983). (The European Commission
did not directly answer the Argentinian complaint that it imported only minimal quantities, but nevertheless included it because to act otherwise would be discriminatory).
Glass Textile Fibre Mats from Czechoslovakia et al., (imports went up from 1.5% to 3%.
No material injury because the decrease in consumption and the increase in the volume
of other imports far outweigh the relatively limited effects of the dumping).
431. Quartz Crystals from Japan, et al., 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 162) 62 (1980).
Louvre Doors from Singapore, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 135) 33 (1981). ("[T]here is
sufficient evidence of consequent material injury, which could worsen in view of unlimited quantities that this company was prepared to export at dumped prices"). But see
Methylamine from the German Democratic Republic, et al., 25 O.J. BUR. COMM. (No. L
238) 35 (1982). (Correct as to threat). Vinyl Acetate Monomer, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
58) 17 (1984).
432. Orthoxylene, United States 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 141) 29 (1981); Paraxylene, United States 24 O.J. Eu. COMM. (No. L 158) 7 (1981).
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or prevented 'necessary' price increases.""
This approach, if true, is not necessarily in contravention of the
1979 Code, which uses the formula "price undercutting or otherwise
price depressing or preventing price increases." In situations such as
these, however, claims of price depression or suppression by domestic
producers will be easy to make and hard to refute. The European Commission should be very careful in granting relief on this basis. On the
other hand, it should be noted that in at least four cases, the European
Commission issued a no injury finding because the foreign products
were priced higher than the European Community like products, or
13
higher than non-dumped imports.
(3)

Consequent Impact

The factors most often mentioned in the determinations are price
depression or suppression, or both; decreases in production, capacity
utilization, and employment levels; and the existence of lost market
shares and sales. Although not mentioned in the regulation, the European Commission occasionally considers the general condition of the
domestic industry. In Acrylic Fibre from the United States,3 3 for example, the European Commission noted that the European Community industry had been making strenuous efforts to recover from the
effects of production and consumption stagnation accompanied by considerable overcapacity and extremely high losses. The European Commission further noted that the domestic industry had experienced
these effects over many years and that the dumped imports were undermining the process of recovery of the European Community
producers.
In a number of recent determinations involving steel products, it
apparently has become customary to point out that the European
Community industry is in a state of crisis, and that the dumped imports may jeopardize the objectives of the European Community steel
433. Fibre Building Board, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 145) 39 (1980); Phenol, United
States 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 195) 22 (1981); Fluid Cracking Catalysts, 25 O.J. Eua.
COMM. (No. L 11) 25 (1981); Methylamine, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 238) 35 (1982);
Thiopen United States 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 35 (1982); Sodium Carbonate, 25
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 317) 5 (1982); Decarbomodiphenylether, 25 0.J, EUR. COMM. (No.
L 319) 16 (1982).
434. Aluminum Foil from German Democratic Republic, et al., 25 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 339) 58 (1982). Xanthan Gum from United States 26 O.J. Eui CoMM. (No. L 268)
60 (1983). Nickel from the Soviet Union, 26 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 286) 29 (1983).
Saccharin from People's Republic of China, et al., 26 O.J. Eu& CoMM. (No. L 352) 49
(1983).
435. 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No L 114) 37 (1980).
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policy. The relevant portions of Sheets and Plates of Iron and Steel
from Brazil are reproduced integrally, because they review the policy
considerations that occasionally enter European Commission injury
determinations.
Whereas the Commission also took into account the fact that
the Community Steel industry is in a state of crisis: whereas
the overall steel output has been cut considerably and numbers
employed fell . . . ; whereas the situation of Community producers continues to be one of extremely low capacity ulitization
levels and seriously reduced profits or of losses. Whereas, in
order to remedy this situation, the Community's steel policy
seeks to ensure sufficient price levels for products concerned
sold in the Community through the use of internal and external measures; whereas the internal measures consist of production quotas for ECSC companies and the obligation to respect
certain price levels; whereas, in order to keep imports within
reasonable limits, the Commission has concluded steel arrangements with a large number of supplying countries which involve quantitative limitations on exports to the Community
and the observance of arrangement prices which are closely
linked to development of internal price levels in the Community. Whereas production quotas for Community producers are
adopted periodically on the basis of a forecast of supply and
demand for products concerned, taking into account the development of imports from third countries including those whose
exports are not covered by a bilateral arrangement with the
Community; whereas any sharp increase in imports from these
countries, such as Brazil, requires a downward adjustment of
the quotas of Community producers and thereby increases
their indirect costs and further reduces their margins. Whereas
imports of significant quantities of dumped products into the
Community also put into question the objectives sought by the
external measures adopted within the framework of the Community steel policy; whereas third countries which have concluded steel trade arrangements with the Community will only
respect and renew these agreements if they see a reasonable
chance of selling quantities provided for at the price levels
agreed; whereas significant imports of dumped products from
sources not covered by an arrangement jeopardize the equilibrium not only of the internal quantity and pricing system but
also of the quantities and prices agreed with most of the sup-
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plying countries. 436
It seems doubtful that such a broad interpretation of injury is permitted by the 1979 Code. Although policy considerations may operate
as a reason for not imposing antidumping duties despite the existence
of dumping and resulting injury,4 3 7 the converse of these considerations
(imposition of duties to fulfill or to prevent distortion of policy objectives even though there is no injury) is clearly illegal. Of course, the
situation in the steel cases was not that clear cut. The European Commission did not rely exclusively on the language quoted above to issue
an affirmative finding, and it is indeed possible that the other factors
sufficiently established the materiality of injury. Use of such policy
considerations distracts from the real issue however, and seems irrelevant in the context of dumping investigations. Policies designed to
support an industry, whether governmentally or privately sponsored,
are a voluntary choice on the part of the importing country, and injury
determinations cannot be used to support those policies.
3.

Threat of Material Injury

The basic Regulation lays down the following guidelines for threat
determinations: A determination of threat . .. may only be made
where a particular situation is likely to develop into actual injury. Account may be taken of factors such as: (a) rate of increase of the
dumped imports to the Community; (b) export capacity in the country
of origin or export, already in existence or which will be operated in
the foreseeable future, and (c) the likelihood that the resulting exports
will be to the Community. As of the moment of writing the European
Commission has never based an injury finding on threat alone. In a few
cases, however, the affirmative determination was based on "injury or
3 8
threat.'
For someone used to the standards set by the CIT, in for example
Alberta Gas,' 9 the motivation for such a finding in these cases will
come as a surprise. In Quartz Crystals,"0 the European Commission
436. See also Broad-flanged Beams from Spain, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 238) 32
(1982); Iron or Steel Coils for Re-rolling from Argentina, et al., 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 82) 9 (1982); Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Spain, 26 O.J. EUR.COMM. (No. L 303) 13
(1983).
437. 1979 Code, supra note 5, art 8(1). "It is desirable that the imposition is permissive." Id.
438. Methylamines, 25 O.J. Eus. COMM. (No. L 238) 35 (1982); Vinyl Acetate Monomer from Canada, 27 O.J. EuR. COMm. (No. L 58) 17 (1984); Quartz Crystals from Korea,
23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 162) 62 (1982).
439. 515 F. Supp. 780 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
440. Quartz Crystals, Korea, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 162) 62 (1982).
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determined that there was injury, or at least a threat thereof, because
exports had increased 300% over the last two years and there was evidence that exports would double again during the next year. In Vinyl
Acetate Monomer,441 the European Commission decided that

In addition to the already existing injury, a considerable threat
of injury. . exists due to the high rate at which dumped imports into the Community have increased since 1982, the ability of producers to increase the existing capacity in Canada
without substantial adjustments and the likelihood that the resulting exports will be directed to the Community because of
the high import and antidumping duties applied by the Community to other exporting countries.4 4
Similarly, in Methylamines from the GDR and Romania,44 the European Commission based its injury or threat determination on "the high
rate of increase of imports in the last few months, high production capacity in the GDR and Romania, and the likelihood that the resulting
exports will be to the Community countries because of difficulties in
transporting methylamine by sea."
Analysis reveals that the Methylamines decision is based at least
on four assumptions. They are: (1) the increase will continue; (2) the
high production capacity is not fully used; (3) the exports will not be
made to European countries not included in the European Community;
and (4) the difficulties in transporting mehtylamines by sea are insurmountable. Apart from the lack of motivation, it seems doubtful
whether these decisions conform to the 1979 Code requirement that
threat determinations should be based on facts and not merely on allegations, conjecture or remote possibilities. In Sodium Carbonate from
the U.S.S.R., 444 on the other hand, the European Commission refused
to base its injury finding on threat, despite recently built and planned
production facilities in some countries, because it could not be determined that such increased production capacity would lead to a significant increase in exports to the European Community.

441. Vinyl Acetate Monomer from Canada, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 58) 17 (1984).
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 48) 1 (1980).
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4. Material Retardation of the Establishment of a European Community Industry.
In Outboard Motors from Japan," " the European manufacturers
argued that the low prices of Japanese motors above eighty five horse
power had prevented any European production of such motors. The
European Commission refused, however, to issue a finding of material
retardation. Instead, the European Commission excluded these types
of motors from the scope of the investigation because there had been
no production of this type in the European Community and there was
not a sufficiently convincing factual indication that the establishment
in the European Community of such production was envisaged. This
approach is in conformity with the view of Cunnane that such a claim
should only be honored if the industry comes forward with convincing
evidence that the industry is at an advanced stage of planning."" Evidence of such planning could be derived from availability or acquisition of premises, investment capital and technology.
F.

Conclusions and Comparison

Analysis of the decisions discussed in this article shows little that
we did not already know before. It is impossible to say which system
requires a higher degree of injury or which system is less protectionist.
Initially, the relatively scarce number of no injury findings in the
European Community might seem indicative of a more lenient standard. Indeed, only twenty out of 226 analyzed cases were terminated
on the basis of a no injury finding, a number which contrasts sharply
with the United States ratio of sixty six out of 245. The counter-argument might be that the European Commission screens complaints
more thoroughly before it opens the investigation. Another explanation
for the difference might be that European Community producers are
less willing to start an investigation if they are not completely sure of
affirmative findings. A third explanation is offered by Davey:"
It is relatively rare for a finding of dumping to be made but a
conclusion reached that such dumping caused no material injury. This result is not difficult to understand- if no dumping
had occurred, the price level in the Community would normally
445. 26 O.J. Eu. COMM. (No. L 152) 18 (1983).
446. CUNNANE & STANBROOK, supra note 314, at 68.
447. The number of investigations is based on a country-by-country approach. Although United States investigations involving several countries have different investigation numbers, investigations in the European Community are not numbered and often
involve numerous countries. See also Part V.
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be higher and Community industry would have had a better
opportunity to make a sale or to make a profit on the sales it
made. The lack of that opportunity inevitably results in some
Comdetriment to Community industry, and to convince the
448
difficult.
is
immaterial
is
detriment
such
that
mission
Both the European Community and the United States attach particular weight to absolute increases in volume or increases in market
share, to price depressing or suppressing affects, and to the consequent
adverse impact on the domestic industry. The impact on the domestic
industry is measured particularly in such terms as lost sales, lost profits, decrease in production and decrease in market share. Wages,
growth, cash flow and the ability to raise capital or investments are
seldom mentioned. Neither system clearly distinguishes injury from
causation, and, as this article argues, such a distinction would indeed
be hard to make.
Both the ITC and the European Commission seem to be willing to
"find material injury on a lower showing of import impact, if the industry is in a particularly vulnerable situation. ''449 Although this policy
has been rather explicitly adopted in a few European Commission determinations, at least one former commissioner of the ITC has admitted that it also applies to United States injury determinations.4 60
It is doubtful whether such a practice is admitted under the 1979
Code. The 1979 Code does not contain any special provisions for times
of recession, and, therefore, is neutral in that respect. It is obvious that
domestic producers will become more active in filing for import relief
during a recession (antidumping complaints have sky-rocketed during
the last four years in both the United States and the European Community) and that the least competitive industries will cry "foul"
loudest. Although these complaints are permitted, they should be subject to the same test found in other cases.
V.

A.

CAUSATION

The United States

1. Introduction
The only language in the TAA, pertaining to causation are the
brief statements in Sections 731 (imposition), 451 733(a) (prelimi448.
449.
450.
451.

Davey, supra note 131, at 73.
Calhoun, supra note 309, at 17.
Id. at 17.
19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
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nary), 52 and 735(b)(1) (final),45 that the ITC shall determine whether
a United States industry is materially injured (in a broad sense) "by
reason of" the dumped imports.
The Senate Finance Committee Report and the House Ways and
Means Committee Report, however, treat this issue quite extensively.4 4 The main conclusions that can be drawn from the legislative
history are the following:
(1) current (pre-1980) ITC practice will continue with respect
to causation;
(2) the ITC has considerable discretion;
(3) the statute does not contemplate a weighing of the effects
of the dumped imports against other factors which may have
caused injury;
(4) these other factors include the volume and price of nondumped imports, contraction in demand, changes in patterns
of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition
between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in
technology and the export performance and productivity of the

domestic industly

45

5

(5) the petitioner is not required to prove that injury is not
caused by those other factors; and
(6) it is not important whether the dumped imports are the
principal, substantial, or significant cause of injury.
Three of the most important causation issues are: first, whether
the injury should be caused through the effects of dumping or through
the effects of the imports per se; second, in the case of imports from
several countries, whether the imports should be cumulated or considered on a country-by-country basis; and finally, whether competitivelypriced imports can cause injury at all. Because of the importance of
these issues nd the current i arest in them, they will be treated separately in the following sections. The remainder of this section will analyze the standard of causation that the ITC applies and the other factors the ITC has considered relevant.
The statement in the Senate Finance Committee Report that the
imports need not be the principal, substantial, or significant cause has
been interpreted to mean that the imports need only be a contributory
cause of injury to the domestic industry.456 It should be mentioned that
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

19 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(a) (1982).
19 U.S.C. § 1673(d)(b)(i) (1982).
SENATE FINANCE CoMMrrTE REPORT, supra note 7, at 74-75.
19 C.F.R. § 207.27 (1986).
Victor, supra note 129, at 147; . Dale, supra note 1, at 113.
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the ITC traditionally has interpreted the causation standard in this
way,"' and that it is supported both by case law" 8 and by the legislative history of the 1974 Trade Act."" It was clear that this standard
did not comply with the "principal cause" language of the 1967
Code, " and, until adoption of the new 1979 Code, the United States
was repeatedly criticized on this point by other Code signatories."" Despite defaulting international obligations,"4 however, the hands of the
United States President were bound in view of Congressional will that
the 1979 Code was to be implemented only insofar as its provisions
were consistent with those of the 1921 Act. Any conflict between the
executive and legislative branches had to be resolved in favor of the
interpreted. 46 3 In the area of
1921 Act as it has been administratively
4
conflict."
a
clearly
causation there was
As it is also clear that the United States did not intend to change
its causation standard with the adoption of the TAA, the question is
whether the contributory cause standard is in violation of the 1979
Code. In the author's view, there is no violation. This article has
demonstrated in Part I, section F that one of the main reasons for revision of the 1979 Code during the Tokyo Round was irritation on the
part of the European Commission that different standards applied
with respect to the causal link in the European Community and the
United States. This irritation, coupled with the European Commission's realization that the "principal cause" standard was too stringent,
leads to the conclusion that it was the intention of the 1979 Code
drafters to lower the causation standard to the United States level.
Omission of both "principal cause" and the "weighing" language
amounts to implicit revocation of the "principal cause" standard.
457. See, e.g., Pig Iron from Canada, USTC 6 (AA1921-72-74) (1971); Ferrite Cores
from Japan, USTC 9 (AA1921-72-74) (1971); Elemental Sulphur from Mexico, USTC 9
(AA1921-72-74) (1971); Melamine Crystal Imports from Japan USTC 6 (AA1921-162)
(1976) Certain Railway Track Maintenance Equipment From Austria, USTC 4 (AA192173) (1977).
458. See, e.g., Rasco Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 83 Cust. Ct. 65 (1965), 477 F.
Supp. 201 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
459. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 521, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2341 (1976).
460. DALE, supra note 1, at 113.
461. BISD, supra note 3, Supp. No. 20, at 43 (1974); cf. E. McGoVERN, supra note
142, § 12.132 at 284.
462. Cf. RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 135 comment e (1980) [hereinafter REVISED RESTATEMENT].

463. Renegotiation Ammendients Act, Pub. L. No. 90-634, S 201, 82 stat. 1347
PIOnLMzmS OF INTERNATIONAL
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 160 (19
ci. J. JAcKsoN, Lav.
cf));
ECONoMic RELATIONS (1977).
464. Long, supra note 113, at 464.
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An overview of ITC determinations supports the conclusion that
the standard in the United States has remained the same. Unless it is
clear that there is no causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry, the ITC will seldom terminate
4 65
the investigation. In Cyanuric Acid from Japan,'
for example, the
ITC admitted that several factors, in addition to the imports, might
have caused the economic problems of the United States industry.
Those other factors included quality problems experienced by one domestic producer, and reduced demand resulting from poor weather.
The court added, however, that the ITC does not weigh causes, but
rather looks to see whether imports are a cause of injury.46 6
In Carton Closing Staples from Sweden,'46 7 the respondents argued that the injury was caused not by dumping, but by the devaluation of the Swedish krona. Although admitting that in many cases exchange rates might be a more important cause of underselling than
unfair trade practices, Commissioners Lodwick and Eckes admonished
the respondents that the ITC was not required to weigh causes of injury.4s The Commissioners added that it was not their responsibility
to examine and weigh the causes of underselling. 46s This latter argument will be discussed more extensively in the next section.
Affirmative injury findings rely strongly on proof of price depressing or suppressing effects and on evidence of lost sales because of price
considerations. 470 These factors are indeed the most direct indicators
imaginable of both injury and causation. Conversely, it can be safely
argued that an absence of both of these factors will make a causation
finding impossible.
More interesting are the negative causation and injury findings.
These can be grouped under six headings: (1) No underselling, price
4ro.

U S. l w'L TiD%Co'm,.

Px

N. 1

', Cyanuit

d

rA Its
t Crnattd

Derivatives From Japan (1983) (preliminary determination).
466. But see strong dissent of U.S. International Trade Commissioner Stern in Cyan-

uric Acid and its Chlorinated Derivatives From Japan, USITC Pub. 1407, Inv. No. 731TA-136 (Preliminary) (1983). See also Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1064, Inv. No. 731-TA-18, 19, 20 21, 22, 23 (Preliminary) (1980); Sheet
Piling from Canada, USITC Pub. 1212, Inv. No. 731-TA-52 (Preliminary) (1982): Sodium Nitrate from Chile, USITC Pub. 1357, Inv. No. 731-TA-91 (Final) (1983).
467. Carton-Closing Staples and Non-Automatic Carton-Closing Staple Machines
from Sweden, USITC Pub. 454, Inv. No. 731-TA-116, 117 (Final) (1983).

468. Id. at 10 n.36.
469. But see dissent of Commissioner Stern in id., who took exchange rates into account in reaching a no injury finding.
470. Chloropicrin from People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1505, Inv. No. 731TA-130 (Final) (1984).

1986]

ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIONS

depressing or suppressing effect;'71 (2) Lost sales because of perceived
quality or service differences;"7 2 (3) Lost sales because of a desire for an
alternative source of supply;' " (4) Decline in demand and consumption; 47 4 (5) Increase in expenses of the domestic industry;'" and (6)
Competition among domestic producers.'7 6 With regard to factors (2)
through (6), it should be noted that the ITC has never based a negative
finding on any one of them separately, but generally uses them to support each other.
A factor curiously absent from the list is the volume and the price
of nondumped imports.' 7 This absence is curious because nondumped
imports can influence the causation analysis in a number of ways. Lowpriced nondumped imports might force other foreign producers to resort to dumping in order to meet the competition. Although this is not
a justification under the antidumping law, equitable considerations
might influence the injury analysis. Furthermore, in such a situation it
is unlikely that imposition of antidumping duties would remove or alle471. See infra Part V, § A, 4.
472. Certain Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof from Japan, The Federal
Republic of Germany, and Italy, USITC Pub. 1359, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-120, 731-TA-121,
and 731-TA-122 (Preliminary) (1983), USITC Pub. 1497 Inv. Nos. 731-TA-120 and 122
(Final) (1984); Snow-Grooming Vehicles from Federal Republic of Germany, USITC
Pub. 1117, Inv. No. 731-TA-36 (Preliminary) (1980); Melamine from Austria Italy,
USITC Pub. 1065, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-13 and 731-TA-14 (Final) (1980).
473. See, e.g., Certain Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof from Japan, The
Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, USITC Pub. 1359, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-120, 731TA-121, and 731-TA-122 (Preliminary) (1983), USITC Pub. 1497, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-120
and 731-TA-122 (Final) (1984); Melamine Austria from Italy USITC Pub. 1065, Inv. No.
731-TA-13 and 731-TA-14 (Final) (1980).
474. See Melamine from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1303, Inv. No. 731-TA-107 (Preliminary) (1982); Chlorine from Canada, USITC Pub. 1249, Inv. No. 731-TA-90 (Preliminary) (1982); Secondary Aluminum Alloy in Unwrought Form from The United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1143, Inv. No. 731-TA-40 (Preliminary) (1981); Snow-Grooming
Vehicles, USITC Pub. 1117, Inv. No. 731-TA-36 (Preliminary) (1980).
475. Snow-Grooming Vehicles, USITC Pub. 1040, Inv. No. 731-TA-36 (Preliminary)
(1980).
476. See Sodium Hydroxide, USITC Pub. 1040, Inv. No. 731-TA-1l (Preliminary)
(1980).
477. BRYAN, supra note 2, at 70, also mentions (2) contraction in demand; (3) trade
restrictive practices; (4) export performances of domestic industries; (5) increasing production costs; (6) climate changes; (7) energy shortages; (8) decreasing government
spendings; (9) domestic competition; (10) domestic economic depression; (11) strikes;
(12) U.S. pollution control; (13) high price of supplies; and (14) aging plant and equipment. This article has not adopted this type of classification partly because some of the
factors (3 and 4) have never played a role yet, and partly because some of the factors
seem to overlap. Contraction in demand, for example, might be caused by climatic
changes, decreasing government spendings or a domestic depression. High prices of supply will result in increasing production costs.
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viate the injury suffered by the domestic industry, especially if the volume of the nondumped imports significantly exceeds that of the
47 8
dumped imports.
2.

By Reason of Imports: Imports or Dumped Imports?
a.

Introduction

One of the most hotly debated issues in current United States antidumping and countervailing duty law is the question whether injury
should be caused by imports which are the subject of an antidumping
investigation or whether it should be caused through the effects of
4 79
dumped imports.
The approach that is chosen can be of decisive importance for the
outcome of an investigation and the subject, therefore each approach,
merits comprehensive attention. An example will show the difference.
Let's assume that Dutch producers sell wooden shoes for ten dollars a
pair in the Dutch market and for nine dollars a pair in the United
States market. In that case the dumping margin is one or ten percent.
Let's assume further that the sole United States producer sells identical shoes for forty dollars a pair and suffers material injury. Under the
first or "imports" analysis, the ITC would not look at the dumping
margin, but would only consider whether the imports are a contributing cause to the injury, which they probably are. The second or "margins" analysis, on the other hand, would investigate whether the dumping margin is a contributing cause. In the hypothetical, the likely
conclusion is that when the Dutch shoes undersell their United States
counterparts by 310% and when only ten percent of the margin of underselling can be accounted for by the dumping margin, any injury is a
result of the margin of underselling. The injury is only minimally, if at
all, caused by the margin of dumping. The ITC would be likely to conclude that any injury which is suffered is not by reason of the lowerthan-fair-value imports. The imports analysis seems protectionist in
that it affords protection to industries which are only marginally injured by reason of the unfair imports. Although the CIT has recently
ruled that the margins analysis is not required by the Act,4 "° it is still
478. Cf. the EEC practice is discussed infra in Part V, § B, 1.
479. Victor, supra note 129, at 149, Speaks about the "import" test as opposed to the
"unfair trade" test. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago,
USITC Pub. 1316, Inv. No. 731-TA-113-114 (Preliminary) (1982); Carbon Steel Wire
Rod from Brazil, Belgium, France and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1230, Inv. No. 731-TA148-149-150 (Preliminary) (1982).
480. See Maine Potatoe Counsel v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985).
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open whether the ITC may apply a margin analysis.
b.

History

Until December 1982, the dumping margin was one, but certainly
not a dispositive,4 8 factor which the ITC considered in its causation
analysis. The ITC "compared the weighted-average-lower-than-fairvalue margin with average national prices of U.S. producers and average national resale prices of the imports.""" If the LTFV margin was
substantially lower than the margin of underselling, this would be8 an
indicator that the injury was not caused by the dumped imports.' 3 If
conversely it was the margin of dumping which enables the foreign exporters to undersell United States producers, material injury caused by
the dumping seemed evident.'"
In either situation, however, positive or negative injury determinations were supported by other evidence, and the statement that "if the
dumped merchandise undersold the United States (sic; price) by
greater than 20 percent (the dumping margin), the Commission would
conclude that the less-than-fair-value margin did not have a causal relationship to the injury,"' 48 seems too sweeping. Indeed one commentator 486 gives examples of situations in which the ITC found injury despite the fact that the margins of dumping were a relatively small part
of the margins of undersellings4 7 and also examples in which the ITC
found no injury despite high dumping margins.488 The same commentator estimates that under the 1921 Act at least in fifty-three (no) injury determinations the dumping margins were a factor under consideration.4 8 9 Indeed, it seems generally acknowledged, that such
consideration was a consistent and uniform practice under the old law
481. But see Easton, Administration of the Import Trade Statutes: Possibilitiesfor
Harmonizing the Investigative Techniques and Standards of the InternationalTrade
Commission, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 78 (1980).
482. Easton & Perry, The Causation of Material Injury: Changes in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of the International Trade Commission, 2
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 43 (1983).
483. E.g., Vital Wheat Gluten from Canada, USTC 126 (AA1921-37) (1964).
484. E.g., Television Receiving Sets from Japan, USTC 367 (AA1921-66) (1971).
485. Easton, supra note 481, at 79.
486. For an excellent article, see Palmeter, Countervailing Subsidized Imports: The
InternationalTrade Commission Goes Astray, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 9 n.20 (1983).
487. Id. See also Fishnets and Netting of Manmade Fibers from Japan, USTC 477
(AA1921-85) (1972), investigated because the dumping margins nevertheless enabled the
domestic producers to gain market share.
488. Saccharin from Japan and Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 846, Inv. No.
AA1921-174,175, (1977). Palmeter, supra note 486, at 10.
489. Palmeter, supra note 486, at 7. For enumeration of these cases, id. at n.18.
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and the first decisions under the TAA.' 9 °
The first argument for adoption of an imports analysis seems to
have been advanced by Easton in a 1980 law review article.4 9' Since
then it has been a recurring theme in General Counsel memoranda to
the ITC,41 2 until it was adopted by an ITC majority in December,
1982. , s s
Although these cases involved countervailing duty investigations,
arguments for and against adoption of the imports analysis principle
apply equally to both dumping and countervailing cases, and it is presently assumed that the ITC majority uses the imports analysis in both
types of investigations. 494 Whether subsequent changes in the composition of the ITC will affect this assumption remains to be seen. Analysis
of recent ITC cases reveals only that the ITC frequently mentions
margins of underselling and resulting lost sales as an indication of causation, but seldom mentions the dumping margins.
c.

49
Arguments For and Against a Margins Analysis '

The arguments that have been made for and against a margins
analysis, can be divided into six categories: t1) Structural arguments;
(2) Economic and public policy arguments; (3) Prior agency practice
arguments; (4) Legislative history arguments; (5) International arguments; and (6) Pragmatic arguments.
The lines which separate these categories are not crystal clear and
490. Easton, supra note 481, at 80.
491. Id.
492. See, e.g., General Counsel Memorandum, GC-E-065 (3/17/81), Memo from General Counsel to Commissioner Stern whether the ITC needs a final determination from
the Department of Commerce on lower-than-fair-value margins and the related issue of
the causation standard in § 7; General Counsel Memorandum, GC-F-345 (10/8/82),
Memo from General Counsel to the ITC of analysis of the causation and cumulation
issue briefed in the countervailing duty investigations concerning carbon steel products
investigations 701-TA-86 et. al. (Final)) (LEXIS, Itrade library, GCM file).
493. Certain Carbon Steel Products from Spain, USITC Pub. 1331, Inv. Nos. 701TA-155, 157-160 and 162 (Final) (1982); Hot-rolled Stainless Steel Bar, Cold-Formed
Stainless Steel Bar, and Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain, USITC Pub. 1333, Inv.
No. 701-TA-176,177,178 (Final) (1982).
494. Victor, supra note 129, at 150; Easton, supra note 481; Easton & Perry, supra
note 482, at 44.
495. EASTON, supra note 481; EASTON & PERRY, supra note 482; GRANETr, ITC Injury
Determinationsin CountervailingDuty Investigations, 15 L. POL'Y INT'L Bus. (1983) at
987; PALMETER, supra note 486; see also General Counsel Memoranda GC-E-065 (3/17/
81), GC-F-341 (10/6/82), GC-F-345 (10/8/82) and the opinions of Commissioner Stern in
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 479, and
of Commissioner Haggart in Certain Steel Products from Spain, 'ISITYC Pub. 3MI, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-155, 157-160 and 162 (Final) (1982).
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indeed arguments from one category are sometimes countered by arguments from another category. Nevertheless, the division seems useful
for purposes of analysis.
(1) Structural Arguments
Advocates of the margins analysis contend that Title VII of the
Tariff Act is aimed at subsidies and dumping, and not at imports per
se. The purpose of the statute is to prevent or remedy injury caused by
allegedly unfair practices. Consequently, common sense dictates that
one should consider whether the unfair practice (the dumping) causes
injury. The measure of unfairness is not only relevant to the lowerthan-fair-value determination, but also to the injury determination. If
a dumping margin is too high for exclusion as "de minimis," it might
nevertheless not be a cause of injury.
Opponents argue that the purpose of the antidumping law is
"merely to tax the amount of dumping and force foreign exporters to
raise their prices to the United States or lower their foreign prices,
thus reducing or eliminating dumping."' " They invoke the "plain
meaning" rule in support of their position. The proplem is that the
meaning of the statute is not all that plain.
4 7
The TAA three times uses the phrase "by reason of imports.
With regard to an injury finding to a regional industry, the TAA requires injury "by reason of the dumped or subsidized imports, ' 4 "
while in the products lines paragraph, the TAA requires assessment of
"the effect of subsidized or dumped imports" in relation to the United
States production of the like product."" It seems improbable that Congress wanted regional industries to be treated differently in this respect. Furthermore, the rather explicit provision that the ITC should
consider the effects of the dumped imports on the production of the
like product in section 771(4)(D) of the TAA contradicts the imports
analysis interpretation of the "by reason of the imports" language.
Therefore, the plain meaning of the statute is hard to defend. Analysis
of the legislative history leaves one with the impression that Congress
did not pay much attention to the differences in the mentioned phrases
but rather equated their meaning.
Furthermore opponents stress the statutory bifurcation of functions between the ITA and the ITC, 50* and invoke judicial precedent to
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

Easton & Perry, supra note 482, at 36.
19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
19 U.S.C. § 1677 (1982).
Id.
Easton & Perry, supra note 482, at 35.
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support their argument. 1 Thus, the ITA is exclusively qualified to
look into the dumping margin. Consequently, the ITA has to determine whether that margin is sufficient or not; that is, whether it is de
minimis. Once the Commerce Department makes this determination,
the ITC has to consider whether the imports that have been qualified
by the Commerce Department as being lower-than-fair-value (or by petitioner in the preliminary phase of the investigation), cause injury.
Thus, in Sprague Electric Co. v. United States,50 2 in which a domestic producer appealed from the .ITC's negative determination in
503
Tantalum Electrolytic Fixed Capacitors from Japan,
the CIT held
"that the Commission has no authority to refine or modify the class or
kind of merchandise found to be, or likely to be sold at LTFV." 50 4 In
Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 05 the CIT ruled that the ITA
had acted improperly in dismissing countervailing duties and antidumping investigations because there had been no or only minimal
importation of the products in recent years. "According to the court,
[b]y reaching a conclusion that a given level of importation was de
minimis, the ITA usurped the role of the ITC whose duty it is to gauge
whether the levels of impqrtation have any meaningful effect."
The argument goes that this implies that the ITC should not determine the valuation of a subsidy." 6 In the author's opinion, the statutory bifurcation argument does not support the position of opponents
of the margins analysis. It is of course clear that the ITA determines
the dumping margin, but this does not preclude the ITC's using the
established margin in its causation analysis, nor do the Sprague Electric and Republic Steel cases compel that conclusion because their
scope is limited. If the propriety of a margins analysis can be proved
on other grounds, neither the statutory bifurcation of functions nor the
few court decisions, which bear on this issue, should stand in the way
of such interpretation.
A structural argument in favor of the margins analysis has been
made out of the timing provisions of the TAA 0 7 After the initial ITC
preliminary determination, all subsequent deadlines for the ITC are
determined by referring to Commerce Department decisions. Furthermore, the ITC cannot terminate the investigation before the Commerce
501. Cf. GC-F-341, supra note 495.
502. 84 Cust. Ct. 243 488 F. Supp. 910 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
503. USTC 789 (AA1921-159) (1976), cited in GC-F-341, supra note 495, at 1.
504. Quoted in GC-F-341, supra note 495, at 1.
505. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 82-2-00207, Slip Op. 82-58 (Ct. Int'l
Trade July 22, 1982).
506. GC-F-341, supra note 495, at 5.
507. GRANET, supra note 495, at 996.
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Department makes its preliminary LTFV determination.50 8 It might
follow from this scheme that Congress wanted the ITC to consider the
information, that is the preliminary dumping margins, gathered by the
Commerce Department. This interpretation is further supported 0 9 by
the TAA requirement that the ITA must make available to the ITC all
information upon which its affirmative preliminary determination is
based and which the ITC considers relevant to its injury
determination.5 10
This argument is not altogether convincing. First, if Congress
wanted the ITC to consider the dumping margins, why did it time the
preliminary ITC decision before the preliminary ITA decision? The
only information with respect to dumping margins that the Commission has at the time of its preliminary investigation usually consists of
Second, the information that the ITA
allegations by the petitioner"
has to make available to the ITC does not necessarily have to concern
the dumping margins, but might be information regarding the United
States price of the dumped imports.
(2) Economic and public policy arguments
In cases in which the dumping margin is insignificant in relation to
the margin of underselling, imposition of duties on the basis of the
imports test would, on the one hand, not alleviate the injury suffered
by domestic producers, and, on the other hand, impose burdens both
on United States consumers and international trade relations.5 12 The
economic usefulness of the margins analysis, however, has been subjected to criticism too. Indeed, the weighted-average margin has been
described as having "no probative usefulness whatsoever for the purposes of the Commission's import-injury determinations."5 3 The margins analysis assumes that there is a logical relationship between the
dumping margin (weighted-average of the difference between foreign
producers' export prices and their home market prices) and the prices
at which United States importers or subsequent distributors sell the
508.

19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).

509.

GRANET, supra

note 495, at 1000.

510. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
511. See United States International Trade Commissioner Stern's opinion in Carbon
Steel Wire Rod from Brazil, Belgium, France and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1230, Inv.
Nos. 731-TA-148, 731-TA-149 and 731-TA-150 (Preliminary) (1982).
512. Victor, supra note 129, at 151.
513. See Hearings on Trade Remedies Legislation Before the House Ways and
Means Trade Subcomm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1119, 1143 and 1179 (1983) (statement of
Russell N. Shewmaker). Cited in Easton, supra note 482, at 44.
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merchandise.3 '1 For one thing, this assumption neglects distributors'
profits. For another, reliance on the Weighted-average Masks cases in
which importers deliberately undersold their competitors. In either
case, these arguments merely come into play once the question has
been answered whether use of an imports analysis (the alternative) is
permitted under United States and international law.
(3) Prior agency practice
It is generally acknowledged that use of the margins analysis was a
consistent ITC practice under the 1921 Act and in the first decisions
under the TAA5 1 5 Also, because consistent prior agency practice is a
factor which the courts consider in interpretation of statutes, this argument seems strong. 1 6 Opponents, however, submit that this practice
was in fact inconsistent with the 1921 Act and is even more out of step
with the 1979 Act. 17 Both section 160(a) of the 1921 Act"' and Section
735 of the TAA519 merely mention "injury by reason of imports." The
TAA, furthermore, requires the ITC to look into volume 5 0 and price
effects " ' in making its preliminary and final investigations. It is contended that "[a]s long as the dumped imports have a general downward effect on market price, therefore, there is price suppression even
though the price of the dumped product may not actually reflect the
exact lower than fair value margin.2 Indeed, the volume language
would permit affirmative injury findings with regard to imports which
do not have any discernible effect on prices at all. This logic cannot be
accepted and can be attacked on two grounds. First, it may be argued
that the relevant section of the TAA deals exclusively with material
514. Easton, supra note 482, at 43.
515. Palmeter, supra note 480, at 6-14; Easton, supra note 481, at 78; Easton, supra
note 482, at 39-44; Victor, supra note 129, at 152.
516. Id. at 540. Cf. Udal v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (quoting Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978):
"When faced with a problem of statutory construction this Court shows great
deference to the interpretation given the Statute by the officers or agency
charged with its interpretation. "To sustain (an agency's) application of (a) statutory term we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or
even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings."
517. Easton, supra note 481, at 80.
518. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
519. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(d)(1) (1982).

520. 19 U.S.C.
521.
522.

§ 1677(c)(i) (1982).

19 U.S.C. § 1677(c)(ii) (1982).
GC-F-065, supra note 492.
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injury and does not concern the causation requirement. This counterargument is weak, however, because, as already discussed the factors of
material injury usually indicate a causal link.
Second, assuming that the section applies to both, it is explicitly
mentioned that the list is not exhaustive. The statement that the margins analysis is inconsistent with the pricing and volume effects of the
imports is, therefore, not supported by the statutory language. The
most that might be concluded is that the statutory language does not
require a margins analysis.
(4) Legislative history arguments
The strongest arguments in support of a margins analysis fall into
the category of legislative history. The Senate Finance Committee Re52 4
port " ' uses the term "by reason of dumped imports" fifteen times,
5"2 5
and the term "injury
the term "by reason of imports" five times,
caused by dumping" four times. " Not only did the Senate acknowledge the requirements of GATT and the 1979 Code,5 27 it also approved
prior ITC practice and intended this practice to continue. As the Senate Finance Committee Report states:
Section 735(b) contains the same causation standard as is in
current law, i.e., an industry must be materially injured "by
reason of" less- than-fair-value imports. The current practice
by the ITC with respect to causation will continue under Section 735. In determining whether injury is by reason of lessthan-fair value imports, the ITC now looks at the effects of
such imports on the domestic industry. The ITC investigates
the conditions of trade and competition and the general condition and structure of the relevant industry. It also considers
• . . how the effects of the margin of dumping relate to the
injury . . . . Current ITC practice with respect to which imports will be considered in determining the impact on the U.S.
industry is continued under the bill.52 8
Further on in relation to material injury, the Senate Finance Commit523.
524.

SENATE FINANCE COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 7.

Id.
525. Id. at 16, 18, 37, 38, 60, 74, 75, 80, 82 and 87.
526. Id. at 37, 38, 39 and 41.
527. Id. The Senate stated: "[under the rules of the GATT, neither antidumping nor
countervailing duties may be imposed unless subsidization or dumping of the imported
merchandise causes or threatens to cause material injury. Id. at 37-38, cf. id at 41: "a
'causal' link between the ... dumping and the injury." Id.
528. Id. at 74. (Emphasis added).
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tee Report states:
For one type of product, price may be the key factor in making
a decision as to which product to purchase and a small price
differential resulting from the amount of . . .the margin of
dumping can be decisive; for others the size of the differential
may be of lesser significance.2"
The House Report three times mentions "impot, 59 0 four times
"dumped imports,"5 and repeats the language quoted directly above
one time. 2 Five conclusions can be drawn from the legislative history.
One, neither the Senate nor the House make a clear distinction between "imports," "dumped imports" and "dumping." Two, the Senate
acknowledges that both GATT and the 1979 Code require a causal link
between the dumping and the injury. Three, both the Senate and the
House knew that the ITC considered dumping margins as one of the
factors in determining material injury. Four, the Senate knew that the
ITC used dumping margins in its causation analysis. Finally, both the
House and the Senate intended the ITC to continue its causation analysis in the same way.
The only argument against these conclusions is the reference in
the Senate Finance Committee Report that "[tihe determination of the
ITC with respect to causation is, under current law, and will be, under
section 735, complex and difficult, and is a matter for the judgment of
the ITC."5 8 One might argue that this language permits the ITC to
change its mind whenever it wants to.
It cannot be accepted that the Senate and the House did not know
what they were talking aboutM Nor does it seem likely that Congress
was intentionally vague in order to placate both United States producers and importers. 5 5 Congress knew the international agreements, it
knew that past ITC practice conformed, and it intended things to stay
that way.
(5) International obligations
Article 3, paragraph 4 of the 1979 Code536 provides that "[iut must
4
be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
529. Id. at 88.
530. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 44, 73 (1979).
531. Id. at 45, 46, 47.

532. Id. at 538.
533. SENATE FINANCE CoMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 75.
534. Easton, supra note 482, at 48.

535. 1d. at 49.
536. 1979 Code, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 4.
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dumping, causing injury within the meaning of this Code." The footnote within the quote refers to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same article
dealing with volume and price effects of the imports and their consequent impact on the United States industry. The provision clearly supports a margins analysis, and is, furthermore, buttressed by Article VI
of the GATT, which requires that the dumping cause the injury. Supporters of the imports analysis argue, however, that the note refers us
to paragraphs 2 and 3 which nowhere mention the effects of
87
dumping.
Perhaps an even stronger argument is the fact that the drafters
used the terms "dumped imports" and "effects of dumping" interchangeably. 38s This argument, however, is unacceptable, because if this
were the case, the phrase "through the effects of dumping," in the sentence quoted above, would be completely superfluous. The fact that
the drafters used both terms in the same sentence is persuasive proof
of an intended distinction and of the drafters' intention that dumping
margins should be taken into account in the causation investigation.
The question then remains whether the United States statute is in
conformity with the 1979 Code, because section 3(a) of the TAA539 provides that in the case of a conflict between United States law and the
1979 Code, the United States law prevails. As has already been seen,
legislative history strongly supports use of a margins analysis. Even
without this support, however, the statute should be interpreted in a
way which makes it consistent with the 1979 Code. As the Senate Finance Committee Report emphasized, "[tihis bill is drafted with the
intent to permit U.S. practice to be consistent with the obligations of
the Agreements, as the United States understands those obligations.
The bill implements the U.S. understanding of those obligations."" 0
If there is a potential conflict between United States law and an
international agreement, that conflict should be explicitly addressed
and dealt with in the TAA and its legislative history. Absent such discussion, a conflict should not be found.
(6) Practical arguments
The margins analysis might create administrative problems."' Reliance on less-than-fair-value margins, as established by the Commerce
Department, would create difficulties if the CIT subsequently found
537.
538.
539.

540.
541.

Easton, supra note 482, at 47. Cf. GC-F-345, supra note 492, at 14.
GATT, supra note 4, art. VI, paras. 2 and 3.
19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1982).
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 36.
GC-F-345, supra note 492, at 11.
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those margins to be incorrect while judicially reviewing the ITA determination. This objection is valid, but exaggerated. In the first place, it
would depend on the role the less-than-fair-value margin played in the
ITC decision. As has been seen above, the relationship of the dumping
margin to the margin of underselling was one, but seldom the dispositive, consideration in the ITC causation anaylsis, prior to 1982. In most
cases, a change in the dumping margin would not necessarily affect the
value of the ITC's determination. In the second place, the problem is
not unique for the dumping margin. The ITC also uses pricing information supplied by the Commerce Department, and similar problems
can arise there. To summarize, even though judicial review might create a problem in certain cases, these problems are inherent in the
United States system of bifurcated functions and should be taken for
granted.
Although there are some economic and practical difficulties with
applying a margins analysis, these difficulties should not divert us from
the basic issue whether such analysis is contemplated by international
and United States law. In the author's opinion, use of a margins analysis is supported, if not mandated, by the language of the 1979 Code,
the legislative history of the TAA and prior agency practice.
3. Cumulation
In this section we are concerned with the question whether the
ITC should consider all imports of a certain class or kind of merchandise alleged to have entered the United States market in an unfair way
or whether the ITC should investigate those imports on a country by
country basis. This question raises several other questions such as the
following. Can the ITC combine dumped imports from one source with
subsidized imports from another source in its injury (causation) analysis? Should complaints against unfair imports from several countries
be filed simultaneously if petitioner wishes an aggregate determination? Does the ITC have discretion in its decision not to cumulate or
not? Furthermore, one should obviously distinguish international obligations from national obligations.
An example may clarify the importance of the decision to cumlulate or not. Assume that countries A, B and C export respectively 100,
400 and 500 widgets to country D at dumped prices and that the total
volume of the imports accounts for twenty percent of domestic consumption in country D. Assuming further that material injury occurs,
cumulation of the exports might result in a finding that such exports
are the cause of the injury. A determination on a country-by-country
basis, on the other hand, would be faced with the problem that A's
exports account for only two percent of domestic consumption. It
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might be hard to defend the argument that such a small percentage
could cause material injury to the domestic industry with a market
share of eighty percent.
This section will investigate obligations which GATT and the 1979
Code impose. In addition, it will analyze how Congress, the ITC and
the CIT have answered the questions raised above.
Neither GATT nor the 1979 Code explicitly address the propriety
of cumulation. GATT Article VI, however, seems to contemplate a
country-by-country approach in that it repeatedly uses the singular
term "country. ' ' 14 The 1979 Code, on the other hand, uses the term
"dumped imports," thereby seeming to permit an aggregate approach.54 The fact that both the European Community and the
United States have on occasion cumulated dumped imports in the
past, and that this practice has never been criticized by the Committee
on Antidumping practices," 4 is further evidence that the practice of
cumulation has been accepted by the signatories to the 1979 Code.
The legislative history of the TAA makes no explicit reference to
cumulation, but the general observation with respect to causation, that
current ITC practice will continue, might encompass cumulation. The
Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1974 Trade Act contained
the following relevant language:
A number of cases before the Commission have been concerned
with the question of whether imports of comparable articles
from different countries should be considered together or
cumulated in making injury determinations. The issue arises in
several different contexts, viz.: (1) when Treasury determinations involving comparable imports from two or more different
countries are simultaneously submittted to the Commission;
(2) when Treasury determinations comparable imports are submitted to the Commission at different times. Under consistent
practice ... the Commission has considered the combined impact of lower than fair value import when the factors and economic conditions so warrant. Such result does not flow as a
matter of law; it follows on a case-by-case basis, only when the
factors and conditions of trade show its relevance to the deter542. GATT, supra note 4, article VI, 1. "The contracting parties recognize that
dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another
..... " Article VI, 6 provides: "No contracting party shall levy any antidumping duty on
the importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless
" Id. ..
543. 1979 Code, supra note 5, arts. 3(1), 3(2), 3(4), 3(5) and 3(7).
544. See Reports of the Committee on Antidumping Practices, supra note 110.
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mination of injury."'
It should also be noted that in 1968 the Customs Court explicitly upheld a decision of the Tariff Commission to cumulate imports of Portland grey cement with cement imports from other countries, with regard to which, injury determinations had earlier been made. 46
Considering both the Senate Finance Committee Report on the
1974 Trade Act and the 1968 Customs Court decision, three conclusions may be drawn concerning pre-1980 antidumping law. First, the
ITC Commission had discretion to determine whether or not to cumulate imports from different sources. Second, the fact that imports from
different sources were not the subject of the same investigation, or that
petitions were not filed simultaneously, did not preclude aggregation.
Finally, the question whether imports that were the subject of an antidumping investigation could be cumulated with imports that were
the subject of another type of unfair trade investigation (countervailing, Section 301 or 337) never arose before 1980.
One of the first and most extensive discussion of cumulation in
ITC injury determinations can be found in the 1982 Steel Countervailing Duty cases. 54 7 In these cases Commissioners Alberger, Stern
and Eckes stated that, in their opinion, cumulation would be proper if
the factors and conditions of trade in the particular case showed its
relevance to the determinations of injury. Especially important would
be factors and conditions of trade that could combine to create a collective hammering effect on the domestic industry. The commissioners
then gave a non-exhaustive list of such factors. The list included the
volume of imports, the trend of import volume; the fungibility of imports, competition in the markets for the same end users, common
channels of distribution, pricing similarity, simultaneous impact, and
any coordinated action by importers.
In the Steel Countervailing Duty cases, the ITC considered the
imports on a case-by-case basis. The ITC noted, however, that it might
cumulate in the final. In these cases producers in the six European
countries involved in the investigation agreed to impose quantitative
restraints on steel exports to the United States in exchange for the
domestic industry's withdrawal of the antidumping and countervailing
545. Senate Finance Committee Report on the Trade Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 1298,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7186, 7316
(1974).
546. City Lumber Co. v. United States, 61 Cust. Ct. 448, 290 F. Supp. 385 (Cust. Ct.
1968), afl'd, 64 Cust. Ct. 826, 311 F. Supp. 340 (Cust. Ct. 1970).
547. Certain Steel Products from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 1221, Inv.
No. 701-TA-86-144 (February 1986).
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duty petitions. As a result, the cases never returned for a final
determination.
Although the ITC majority cumulated on several occasions, 4" in
other cases it has declined to do so because either (1) there was no
need for cumulation as the volume of imports from the individual
countries was sufficient in each case to warrant individual affirmative
determinations; 4 9 (2) the factors and conditions of trade did not require cumulation 550 or (3) the petitions were not filed at the same
time. 65'
52
Furthermore, in Stainless Steel and Strip from West Germany,5
the ITC refused to cumulate those dumped imports with imports of
the same product which were the subject of a Section 301 investigation,
because there was no material injury requirement in a Section 301 investigation and the practice complained of did not necessarily fall
within the purview of Title VII 5 5s It is important to note that this
logic does not necessarily preclude cumulation of dumped imports with
subsidized imports (cross-cumulation). A Commission majority, however, has consistently refused to cumulate dumped and subsidized imports.""' In view of the recent decision of the CIT in Bingham & Taylor," holding that the statute requires cross-cumulation, it remains to
be seen what future developments will bring. The careful attitude of
the ITC must be applauded because cumulation presents difficulties if
looked at from a business point of view. It does not take into account
that small countries with small market shares will generally be forced
by larger countries/exporters to follow the latters' lead, by adopting a
similar pricing level. The counterargument would be that the same
pressure occurs to individual firms within one country, and that the
548. E.g., Certain Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof from Japan and Italy,
USITC Pub. 1497, Inv. No. 731-TA-86-144 (February 1984); Carbon Steel Wire Rod
from jkgentina, M4eiic, Pale.d, end Spain, USITC Pub. 1476, Inv. No. 731-TA.-157-1.60
(January 1984).
549. Thin Sheet Glass from Switzerland, Belgium, and the Federal Republic of Germany, USITC Pub. 1727, Inv. No. 731-TA-127-129 (July 1985).
550. Menthol from Japan and the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1087, Inv.
No. 731-TA-27 (July 1980).
551. Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from West Germany, USITC Pub. 1252, Inv. No.
731-TA-92 (June 1982). The ITC noted that cumulation in such a case would not only
present procedural and administrative problems, but also risked running afoul of the
basic statutory framework within which the ITC must operate. Id.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. See, e.g., Iron Construction Castings from Brazil, Canada, India, and the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1720, Inv. No. 701-TA-249-252, 731-TA-262-265
Pe5.ina

&lY)

.

t

.

555. Bingham & Taylor v. United States, slip. op. 86-14 Ct. Itn'l Trade (1986).
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GATT and United States dumping provisions allow cumulation in such
cases. In other words, if cumulation is deemed appropriate on an intracountry level, why should it be prohibited on an inter-country level?
Antitrust lawyers object to cumulation because it does not rest on
collusive or interdependent behavior."' They argue that cumulation
would only be appropriate if there were evidence that the dumpers acted collusively in order to gain control over the market as a group. The
argument against this point of view is that, no matter what one thinks
of it, present antidumping law simply does not take intent into account, although, as already discussed, one factor that the ITC considers is evidence of coordinated action by importers.
The CIT initially seemed to agree with the ITC's careful reasoning. Thus in U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States,5 5 7 Judge Watson stated
that the suggestion that the ITA and the ITC should deal with the
products under investigation in a more unified manner through the observation that the "statutes are directed to the injurious effect of a
"class or kind of merchandise" and the assertion that all plate and
coiled rolled sheet imports at issue are fungible with like products still
under investigation," does not establish a statutory duty to aggregate.'" In 1984, the CIT seemed to change direction. Republic Steel v.
United States5 5' concerned seven negative preliminary countervailing
duty determinations." 0 The CIT differentiated between preliminary
and final investigations, and held that, for preliminary determinations,
the proper test for cumulation is whether subsidized imports are competing with the product of the domestic industry during the period
under investigation when the effect of these imports is being felt by the
domestic industry. The CIT explicitly rejected the standard used by
the ITC; that standard being whether the importations could conceivably have contributed to material injury, as being too stringent. The
CIT also rejected the "factors and conditions of trade" test. After rejecting these tests the CIT gratuitously remasked that in final determinations cumulation cannot completely eliminate the need for a causal
connection between importations from a country and injury to a do556. Id.
557. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 106 (1982).

558. Id.
559. Republic Steel v. United States, 8 C.I.T. 29, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade
July 11, 1984).
560. Steel Products from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1261, Inv. No. 701-TA170-173 (Preliminary) (1982); Steel Products from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxumbourg, The Netherlands, Romania, The United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC

Pub. 1221, Inv. No. 701-TA-86-v. 1,2; (1982); Steel Products from Spain, USITC Pub.
1331, Inv. No. 701-TA-155-163 (Preliminary) (1982).
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mestic industry.
Cumulation operates on its own terms at the preliminary determination to require the consideration of the combined effect
of all competitive, subsidized or allegedly subsidizes importations of a particular product. It operates at the final determination only in conjunction with findings of contribution to injury from the products of particular countries. This vital
distinction is grounded in the statutory language, and in the
extensive legislative history both of which indicate an extremely low threshold for finding a reasonable indication of
561
injury.
The CIT decision can be criticized on several grounds. In the first
place, as has been argued above, cumulation seems permitted on the
international level both by the language of the 1979 Code and by tacit
approval of the international community. Second, and more important,
the only difference that the 1979 Code makes between preliminary and
final investigations is in evidentiary standards. If anything, the low
threshold standard for preliminary investigations in the United States
is a violation of the 1979 Code. Third, even in the United States it
seems acknowledged that the different evidentiary standards are the
only allowable difference: "[w]ith the exception of the different evidentiary standards, all of the other standards in the Act (e.g. the definition
of industry, material injury and causation) have the same meaning for
5'6 2
both preliminary and final cases.
Without seeming to realize it, the CIT in the Republic Steel case
has used the "low threshold" language in the legislative history to expand the different evidentiary standard, basically a procedural issue, to
the field of substantive antidumping law by applying it to causation.
The holding established a lower causal link in the preliminary investigation than in the final investigation. It is doubtful, to say the least,
whether this is permitted by either the 1979 Code or the legislative
history of the 1974 Trade Act and the TAA. Though the CIT can theoretically exchange its own standard for cumulation for that of the ITC,
it cannot establish different substantive law for preliminary and final
investigations. The court's decision is presumably overruled by the
1984 Trade and Tarrif Act, which enacted a special provision on
3
cumulation:"
The Commission shall cumulatively assess the volume and ef561.
562.
563.

Reptblic Steel, 591 F. Supp. at 646.
Victor, supra note 129, at 123.
H.R. 3398, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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fect of imports from two or more countries of like products
subject to investigation if such imports compete with each
other and with like products of the domestic industry in the
United States market."
In its first decisions on cumulation after entry into force of the Tariff
and Trade Act, the ITC does not seem particularly perturbed by this
legislative mandated. In addition to the two factors already mentioned,
the Commission requires that the marketing of the products is reasonably coincident. The ITC finds support for this position in the Conference Agreement on the House and Senate versions of the bill, which
provides in part:
The provision requires cumulation of imports from various
countries that each account for a small percentage of total
market penetration but when combined may cause material injury. The conferees do intend, however, that the marketing of
imports that are cumulated be reasonably coincident."'
4. Technical Dumping
We have seen in Part IV section B 2(a) that the ITC will normally
refuse to make an affirmative injury finding if the United States price
of the dumped imports does not undercut the domestic price levels.'
This long-standing practice was explicitly authorized in the Senate Report on the 1974 Trade Act:
The Antidumping Act does not proscribe transactions which
involve selling an imported product at a price which is not
lower than that needed to make the product competitive in the
United States Market, even though the price of the imported
product is lower than its home market price. Such so-called
564. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(iv) (1984).
565. H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 173 (1984).
566. E.g., Countertop Microwave Ovens from Japan, USITC Pub. 1033, Inv. No. 731TA-4 (Preliminary) (1980); Melamine In Crystal Form from Austria and Italy, USITC
Pub. 1065, Inv. No. 731-TA-13-14 (Final) (1980); Canned Clams from Canada, USITC
Pub. 1060, Inv. No. 731-TA-17 (Preliminary) (1980); Asphalt Roofing Shingles from Canada, USITC Pub. 1100, Inv. No. 731-TA-29 (Preliminary) (1980); Nitrocellulose from
France, USITC Pub. 1409, Inv. No. 731-TA-96 (Final) (1983); Chlorine from Canada,
USITC Pub. 1249, Inv. No. 731-TA-90 (Preliminary) (1982); Portland Hydraulic Cement
from Australia and Japan, USITC Pub. 1440, Inv. No. 731-TA-108 (Preliminary) (1982);
Bicycles from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1311, Inv. No. 731-TA110 (Preliminary) (1982); Certain Lightweight Polyester Filament Fabric from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1457, Pub. No. 731-TA-119 (Final) (1983).
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technical dumping is not anti- competitive, hence, not unfair; it
is pro-competitive in effect. " '
In adopting this position, the ITC goes further than the 1979 Code,
because the 1979 Code recognizes that dumped imports can have a
price depressing or suppressing effect even in the absence of underselling. Suppose, for example, that in January, 1984 prices of both
United States and foreign-produced widgets were ten dollars, and that
in May, 1984 the prices of raw materials, needed for the production of
widgets in the United States, increased. The competitively-priced imports would prevent the American producers from increasing the prices
of their widgets, and thus cause injury. The 1979 Code allows relief in
such a situation, whereas the ITC would not.
Although the ITC still seems to consider absence of underselling
as dispositive evidence of technical dumping, this position has been
criticized by the General Counsel of the ITC on the basis of the arguments mentioned earlier. The General Counsel would like to see absence of underselling as merely a rebuttable indicator of the possible
presence of technical dumping."" It is likely that the ITC will concede
to the General Counsel's view in the near future if an example similar
to the widgets hypothetical materializes.
B.

The European Community

1. Introduction
The original antidumping regulation 459/68 of the European Community provided that a determination of injury could only be made
when the dumped imports were demonstrably the principal cause of
such injury. Further, the consequences of dumping had to be weighed
against all other factors which, when taken together, might adversely
affect the European Community industry. This language was a direct
result of the signing of the 1967 Code by the European Community.
As we have seen, however, the 1967 Code was replaced by the 1979
Code, which substantially watered down the causal link between
dumping and injury. Consequently, the European Community adopted
the 1979 Code language with respect to causation. Article 4, 1 of Regulation 1276/84 (and of the old regulation 3017/79) now provides in relevant part:
567. Senate Report on Trade Act, supra note 545.
568. See Memo from the General Counsel to Commissioner Stern. For a discussion of
the ITC's requirement of a final determination, see supra note 495 and Memorandum
from the General Counsel to the ITC, Precipitated Barium Carbonate from the Federal
Republic of Germany, USITC Pub. 1154, Inv. No. 731-TA-31 (Final) (1981).
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(a) determination of injury shall be made only, if the dumped
.. . imports are, through the effects of dumping. . . . causing
injury . . . Injuries caused by other factors, such as volume
and prices of imports which are not dumped . . . , or contraction in demand, which, individually or in combination, also adversley affect the Community industry, must not be attributed
69
to the dumped . . . imports."
Although the language basically follows the 1979 Code, it should be
noted that the 1979 Code footnote reference of Article 3, 4 after "effects" to volume and price effects has been omitted. Relevant to the
issue of causation is also Article 13, 5 of the old regulation which provides that, if a product is dumped into the European Community from
more than one country, duties shall be levied on a non-discriminatory
basis on all imports of such products. The scope of this provision is not
entirely clear. It could be read to mean that if products of several
countries are dumped and cause injury, antidumping duties have to be
imposed on all such imports. Thus, there would notably be no discretion for the European Community authorities not to impose duties on
the imports from country X on the basis that imposition in that case
would not be in the European Community's interest. This issue will be
explored more fully in Part V, section B, 3. Such an interpretation
would seem to run afoul of the basic character of the regulation as a
policy instrument. The policy character of the regulation is most evident in the general requirement that imposition of antidumping duties
has to be in the interest of the European Community.5 7 At least theoretically, this additional requirement, for which support can be found
in article 8, 1 of the 1979 Code, is the most important difference between European Community and United States antidumping law. It
will be recalled, that in the United States imposition is mandatory
once dumping, and injury caused thereby, are found. It occasionally
happens that European Community consumers of the dumped product
fulminate against protective measures because such action would result
in higher prices of the product under consideration or because these
consumers desire an alternative source of supply. Although duly considering such lamentations, as of yet the European Commission has always given priority to the interest of the European Community producers who suffer material injury from the dumped imports, thereby
for all practical purposes equating European Community interests with
producers' interests.
The European Community interest criterion has been used, how569. The Regulation, supra note 11, art. 4, 1.
570. 1979 Code, supra note 5, arts. 11(1) 12(1).
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ever, to support a negative or doubtful injury determination. In Furfural from the Dominican Republic, Spain and the PRC,5 ' the European Commission, after considering that the imports from the
Dominican Republic (which accounted for sixty percent of European
Community consumption) were not dumped, decided that the
nondumped Dominican imports had been the principal cause of injury,
and that the interests of the European Community did not call for protective measures on imports from China and Spain because, inter alia,
such imposition would only lead to a decrease in consumption of furfural and replacement by other products. In other words, any injury
suffered by domestic producers would not be alleviated by the imposition of such measures.
Likewise, in the decision Codeine from Czechoslavakia,7 2 imports
from member States into Germany were considered to be the principal
cause of injury. The European Commission noted that it was difficult
to establish whether the dumped import taken in isolation, had caused
material injury. It decided, however, that protective action would not
be in the European Community's interest as long as the other member
States, while maintaining import restrictions, continued to export to
Germany. Imposition of antidumping duties under these circumstances
would merely result in the dumped imports being replaced by lowpriced imports from the rest of the European Community.
Both the Furfural and the Codeine cases reinforce the conclusion
arrived at above, namely, that the interests of the domestic producers
play a predominant role with regard to the European Community interest criterion. In both cases, it was evident that imposition would not
alleviate the difficult situation of the domestic industry. It seems clear
that, had imposition of antidumping duties helped the domestic industry and had the dumped imports caused injury, the European Community interest criterion would not have formed an impediment to action
by the European Commis i n. It can be concluded that, although at
least one influential commentator has argued that the criterion could
be used to take into account the interests of users of the dumped product, trade policy considerations, and the special situation of the lessdeveloped-countries, 7 in practice, the European Community interest
criterion has played a very limited independent role and has virtually
been equated with the interests of the affected domestic industry.
It should be noted that the European Community authorities in
571. 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 189) 57 (1981).
572. Codeine from Czechoslovakia, et al., 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 30 (1983).
573. BESmLR, supra note 98, at 110, 111. Cf. CUNNANE & STANBROOK, supra note 314,
at 72, 73.
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the two cases referred to above used the term "principal cause." Despite the fact that this phrase has been used in other determinations as
well, it should be concluded that the European Commission still uses
the 1967 Code standard. It seems more a standard phrase than a
phrase with substantive content. Since 1980, the European Commission has never weighed the causes of injury and usually states that
The injurious effects attributed solely to dumping together represent material injury; whereas injuries, caused by other factors which could adversely affect the Community industry,
such as the volume and prices of other imports, or stagnation
in demand, have been examined, and any adverse effects,
caused by these factors have not been attributed to the imports
57 4
under consideration.
Analysis of determinations after the entry into force of Regulation
3017/79,575 reveals that the following factors have been deemed relevant by the European Commission for purposes of its causation investigation: (1) the volume, price and impact of nondumped imports; (2)
minimal dumping margins;" 6 (3) demand and consumption within the
European Community;"' (4) overcapacity in general, but especially
within the European Community; 7 8 (5) competition, or lack thereof,
among European Community producers; 5 "1 (6) no price undercutting; 0 (7) lack of interest on the part of the domestic industry;5 81 and
574. In Russian Nickel, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 159) 44,45 (1983), the European
Community interest criterion was used to impose a duty (7%) lower than the dumping
margin (40%).
575. Regulation, supra note 11.
576. See Stainless Steel Bars, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 18 (1980); Hermetic
Compressors (9.15-0.2%), 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113) 54 (1981); Textured Polyester
Fabrics (0.7%), 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 133) 18 (1981); Non-alloyed Aluminium
(0.3%), 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 161 1.4 (19831; But see, Paraxytene (2-37%), 24 OJ
EUR. COMM.

(No. L 158) 7 (1981).

577. See Acrylonitrile, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 29 (1983); Mechanical Alarm
Clocks, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 158) 5 (1980); Textured Polyster Fabrics 24 O.J. EUR
COMM. (No. L 133) 17 (1981); Vinyl Acetate Monomer, 23 O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 311) 13
(1980); Polyester Yarn, 23 O.J. EUR COMM. (No. L 231) 5 (1980); Studded-welded Link
Chain, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 231) 10 (1980); Mechanical Watches, 25 O.J. Eua.
COMM. (No. L 11) 14 (1982).
578. See Polyvinyl Chloride, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 274) 15 (1982); Studdedwelded Link Chain, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 231) 10 (1980); Polyethylene, 26 O.J. EuR
COMM. (No. L 138) 65 (1983); Glass Textile Fibres, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 160) 18
(1983).
579. Lack: Dense Sodium Carbonate, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) 2 (1980); Textured Polyester Fabrics, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 133) 18 (1981); Polyester Yarn, 23
3-3. EuR. Comm. No. 231' 5 (5_'.
580. See Saccharin, 26 O.J. E1JR. COMM. (No. L 352) 49 (1983); Xanthan Gum, 26 O.J.
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(8) low volumes of dumped imports. 5 2
As this article has already discussed, only twenty-two cases have
been terminated on the basis of a no injury finding.588 In the majority
of those cases, the European Commission relied on a combination of
the factors mentioned above, notably factors (1), (2), (6) and (8). Factors (1), (3), (4) and (5) are often mentioned in affirmative injury
findings.
Like the ITC, the European Commission does not always separate
material injury from causation. Unlike the ITC, however, the European
Commission routinely investigates the volume, prices and consequent
impact of nondumped imports. In a number of cases, this investigation
has lead the European Commission to conclude that the injury was not
caused by the dumped imports, but by the far more important nondumped imports. This has especially been the case in situations in
which the volume of the non-dumped imports was significantly higher
than that of the dumped imports and/or in which the prices of the
non-dumped imports were lower than or competitive with the prices of
the dumped imports.
2. Through the Effects of Dumping: Imports or Dumped Imports .
As discussed in Part V, section B, 2, the issue of "imports or
dumped imports" has received a lot of attention in ITC publications
and scholarly writings. Amazingly enough, however, only one European
commentator seems to have noticed that there is a potential problem
here.58 This seems understandable, first, because the regulation adopts
the phrase "through the effects of dumping," thereby implying that the
European Commission must look at the dumping, and not at the imports per se. Second, the same persons in the Commercial Defense Division of Directorate-General I (External Relations) of the European
Commission will usually investigate both dumping and resulting injury,
and, consequently, it will be easier from a structural point of view to
compare the dumping margins with the level of price undercutting.
Third, the Easton argument, that the footnote after "effects" allows
(No. L 268) 60 (1983); Nickel, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 29 (1983);
Sodium Carbonate, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 317) 5 (1982).
581. See Canned Peaches, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 110) 35 (1980); Monochrome
Portable T.V. Sets, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 364) 49 (1981).
582. See Pressure Sensitive Paper Masking Tape, 23 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 344) 58
(1980); Glass Textile Fibres, 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 160) 19-20 (1983); Oxalic Acid, 25
O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 19) 27 (1982); Fibre building Board, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
145) 39 (1980).
583. As of April 26, 1984.
584. Didier, supra note 323, at 41-43.
EUR. COMM.
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the signatories merely to look at the prices and volume of the imports,
once dumping is established, and notably does not require them to
conduct a margins analysis, does not seem applicable to European
Community law (as opposed to GATT/Code law), simply because the
regulation has omitted that footnote.5 85 Thus, all indicators seem to
lead to the conclusion that the issue has not received extensive attention, simply because there is no problem. The European Commission
always investigates whether there is a causal link between the dumping
margin and the injury "[ilf the imported goods significantly undercut
the prices of Community producers and if the undercutting is caused
either entirely or to a significant degree by dumping. . . and if it has
an adverse effect on the Community industry, a finding of injury may
be made. 5 86 This conclusion, however, is not buttressed by the injury
determinations of the European Commission. From the outset, two
problems in this respect should be noted. In the first place, the determinations do not always mention the margins of undercutting. In a
number of cases, the European Commission has merely noted that the
European Community prices of the dumped products were so low that
they did not even permit European Community producers to cover
their costs of production. In these cases, it is obviously impossible for
the outsider to know whether or not there was a significant difference
between the dumping margins and the levels of undercutting. Second,
in a majority of cases the dumping margin was clearly higher than the
margin of undercutting. Therefore, it was clear that the unfair practices enabled the foreign producers to undercut prices of European
Community producers, and, consequently, cause them injury.
Other cases do not permit such a clear conclusion. In Seamless
Tubes from Spain,87 for example, the European Commission concluded that, as the margin of Spanish undercutting was 12.6-17.36%,
and as a countervailing duty of 11.75% already had been imposed,
dumping, as distinct from subsidization, was not in itself a source of
material injury. On the other hand, in Potato Granules from Canada,5 s the European Commission reached an affirmative injury finding
despite the fact that the level of price undercutting was 26 %, while the
dumping margin was only 6.9%. In Malleable Cast Iron Tube Fittings
from Brazil, 9 the level of price undercutting was 20%, the dumping
585. This article attacks the validity of the argument in that footnote in Part V, § A,
2(b), infra.
586. Cf. CUNNANE & STANBROOK, supra note 314, at 65 (emphasis added).
587. 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 165) 27 (1981).
588. 24 O.J. EUR. COMM (No. L 116) 11 (1981).
589. 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 145) 29 (1981).
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margin 5.8%.90
These decisions have been justly criticized on the ground that they
lead to higher prices for consumers without improving the situation of
the domestic industry. 91 That is, the question becomes whether fewer
consumers buy a product that is nineteen percent cheaper than a product that is twenty-six percent cheaper. One should be careful, however,
to draw the conclusion that the European Commission in these cases
does not conduct a margins analysis. As has been discussed in Part V
section A, 2, a dumping margin that is significantly lower than the
margin of undercutting is not necessarily dispositive evidence of no
causation. It is merely an important indicator thereof, which can be
rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless it would be helpful
if the European Commission in such cases paid attention to the difference and explained why it nevertheless concluded that the dumping
resulted in injury.
3. Cumulation
We have concluded that the international regime probably admits
cumulation.
Contrary to United States practice, in which cumulation is more of
an exception than the rule (at least until now), the European Community authorities routinely seem to cumulate in cases in which imports
come from different sources, whether from different producers within
one country or from several countries. The fact that imports of a certain product were the subject of different investigations has not formed
an impediment to the proceedings of the European Commission.5 92
In 1980, Beseler advanced the following arguments for this position. First, it is logical to cumulate, because the position of the domestic industry depends on the total of the dumped imports. Second, cumulation is mandatory under the 1979 Code, article 8, 2, which
provides that "when an antidumping duty is imposed in respect of any
product, such antidumping duty shall be collected in the appropriate
amounts in each case, on a nondiscriminatory basis of imports of such
product from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury."
Third, cumulation is mandatory under Article 13, 5 of the Regulation
590. See also Styrene Monomer, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 42) 14 (1981) (dumping
margin 4%-undercutting 10%; Upright pianos dumping margin 42% -undercutting 69%).
591. Didier, supra note 323, at 42.
592. Saccharin from People's Republic of China and United States, 23 O.J. Eu.
COMM. (No. L 331) 41 (1980). Saccharin from Korea, 23 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 331) 25
(1980). Fibre Building Board from Brazil, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 47) 30 (1983). Copper Sulphate from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 274)
1 (1983).
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which provides that antidumping duties shall be levied in a nondis598
criminatory way.
In the author's opinion, the second and third arguments misstate
Cumulation is an aspect of causation. Causation, in turn, is
issue.
the
an aspect of injury (in a broad sense). Article 8, 2 of the 1979 Code and
13, 5 of the Regulation, however, relate to collection and levying of
antidumping duties once all the conditions for imposition are fulfilled
and duties are imposed. The language of both explicitly mentions
"dumping" and "causing injury." In other words, first there have to be
determinations that a product is dumped and that those dumped products cause injury to the domestic industry of the like product. Only
after these determinations are made does the GATT and the European
Community obligation arise to treat on a nondiscriminatory basis those
producers subject to the determinations. Indeed, the cumulation argument based on article 13, 5 of the Regulation, would require signatories
to cumulate.
This seems to be contrary to the whole meaning of nondiscrimination. Nondiscrimination is a species of the international economic principle of equality. This principle has two components- (1)treat equal
cases equally (formal equality); and (2) treat unequal cases unequally
in proportion to their unequality (substantive equality).5' Mandatory
cumulation, in each case in which imports come from different sources,
would run afoul of this principle in that it would require the European
5
Commission to treat cases equally which are not substantively equal."
Therefore, it can be concluded that those provisions of the 1979 Code
and the Regulation simply do not address the propriety of
cumulation.5"
A third and related argument, which supports this article's position can be found in those determinations in which the European Commission decided to exclude certain countries from the scope of the investigation because their market shares were minimal and could not be
causing injury. Thus in Fibre Building Board from a Number of EastEuropean Countries,"7 the European Commission excluded Bulgaria
593.

BESELER,

594.

VERLOREN VAN THEMAIr, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE

supra note 98, at 95.
OF INTERNATIONAL

Eco-

193 (1981).
595. How can it be argued, for example, that country A which dumps 1000 products
in the market of country B, thereby obtaining a market share of 30%, is equal to country
C which dumps 100 products?
596. But see infra Part V § A, 3. Cf. Davey, supra note 131, at 78, who concludes that
Articles 13, 2, and 3 seem to require a country by country approach.
597. O.J. EuR COMM. (No. L 181) 19 (1982).
NOMIC LAW
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because its market share of 0.2. to 0.7% could not cause injury. 598 This
indicates a country-by-country approach, at least for the analysis of
injury. If cumulation were mandatory, such exclusion would not be
permitted.
Until recently, the European Commission simply cumulated in
most cases, 59" thereby creating the impression that whenever imports
came from different sources, it would consider their impact as a whole.
Under this theory, certain exceptional cases referred to above might be
seen as an application of the "de minimis" rule.
Recent cases, however, suggest a shift in this approach.600 In Iron
or Steel Coils for Re-rolling from Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela,60 ' for example, the European Commission stated that
In analyzing whether cumulation was appropriate in each case,
the Commission considered whether the dumped imports were
a contributory factor to material injury sustained by the Community industry. In reaching its conclusions, factors considered
were comparability of imported products, total volume of imports, the increase in the volume of the imports, from previous
comparable period and the low level of prices attributable to
products of all supplying countries. Therefore, the Commission
took the view that exports by the countries concerned . . .
were under such conditions that, should the Commission treat
any country in isolation, it would be acting in a discriminatory
manner against the rest.6 "
The quoted language is interesting for several reasons. First, it indicates that cumulation is not an automatic matter anymore, but rather
depends on fulfillment of a number of conditions. Second, the conditions mentioned show a striking similarity to the conditions the ITC
usually considers, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the ITC's
598. In the same case, however, an antidumping duty was imposed on imports from
Romania which accounted for only 0.8% of the market. Cf., Oxalic Acid, Czechoslovakia,
25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 148) 51 (1982), in which the German Democratic Republic
and Hungary exports were very small and any injury resulting therefrom was considered
minimal.
599. Sodium Carbonate, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 283) 9 (1982). Electric Multiphase Motors, 23 O.J. Eu. COMM. (No. L 53) 21 (1980). Upright Pianos, 25 O.J. EuR.
COMM. (No. L 101) 45 (1982). Perchlorethylene, 25 O.J. Eu. COMM. (No. L 371) 47
(1982). Hexamethylene Tetramine, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 40) 24 (1983). Fiber Building Board, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 47) 30 (1983).
600. This is not certain because the European Commission might have applied the
same criteria before, but internally.
601.

26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 210) 5 (1983).

602. Id.
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conditions have been a model for the European Commission. Third,
careful reading of the last two sentences of the quote gives the impression that the European Commission was trying to reconcile the language of Article 13, 5 (if the reference to discrimination is indeed an
implicit reference to Article 13, 5) with the meaning of the nondiscrimination principle, as advocated by this article above. In this case, isolation of Argentina would discriminate against the other countries involved in the investigation because Argentina was in substantially the
same position as those other countries. On the other hand, it should be
noted, that the European Commission did admit that of the four countries concerned, Argentina exported the smallest quantity of the steel
coils, without, however, explaining why this fact did not affect its conclusion that Argentina was in the same position as Brazil, Canada and
Venezuela.
In summary, it is important to remember the following points. (1)
It is not exactly clear whether the GATT permits cumulation, but articles 3, 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 of 1979 Code all mention "dumped imports,"
and therefore could be interpreted that way. (2) If that interpretation
is right, cumulation is discretionary, rather than mandatory. (3) Article
8, 2 (non-discriminatory basis for collection)6 of the 1979 Code and
article 13, 5604 of the Regulation require previous findings of dumping
and injury. As cumulation is an aspect of causation, and causation an
aspect of injury (or, perhaps better, a bridge between dumping and injury), these provisions cannot be used to support the necessity of cumulation. (4) Even if articles 8, 2 and 13, 5 of the 1979 Code apply,
they should be interpreted in accordance with the underlying rationale
of the principle of nondiscrimination, or equal treatment of equal
cases. (5) The mere fact that several countries produce the same product, and that they dump it in the same market, does not make them
equal for the purposes of an injury analysis. (6) Equality (in a substantive sense) might, nevertheless, be inferred from additional data such
as the same volume of exports or the same prices.610
4. Technical Dumping
An alignment defense, otherwise known as technical dumping,
could be applied to three situations: (1) foreign producers align their
prices to the prevailing price level in the market of the importing country; (2) foreign producers align their prices to the prices of other lowpriced, but non-dumped imports; and (3) foreign producers align their
603.
604.
605.

1979 Code, supra note 5, art. 8, 2.
The Regulation, supra note 11, aT. I's, 5.
See 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 6 (1983).
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prices to other, dumped imports.
From the aligning producers' point of view, there seems to be no
reason why an alignment defense should not apply to all three situations if they can prove that they merely followed existing prices and
that they did not act in a concerted manner. In all three cases, it would
be a suicidal business technique to maintain higher prices than the
competition. For purposes of the injury analysis or from the importing
country's point of view, however, there is a difference between the
three situations.
In the first situation one can argue that products priced competitively at the level of domestic producers' prices cannot cause injury
without more (the United States view), or, more moderately, cannot
cause injury unless they have a price depressing or suppressing effect
(European Community point of view). In the second situation, if the
volume of non-dumped imports is clearly higher and the prices lower
than the volume and the prices of of the dumped imports, it is not the
dumped imports which cause injury, but the non-dumped imports.
Furthermore, in such a case imposition of antidumping duties would
not alleviate the injury, but simply increase the market share of the
non-dumping producers at the expense of the dumping producer.
With regard to the third situation, although it might be true that
smaller producers are forced to follow the unfair practices of their
more powerful competitors, this does not make any difference from the
importing country's point of view. Both types of imports hurt as much
as the other. Furthermore, antidumping law in general does not consider motive.
As discussed in Part V, Section A, 4 both the Senate Report on
the 1974 Trade Act and ITC practice indicate that dumped imports at
prices which make the foreign product competitive with the United
States product are not considered to be unfair. It is not clear, however,
if this practice extends to the first two situations mentioned above or
only to the first. European scholarly communis opinio seems to be that
competitively-priced dumped imports can nevertheless cause injury because they may depress prices or prevent needed price increases, which
otherwise would have occurred.'" This conclusion is supported by European Commission determinations. In Studded-welded Link Chain
from Spain and Sweden," 7 the European Commission noted that
"whereas prices at which these imports were sold, were very low, thus
606. CUNNANE & STANBROOK, supra note 314, at 66; BESELER, supra note 98, at 100,
101; Didier, supra note 323, at 41; Bellis, supra note 373, at 13.
607. 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 231) 10 (1980).
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forcing all Community producers to align their prices downwards."6 08
Even clearer is Sodium Carbonate from the USA: 6 09 "whereas resale
prices of imported sodium carbonate in general were below those prevailing in the market concerned, albeit in part only marginally .. .
they nevertheless prevented intended price increases and led to price
depression."' 61 ' The author's research reveals that the only two cases
ever terminated by the European Commission on the basis that the
dumped imports did not undercut European Community prices (and in
fact were priced even higher) were American Xanthan Gums" and
Codeine.612
On the other hand, in at least four cases the European Commission has issued either a "no injury" or a "not in the Community interest" determination or both, because the prices of the dumped imports
did not undercut those of a substantially larger volume of non-dumped
imports. 6" The rationale was that dumping was caused predominantly
by the non-dumped imports (as opposed to the dumped imports) and
that imposition of a duty would not alleviate the plight of the European Community industry, but would merely lead to a shift in market
%harefrom the dumping producer%to the non-dumping producers. An
additional argument in these cases may have been that the prices of
the dumped products were in fact higher than those of the nondumped imports. The resulting shift in market share, therefore, could
have had the effect of injuring the European Community producers
even more.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Antidumping law has grown up. After a long period of hesitant
and often groping application, the last four years have witnessed the
development of a relatively uniform, consistent body of rules. Although
administering authorities in both the 'United States and the European
Community stress a case-by-case approach and warn against the drawing of general conclusions, the more than 200 determinations in each
608. It should be noted that the European Commission did not egplicitly admit that
no price undercutting occurred in this matter. The latter conclusion can be inferred,
however, from the fact that the commission usually mentions if price undercutting occurs. Id. at 11.

609.
610.
611.
612.

25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 317) 5 (1982).
Id.
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 268) 60 (1983).
23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 313) 70 (1980).

613. 2 G.t. EuR. CoiAm. (No. L M9) 5 (1994; 26

.J.
Euiv. COat.

(Na. L M52 49

(1983); 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 29 (1983); 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 189) 57
(1981).
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system that have been made from 1980 to 1984 reveal consistent practice in numerous ways.
The 1979 Code, negotiated during the Tokyo Round under GATT
auspices and implemented by both the United States and the European Community by legislation, effective January 1, 1980, has been a
potent stimulus for this consistency.
Another stimulus, at least as far as the United States is concerned,
has been the establishment of an extensive system of judicial review.
The CIT's thorough review of ITC injury determinations has been an
invaluable source of statutory interpretation and, although occasionally
overstepping its boundaries, the CIT on the whole has corrected the
ITC in an appropriate manner.
Thus far, this development has not had an equivalent in European
practice. There, antidumping is still considered to be policy-oriented
and the European Court of Justice has acted accordingly by leaving the
European Council and the European Commission considerable margins
of discretion. The Allied Fediol and Timex cases, although breakthroughs in the procedural field, as yet have not changed this attitude
in the field of substantive antidumping law.
The policy-oriented approach is also apparent in the rather summary character of European Commission determinations. Final determinations are often merely updated replicas of preliminaries and determinations in general sometimes largely consist of the language of
the regulation without specifically explaining why the facts of the case
warrant such application.
There are, however, strong indications that change is at hand, and
that the European Community is slowly moving towards a more adjudicatory approach. The new design of antidumping determinations,
coupled with a more explanatory and less summary motivation is a
good example. No longer do the authorities automatically cumulate,
but they give their reasons for doing so. Likewise, the European Commission occasionally discusses why they considered a like product a
like product. These developments should be applauded. Not only do
they create precedent to a certain extent, thereby improving predictability, they might also form a basis for judicial review in that they lay
down standards which could be attacked before the European Court of
Justice.
In the author's opinion, there is no reason for a reserved judicial
attitude in the field of antidumping law. Antidumping is highly technical with a number of well-developed, detailed rules. The judiciary
should assume the task of testing whether application of these rules
has been in accordance with their purpose and their wording. And although policy considerations might be injected into a determination
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via the "Community interest" criterion, they should arguably be confined to that place. Determinations whether dumping occurs, and
whether such dumping causes injury, are relatively technical and
objective.
The determinations also show that antidumping law is a fast-moving field. Notably in the field of causation, issues such as cumulation,
margins analysis and technical dumping with a potentially decisive impact on the outcome of an investigation, have arisen in recent years. As
the 1979 Code does not directly address these issues, the propriety of
an analysis using cumulation, margins analysis, or a technical dumping
based determination hinges on interpretation of vague 1979 Code provisions and the purpose of those provisions.
Powerful arguments have been advanced in favor of a more antitrust like approach to the problem of dumping. The central notion of
these arguments is that dumping will practically always improve the
overall economic welfare of the importing country, simply because it
leads to cheaper prices of products. The only exception to this rule
would be the case of predatory dumping, that is, dumping practiced
with the intent to drive domestic competitors out of the market and to
subsequently raise the prices to monopoly levels. Therefore, it is argued, only this form of dumping should be acted against. A weaker
variation of this theory advocates an injury-to-competition approach as
opposed to an injury-to-competitors approach.
No matter how sympathetic these arguments sound, especially to
consumers of low priced imports, this article has shown that current
antidumping laws are extremely producer-oriented and they take the
position that if domestic producers are materially injured by reason of
dumping, the interests of those producers prevail above those of consumers and society in general. From an economic point of view, such
laws are undoubtedly protectionist. Politically speaking, they possibly
represent the best of two evils. Abolition of antidumping laws would
lead to a proliferation of escape clause actions and voluntary restraint
agreements. The antidumping laws arguably restrain clamors for such
actions. Even if the administering authorities decide not to take action,
for example because there is no causation, at least the petitioning industry has had its "day in court" and might temporarily refrain from
exploring other avenues of obtaining import relief. This view, however
cynical, seems the most realistic. It is no accident that "weak" industries such as steel are disproportionately active in filing antidumping
complaints.
A last remark that remains to be made concerns United States and
European Community compliance with international obligations. Parts
II through V detailed to what extent the law and practice in both sys-
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tems are in accordance with international rules. Although the European Community Regulation basically reproduces the language of the
1979 Code, the TAA deviates from it in several important respects.
This is most clear in the definition of "like product." The United
States definition of "material injury," although not in a strict sense a
deviation because the 1979 Code does not define the term, potentially
could be interpreted as requiring a very low degree of materiality.
Analysis of and comparison between United States and European
Community determinations, however, does not show any significant
difference in that degree. Furthermore, minor deviations are apparent
in the United States definition of regional industries and potentially in
the causation language "by reason of imports."
Both systems occasionally seem willing to allow a lower degree of
materiality of injury or causation, if the industry concerned is in a particularly vulnerable situation. Such practice does not seem permitted
by the 1979 Code, but reinforces the view that antidumping laws are
basically protectionist devices.
Other areas in which the United States and the European Community seem to be converging include cumulation and use of an imports
analysis as opposed to a margins analysis. The recent trend toward a
convergence of the two systems is a good one and will probably
continue.

